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In this thesis I describe my research activities and results of the last 4 years. I also provide an
outlook and guidelines on how to proceed with our project, that we named SEDNS - Security-
Enhanced Domain Name System. This project’s ambitions are to complement DNS, the Domain
Name System, in a way that allows us to keep using it in the future. The main reason for this
strategy is, that it has proven to be difficult to change any part of the Internet infrastructure, such
as parts of the protocols stack or well established Internet authorities, like ICANN or IANA.
The main problems of DNS are twofold. (1) The DNS protocol does not contain any measures to
prevent data from being tampered with. (2) Furthermore, it is difficult to configure DNS correctly
since most of the configuration is done within the DNS data itself, e.g., delegating authority.
It is well known that DNS problems lead to reduced availability of Internet-based services in
many different ways.
In this thesis, I present four main results. All of them contribute to improvements and deeper
understanding of DNS’ dependability issues.
First, I discuss, how well established cryptographic tools can be used to enhance DNS’ security
without getting into the same problems that prevent DNSSEC from being globally deployed.
These problems are explained as well. This is an important topic for the Internet and DNS
community, since at the moment most of the protocol improvements are connected to DNSSEC.
Second, I thoroughly discuss the technique that was used in the recent years to overcome any
problems related to client-server architectures, i.e., peer-to-peer systems. Such solutions have
been proposed to improve DNS’ availability and reduce configuration effort. I show, that those
systems do not keep up with the expectations, neither as client side tools nor as server infras-
tructure replacement. To reach this conclusion, a novel DHT scheme has been developed. The
evaluation of it is shown as well.
Third, results of our DNS data mining show that it is useful to improve the quality of DNS data
and therefore, to protect clients from malicious or erroneous information.
And fourth, an outlook is presented, which combines all the results of the first three points
to suggest an architecture that indeed can improve our supply with DNS data, omitting the
shortcomings of the classical client-server-architecture and its peer-to-peer replacements.
Note, that although the development of future DNS standards and protocols is subject to political
struggle, e.g., on whether or not an international organization should maintain the root zone
instead of the USA, this thesis focuses only on technical aspects.
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Starting as a network of networks, connecting different civil and military research institutes in
the US, the Internet has a growing influence on the daily life of people all over the world. We use
it for many things that are essential for us, like communication, entertainment, and shopping.
While we used the telephone network to set up an Internet connection ten years ago, we are
now using the Internet to implement phone calls. This is probably the best use case to show the
paramount importance of the Internet in our lifes. If the Internet is not available, we might in
the near future find ourselves unable to pay our bills, call a taxi, or notify the receiver about the
availability of an organ for transplantation.
The Domain Name System (DNS) is one of the key services that contributes some essential
characteristics of the Internet, e.g., the ability to use names instead of network layer addresses,
or the association of responsible mail servers for certain computers or domains.
Before the DNS was introduced in the early 80s, each computer was maintaining a file which
contained the name and address of each other computer in the Internet. Even though this system
worked successfully for about ten years, with the growing number of such mappings, keeping
this file up to date was expected to be impossible in the future. Therefore, a distributed service
had to be introduced. A basic requirement was, that each institution be able to manage their own
data independent of each other. Nevertheless, it had to be available to be used by any computer
in the network. To allow a computer to find a mapping and to make sure, that there are no
naming collisions, an hierarchical namespace has been used. It has been clear, that each owner
of a part of this namespace need to be able to partition it furthermore and to delegate authority
to other organizations or institutions.
In the upcoming Sections, some of DNS’ intrinsic properties and functionalities are explained.
Furthermore, a series of measures, that can contribute to an increased dependability of DNS,
among them the use of Supercaches and peer-to-peer networks, are investigated.
The reader of this thesis should be familiar with the most basic terms of DNS. Most important
among them are the DNS resource record types. A brief overview of DNS terminology can be
found on various web sites, among them http : //www.more.net/technical/dns/.
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 DNS Overview
The Domain Name System has been used for more than 20 years now as a universal distributed
dictionary. It can translate names to IP addresses and vice versa, which is certainly the main
functionality. But this translation mechanism can also be used for arbitrary mappings. Any kind
of data can be associated with a name.
The main weaknesses of DNS that I want to address in my work are:
• DNS is not secure. Messages and data can be forged. DNS security extensions are facing
serious obstacles and are not going to be deployed soon, such as the root key rollover
problem, NSEC walking and others[AA02].
• DNS is not sufficiently available and reliable.
• DNS data often shows configuration faults.
• DNS is difficult to deploy correctly.
DNS Administration. The administration of DNS is completely decentralized. Authority is
divided into zones which are manifested as suffixes of names. These zones form a tree. The
root of the tree, called root zone, is served by 13 root servers. The next level is called Top Level
Domains (TLD). Most organizations register their domains directly under a TLD, which makes
the tree rather flat.
DNS Query Processing. DNS data can be queried using DNS resolvers, which are usually com-
piled directly into user applications like web browsers. These resolvers are called stub resolvers
because they just implement a very limited functionality. Usually another local component is
used. This local DNS server offers the complete DNS functionality, including a cache. Often
the addresses of such local DNS servers are provided by dynamic host configuration (DHCP).
Sometimes such servers are used by Internet service providers to offer their own search engines
or portals, e.g., whenever a DNS name resolution resulted into an error.
When a stub resolver looks up a name, a query is sent to the local DNS server. From there
on, each other server might answer the query or shortcut the resolution process by using cached
information.
The local DNS server has to determine, which DNS server is responsible for the data being
requested. Therefore, it has to traverse the server hierarchy to follow the delegations leading
to this server. For bootstrapping reasons, each DNS server installation comes with a list of
root servers, which has to be kept up to date. The root servers are the entry points of the DNS
resolution process. There are 13 root servers now. Therefore, caching must be used in order not
to overload them. However, some of these root servers use IP anycast and therefore represent
actually a higher number of servers. In IP anycast, there is a one-to-many association between
an IP addresses and network endpoints. An IP address identifies a set of receiver endpoints,
which allows to select a nearby server.
Listing 1.1 shows an example of a typical DNS resolution. We want to resolve the name cnn.com.
First the list of root servers is retrieved from the local DNS server. Then E.ROOT-SERVERS.NET
is asked to provide the right TLD server. This is a random decision. If the answer contains
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Listing 1.1: Iterative resolution of “cnn.com”
; <<>> DiG 9.4.1-P1 <<>> cnn.com +trace
;; global options: printcmd
. 453042 IN NS L.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS M.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS B.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS C.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS D.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS E.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS F.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS G.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS H.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS I.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS J.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
. 453042 IN NS K.ROOT-SERVERS.NET.
;; Received 272 bytes from 141.76.44.1#53(141.76.44.1) in 19 ms
com. 172800 IN NS C.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS J.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS E.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS B.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS H.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS D.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS F.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS K.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS I.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS G.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS L.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS A.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
com. 172800 IN NS M.GTLD-SERVERS.NET.
;; Received 497 bytes from 192.203.230.10#53(E.ROOT-SERVERS.NET) in 178 ms
cnn.com. 172800 IN NS twdns-01.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com. 172800 IN NS twdns-02.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com. 172800 IN NS twdns-03.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com. 172800 IN NS twdns-04.ns.aol.com.
;; Received 188 bytes from 192.48.79.30#53(J.GTLD-SERVERS.NET) in 289 ms
cnn.com. 300 IN A 64.236.29.120
cnn.com. 300 IN A 64.236.16.20
cnn.com. 300 IN A 64.236.16.52
cnn.com. 300 IN A 64.236.24.12
cnn.com. 600 IN NS twdns-04.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com. 600 IN NS twdns-03.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com. 600 IN NS twdns-01.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com. 600 IN NS twdns-02.ns.aol.com.
;; Received 188 bytes from 149.174.213.151#53(twdns-01.ns.aol.com) in 131 ms
several records, the selection is usually randomized. The selected TLD server provides the
responsible DNS server for the zone cnn.com and there we finally find the name.
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In Listing 1.1 one can see a trace of the name resolution. TheNS records are called delegations
since they are used to point to a server which is responsible for serving a certain part of the DNS
namespace. One can see, e.g., that there are four servers serving cnn.com. The time it took for
each step indicates that the list of root servers came from the local name server while all other
records where received using remote queries.
The local name server usually iterates through such information and stores it in its memory to
be able to take if from its cache for the next query.
Since resolving DNS names involves many components and requires many messages to be ex-
changed, there is high probability that there is at least one component unavailable.
In Listing 1.1 one can see, that 31 DNS servers are involved in resolving a single query. Even
if only four servers are actually used, a failure in any of the 31 could lead to a client perceived
failure since the server to query next is picked randomly. Resolvers try to mask such failures
using a retry mechanism, which does not guarantee to avoid involving the same components
again.
Sometimes the situation is even worse. If there are correlated failures, then even the use of alter-
native DNS servers does not help. In Listing 1.2 one can see that the name academictracker.org
is served by two servers: ns1 and ns2. Using more than one server is common practice and
usually contributes some degree of fault-tolerance. But in this case there is probably a single
point of failure since both servers are behind the same gateway. Maybe they even share a switch.
One could argue that this does not really make a difference since the address of the requested
name is also behind this component and a failure would make it unavailable anyway. As already
mentioned by [PXL+04] this is not true: Say a user wants to open the web site academic-
tracker.org and the subnet 72.167.55 is not reachable. The web browser could not resolve the
name and therefore asks the user to check the spelling of the URL. In other words, it indicates
that the client caused the problem. If a DNS server would be available, the browser would re-
solve the name and report, that the desired web server is not reachable. For the user it would be
clear that it is not his fault.
Reducing the number of components involved in resolving a name could improve DNS’ avail-
ability.
The reason for DNS to be designed as such a distributed data base is to increase availability,
and to distribute workload and authority, but not to distribute the pure amount of data. The
amount of data that is being served by DNS is not too big to be served from a single component.
Hence, Amir et al. [AMT03] proposed to use Supercaches to serve the complete DNS data. A
Supercache is a DNS cache, which exploits the availability of large storage devices, to keep
cached copies of DNS records for a very large number of users. A conventional caching resolver
only uses its volatile main memory to cache records for a small group of users. This concept
helps solving many problems.
1. The number of messages needed to resolve a name would be reduced. This might help to
improve response times.
2. The load on the root and TLD servers would be reduced. This can help cutting cost and
should also increase their reliability.
3. The delay might be reduced depending on the workload and design of the Supercache.
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Listing 1.2: Correlated failures example
; <<>> DiG 9.4.1-P1 <<>> academictracker.org
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 60318




academictracker.org. 14287 IN A 72.167.55.138
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
academictracker.org. 86287 IN NS ns2.academictracker.org.
academictracker.org. 86287 IN NS ns1.academictracker.org.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns1.academictracker.org. 14299 IN A 72.167.55.138
ns2.academictracker.org. 14304 IN A 72.167.55.185
;; Query time: 1 msec
;; SERVER: 141.76.44.1#53(141.76.44.1)
;; WHEN: Mon Apr 21 10:53:07 2008
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 121
4. Data mining could be used to detect configuration issues. Often wrong or suboptimal
configuration of DNS leads to performance problems, failures, and high message overhead
[JSBM01, PPPW04]. Having more data in one place would make it easier to compare and
analyse it. One could, e.g., look at the delegations and their glue records in a parent zone
and compare them to the same data in the child zone.
5. Data mining could help to detect different kinds of fraud. Sometimes typos in URLs are
used to redirect traffic to another server. Some providers do not return NXDOMAIN errors
for a non-existing DNS name. Instead, they send an IP of some server which, e.g., offers
a web site full of ads. Of course, this could be done with malicious intent as well.
6. During outages of DNS, the Supercache could act as a backup of DNS. This can also be
done for a longer period of time. Historical data could help to estimate the expiry of DNS
data. Usually DNS mappings do not change each time when their TTL expires. So a
mapping could still be served if the history shows that it rarely or never changes. If there
is no alternative, old DNS records can even be served longer, expecting that they would
not be changed as long as a DNS outage is globally visible, e.g., during a denial of service
attack.
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1.2 DNS Data: Consistency and Correctness
Certain characteristics in DNS data can show that DNS server or zone administrators either
do not know what they are doing or that there is some kind of fraud going on. If there is a
Supercache, it is easy to find such examples:
Invalid TTLs RFC 2181 specified that a TTL value is an unsigned number with a minimum
value of 0 and a maximum value of 231 − 1. Listing 1.3 shows what patient data mining
gives us. The TTL is the second field of each record. We can see that all those records
have too large TTLs.
Serial vs. Refresh Timing A SOA record contains several timings. The refresh value says,
how often the secondary name server should transfer the zone to update its own copy,
specified as time interval in seconds. The serial is a counter that is incremented for each
update. It may also be a timestamp of the last update. Listing 1.4 shows some examples,
where zones are almost never updated, i.e., have a small serial, but the name servers are
rather tightly coupled, i.e., have a high refresh rate. This is obviously not necessary. In a
sensible configuration the refresh timing would reflect the update frequency. In Figure 1.4
the original SOA records are shown. The serial is the 7th field. The refresh value is given
in seconds in the 8th field.
Name Hijacking Sometimes DNS servers return names for which they are not authoritative, al-
though stating that. Asking the DNS server dnsp1.powerhosting.com for cnn.com returns
an answer pointing to the IP address 38.98.193.15, which is obviously a fake. The DNS
answer message has the AA flag set, indicating an authoritative answer.
Listing 1.3: Wrong TTLs found with data mining (greater than the maximum for signed 32-bit
integer)
unibaseinc.com. 2599813632 IN NS ns1.unibaseinc.com.
synthesco.fr. 3835759360 IN NS ns1.acces-web.net.
synthesco.fr. 3835759360 IN NS ns2.acces-web.net.
Listing 1.4: low serials vs. short synchronization intervals)
caiazzocittaviva.org. 640 IN SOA ns1.netsons.com. admin.netsons.com. 1
640 300 604800 600
combinedgroup.com. 180 IN SOA ns.combinedgroup.com. admin.
combinedgroup.com. 1 180 180 180 180
childrenmagic.sg. 600 IN SOA ns2.ebrainnetwork.net. webhosting.
ebrainnetwork.net. 4 600 600 600 600
1.3 Access Network
DNS resolver performance is improved significantly through caching. If we would offer a cen-
tral Supercache for a larger number of users, there would be a need for an access network to
efficiently access the Supercache without overloading it.
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Of course, one could just use DNS stub resolvers and configure them to use the supercache, but
there would be configuration parameters, which influence performance, e.g., retry timeout and
number of retries. Malconfigured stub resolvers could cause more load on the supercache.
The access network should be free of any administrational effort and automatically balance load.
While peer-to-peer networks are known to be self-organizing, scalable, fault-tolerant and easy
to configure, they have so far not been able to compete with DNS in terms of response time
[CMM02, WBS04, RS04a, RS04b].
We want to design a peer-to-peer solution which improves data locality by using an improved
hash function dedicated for the use with hierarchical name spaces like DNS. We already have
published intermediate results in [PFH07] and submitted more results for review recently. By
improving locality, traffic in the access network is routed more efficiently and better answer
times are reached.
1.3.1 Caching
Coral [FM03] has shown, how a peer-to-peer network can be used to reduce the load of web
servers. The network creates self-organizing clusters of nodes that fetch information from each
other to avoid querying more distant or heavily-loaded web servers.
A peer-to-peer access network for a DNS supercache would look slightly different. Coral just
distributes references to client caches that contain the requested data. If DNS mappings would
be served, such references would be approximately as big as the data itself. Hence, peers, i.e.,
the nodes of the peer-to-peer network, would rather maintain DNS caches than references to
DNS caches.
Data in these caches would expire as soon as it is replaced in the Supercache. Usually a time
to live (TTL) value per DNS record is used to indicate how long it can be cached. However,
as long as the Supercache is not aware of a new version, TTL based cache invalidation would
only increase traffic in the peer-to-peer network without actually updating data, because expired
mappings would be searched, no mapper if the implementation would actually deliver them or
not.
The Publish/Subscribe paradigm offers a mechanism to disseminate updates of cached data with-
out increasing the traffic to nodes that do not hold any copies of the cached item. Nodes caching
a DNS record subscribe for updates with the Supercache. If a record is ousted from a cache, the
node explicitly unsubscribes.
1.4 Security Considerations
While there is already a lot of fraud going on in the Internet like identity theft, phishing, denial of
service (DoS) attacks, worms, trojan horses, Spam, and Scam, enforced DNS outages have not
played a major role in attacks so far. There have been some denial of service attacks, but victims
have always managed to learn from them and to improve their infrastructure accordingly. A
good example is Microsoft, which has experienced a DoS attack in 2003 and decided to become
an Akamai1 customer afterwards.
1Akamai Technologies, Inc. is running the worlds larges content distribution network. (http://www.akamai.com)
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Even if DNS outages due to attacks are hardly observed, DNS servers themselves are very
versatile for hackers. They can be involved in different kinds of attacks.
Hacked DNS servers can be used to redirect users to arbitrary hosts for almost any kind of web
application. Attackers do not even have to attack the implementation of the server itself using
any known exploits. They just have to make good use of the protocol, which allows, e.g., cache
insertion attacks. They can also interrupt, manipulate, or replay messages, since there is no
authentication mechanism. DNS servers can also be used as denial of service amplifiers to eat
up the available bandwidth of any victim host or service (Details in Section 2.4.3).
As a countermeasure to the known security issues, the IETF is designing security extensions
(DNSSEC, RFC 2535 and follow-ups). Unfortunately, there are still some major obstacles to
overcome until they can be rolled out. Some of them are not even close to being solved. (Details
can be found in Section 2.5)
A Supercache could help to check all information in the cache, before passing it on to the clients,
thereby ensuring data integrity. Note that this is no contradiction to clients being able to check
integrity on their own.
Example: Cache Poisoning
A good example is cache insertion, which is better known as cache poisoning. One variant of
the attack works as follows: An attacker includes an object, like an image, on a web site or in
an HTML e-mail. The client will resolve the name in the URL of this object and so the DNS
server of the attacker is queried. This server can then insert some DNS mapping into the cache
of the victims DNS server. With a high probability, the victim shares this server with thousands
of other users, which would all suffer from this attack.
A DNS supercache could check the newly inserted mapping and find inconsistencies to prevent
the update from being propagated. Furthermore, the sources of such entries can be blacklisted
to prevent any further fraud.
Integrity of Messages
The Supercache could also sign all entries for which consistency has been checked to make sure,
the data is not modified on the way to the client. Of course, to be able to check these signatures,
the client would need to establish trust to the Supercache. This could be done, e.g., by using the
SSL trust infrastructure, i.e., well established trusted third parties.
1.5 Summary
In the future, there is a need for a dependable DNS backup system. due to the increased depen-
dancy on the Internet and therefore on DNS. The main features would have to be:
• Scalable dependable access network with low response times. Peer-to-peer technology
helps to automatically find nearby caches. Caches use the Publish/Subscribe paradigm to
keep the number of cache updates low.
• DNS backup for publicly accessible DNS data
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• Data mining for consistency checking, fraud detection
• Data integrity protection using signed DNS records or other cryptographic measures.
In addition to the backup function, this system can also be used to replace DNS, if records are
inserted directly into the supercache2. Therefore, suppliers of such data need an interface, sim-
ilar to the one they use for normal DNS registries. The updates would have to be published to
update caches. A publish/subscribe mechanism would be needed to keep the number of update
messages as low as the number of caches, which actually hold this DNS record, allows.
The main theses that are presented in this work are:
• Peer-to-peer overlays are not usable to replace DNS completely without performance
degradations.
• Peer-to-peer overlays do not provide advantages that make them useful to complement
DNS to reduce average response times.
• DNS contains many configuration errors. Therefore, as little data as possible should be
used to configure it. This is contrary to what the new DNSSEC standard will produce.
• A cloud computing concept can combine data mining capabilities with flexible cluster
selection. Precisely, a peer-to-peer overlay could be used for a backup service discovery,
but not for DNS lookups, due to the poor performance.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the main problem with DNS,
DNSSEC, and its alternatives. Chapter 3 describes how we collected DNS data and which kinds
of data analysis can be done to protect clients from buggy or malicious DNS zone configuration
data. Chapter 4 discusses advantages and disadvantages of peer-to-peer systems and asseses how
they can be used to implement DNS or improve DNS performance. Chapter 5 describes how we
tried to come up with a DHT (DHTs [GBHC00] are explained in Chapter 4) which can serve
DNS requests with a reasonable performance. It also describes the problems that we found when
the application did not show the performance that we expected due to our simulation results.
Furthermore, it describes how we designed a novel topology generator for better simulations
and how the simulation results changed with it.
Chapter 6 discusses the requirements for implementing DNS with a cloud computing architec-
ture in mind. Furthermore, it describes the main problems and how the system’s architecture
could look like.
Many things are repeated during the thesis. This is on purpose, to allow readers to pick certain
Chapters, which are of their interest.
2Of course, in this case, the name Supercache would not be appropriate anymore.
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Chapter 2
DNS Problems
The Internet uses IP addresses to route messages from one Internet host to another. Since it is
much easier to remember symbolic names than IP addresses, there has always been a mechanism
to translate names to IP addresses. As long as the number of Internet hosts was small, it was
sufficient to have a file with these mappings. These files still exist today in many operating
systems, e.g., the /etc/host.txt in Linux. Later, when the number of hosts grew stronger there
was a need for a distributed scalable mechanism to allow administrators to add new names.
Furthermore, the service had to ensure, that each name was assigned by at most one registrar.
This issue was solved by dividing the namespace into zones which were allowed to have sub-
zones. Each zone is hosted by a machine called the authoritative DNS server. When a name
is registered for an Internet host, the name is relative to the path of its zone. Therefore, only a
small number of hosts has to be checked to prevent naming collisions.
In this chapter the DNS functionality is presented, but only as far as necessary to discuss the
major weaknesses of DNS. DNSSEC is discussed as well and its weaknesses are explained.
2.1 Query Processing
Since names are only stored on authoritative DNS servers, queries must be forwarded to them.
Therefore, the DNS name space is organized as a tree. As already mentioned in the Introduction
at page 3, DNS resolvers start to traverse the tree from a root server. To improve fault tolerance,
there is not just one root server but thirteen. Some of them use anycast addresses, so there are
even more.
Starting from the root server, the resolver asks for the name it tries to resolve. If a DNS server
is not authoritative for this name it either provides a delegation or returns some error code.
The resolver then follows the delegation until the name is found or the responsible name server
indicated that it does not exist. To improve the performance of this process, DNS servers and
resolvers use caches to remember DNS mappings and DNS server locations.
2.2 DNS Architecture
A DNS zone is stored as a collection of resource records in a zone file. On startup, a DNS server
loads the zone file into its memory. Each resource record is a structure consisting of name, time
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to live (TTL), type, class, and a data section as described in RFC 1035. An example can be seen
in Listing 2.1. There are 5 records: a SOA record, doing the bookkeeping for the zone, two
name server records, and two address records.
Note that, if the owner name of a record is not given, the name of the zone is used. If the owner
name is a relative record, the domain is appended (this applies for the empty name as well).
Absolute names are denoted with a trailing dot.
Listing 2.1: example zone file
; zone file fragment for example.com
$TTL 2d ; zone TTL default = 2 days or 172800 seconds
@ IN SOA ns.example.com. hostmaster.example.com. (
2003080800 ; serial number
3600 ; refresh






; A record for the NS RR above
ns IN A 122.10.2.1
www IN A 122.10.2.1
2.2.1 DNS Usage
Nowadays, DNS stub resolvers are part of every distributed software as a small set of library
functions. Usually some local resolver is provided that acts as recursive resolver. A recursive
resolver takes a request and resolves the requested name. Therefore, it uses several iterative
resolvers. An iterative resolvers takes a request and answers the request according to its local
information. If the requested name cannot be found, a delegation is sent to the requester.
The DNS message format has been defined in RFC 1035. It contains 5 Sections as shown in
Listing 2.2.
Later on it will be clear that this message format offers no protection against data manipulation.
The purpose of the Sections is easy to understand. If a query is sent to a resolver, only the header
and the question section have to be filled. The answer is then written into the answer section.
The authority section contains the name servers that are or might be responsible for the name in
the question section. The additional section may contain any useful information1. Usually it is
used to prevent subsequent queries, e.g., if a name server is contained in the authority section and
the resolver has to query this server, it would be an advantage, if the additional section already
contains the IP address of this server. This prevents unnecessary traffic and delay.
1It is often used for cache poisoning attempts, since some DNS implementations copy records from this section
into their cache. More up to date implementations use a bailiwick matching mechanism, to make sure that the
additional records are meaningful for the query itself.
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Listing 2.2: DNS message example
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 51488




se00.inf.tu-dresden.de. 38090 IN CNAME se.inf.tu-dresden.de.
se.inf.tu-dresden.de. 44565 IN A 141.76.44.180
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
inf.tu-dresden.de. 80592 IN NS rnadm.urz.tu-dresden.de.
inf.tu-dresden.de. 80592 IN NS ws-koe1.win-ip.dfn.de.
inf.tu-dresden.de. 80592 IN NS deneb.dfn.de.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
rnadm.urz.tu-dresden.de. 56995 IN A 141.30.66.135
ws-koe1.win-ip.dfn.de. 48937 IN A 193.174.75.158
Even though the DNS message format and the DNS zone structure are very easy to understand,
the DNS often suffers from configuration issues. The influence of configurations problems on
DNS performance has been examined by Jung et al. in [JSBM01]. The authors show three
DNS traces in which 20.1% to 23.5% for all DNS lookups received no answer while 11.1% to
42.2% received a negative answer indicating some kind of error. The authors also found that
unsuccessful queries lead to a much higher numbers of DNS packets in the WAN. The reason
is that DNS servers use a simple timeout and retry mechanism to add a little robustness to UDP
packet loss or server failures. For example, a query that did not even find a referral in response
produces about five times as many wide area query packets before the querying name server gave
up. Referral loops between name servers also contribute a significant number of WAN packets.
This happens when a name server is not responsible for a name and refers to the root server. The
root server might than in an erroneous configuration again lead the resolver to the same name
server, etc.
Another significant reason for failed DNS requests are missing inverse mappings. Obviously
many administrators omit configuring these inverse mapping or forget to change them, when
a mapping is changed. This might be the case, since these mappings, although they belong
together, are configured in two different zone files, which might be served by two different
servers. Usually when a name is pointing to an IP address, there is also a mapping from the IP
address to the DNS name, which is a PTR record in the special purpose second level domain
in-addr.arpa. An example query can be found in Listing 2.3.
Often these mappings are used for authentication purposes. A file server might not allow access
from users in domain badboys.org. But when a user connects, the server can only see the routing
information in the IP header. To be able to use its access control list, it must find the name for
the source IP address. This is done as shown in Listing 2.3. IP addresses are translated into a
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Listing 2.3: DNS inverse mappings
$ dig -x 141.76.2.1
; <<>> DiG 9.4.1-P1 <<>> -x 141.76.2.1
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 54815




1.2.76.141.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN PTR mail.inf.tu-dresden.de.
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
76.141.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN NS rnadm.urz.tu-dresden.de.
76.141.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN NS ws-koe1.win-ip.dfn.de.
76.141.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN NS ns.ripe.net.
76.141.in-addr.arpa. 86400 IN NS deneb.dfn.de.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
ns.ripe.net. 172800 IN A 193.0.0.193
rnadm.urz.tu-dresden.de. 84053 IN A 141.30.66.135
ws-koe1.win-ip.dfn.de. 76333 IN A 193.174.75.158
;; Query time: 56 msec
;; SERVER: 141.76.44.1#53(141.76.44.1)
;; WHEN: Thu Feb 28 10:20:08 2008
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 227
DNS name. These names are part of the in-addr.arpa-branch of the DNS namespace.
Apart from the number of packets generated for inverse mappings, there are also severe security
issues as explained in Section 2.4.
2.3 DNS Performance
There have been many studies of DNS performance. While Jung et al. [JSBM01] also looked on
efficiency, e.g., the number of WAN packages per query, most of them looked at client perceived
performance, i.e., response time, like [PPPW04]. Park et al. explain in [PPPW04] that different
kinds of failures have a strong influence on DNS response time. The authors were motivated
by the experiences of deploying a content distribution network (CoDeeN [WPP+04]) on Planet-
Lab [Ros05]. They found that for some DNS servers the response times of more than 20% of all
requests were greater than 5s. When investigating the reasons for such behavior, it proved to be
useful to classify failures in client-side and server-side failures.
Client-side failures are failures caused by the client’s infrastructure, i.e., the stub resolver, the
recursive resolver, or the LAN connection. Server-side failures are failures caused by the DNS
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servers involved in the processing of the request, including WAN communication failures. The
following subsections describe these problems in more details. Figure 2.1 depicts the infrastruc-
ture that is involved. On the right, there is the distributed server infrastructure. Beginning at the
root servers, authority is delegated (dashed lines) to other name servers. On the left, there is a
client, which is using the local area network to connect to its local name servers. For a query,
the client sends a DNS message to one of the local name servers. This server is using the global










Figure 2.1: Infrastructure overview: components needed to resolve a DNS request
2.3.1 Server-side Problems
When a recursive resolver tries to find a certain resource record, it iteratively traverses the DNS
name space. Starting from the top of the tree, i.e., at a root server, it tries to find a DNS server
that is responsible for the requested top level domain (TLD). From this server the search goes
on from name server to name server until the request can be answered. Since a successful DNS
lookup depends on the cooperation of many remote components it is worth looking how reliable
this process is.
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Configuration Issues
Jung et al. [JSBM01] focus on the reliability of the DNS server infrastructure. They captured
DNS packets at two locations, i.e., two Internet gateways. The traces show that over a third of
all lookups where not successfully answered. The number of query packets is larger than the
number of lookups because if a DNS server does not receive an answer for a query, it retransmits
the query. This is a robustness mechanism that deals with UDP packet loss, leading to the fact
that query packets for unanswered lookups account for more than 50% of the DNS query packets
in the trace.
Another interesting behavior is that between 3.1% and 4.9% of the unanswered lookups formed
a querying loop between two or more DNS servers. This is obviously a configuration problem,
since loops do not make any sense, but are easy to produce. Some CNAME record in a chain of
CNAMEs pointingto the wrong entry is already sufficient. Erroneous configurations also cause
many negative answers. This is usually the case, when someone types in a name with a typo into
the address bar of a web browser. This DNS request would probably not produce a cache hit and
therefore be routed through the DNS server network, but not produce an answer, except someone
created a Typosquatting entry for it. Typosquatting is a subclass of cyber squatting, where DNS
names are registered, based on a speculation on typical typos, e.g. www.goggle.com (instead
of www.google.com). Note, that the same can happen, when the user just clicks on a hyperlink
with a typo. Therefore, browsers like Google’s Chrome, where the address bar is a search bar
at the same time, would not solve this problem. The same problem occurs, when a user is not
sure about the valid top level domain. A well known example is the US White House web site
whitehouse.gov, for which there are different web sites reachable for the .org and .com top
level domains.
Altogether, negative answers account for 10% to 42% of the total number of answers in the trace.
Of course, this does not mean that a client see failures in up to 42% of the requests. More often,
the local name server will have to repeat queries, e.g., because it cannot find IP addresses for
certain name servers or mail exchangers. In these cases it could pick another, if there is enough
redundancy. This would not lead to a client-perceived failure. However, it might result in an
increased delay.
Apart from typos and non-existing inverse mappings, as already explained earlier, other signifi-
cant causes are CNAME, NS or MX records that point to non-existing names. This indicates an
inconsistency problem in a DNS zone, where old entries have not been removed or new entries
have not been checked for typos. It can also indicate an inconsistency problem across multiple
DNS zones, which is often difficult to check, as I explain in Section 3.
Node and Network Failures
Apart from these configuration issues there is also the problem that servers might fail completely.
Reasons can be software and hardware failures as well as occasional denial-of-service (DOS)
attacks.
Usually, there are at least two servers for each DNS zone. The level of availability provided by
these servers depends on several things, e.g., their number and location. To increase availability,
it must be enforced that the DNS servers do not depend on each other nor any shared infrastruc-
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ture, which is often difficult to achieve. They should also be in a reasonable distance from each
other in order to survive disasters like earthquakes or floods. Papas et al.[PXL+04] examined
the number of DNS servers having independent node failures. They found that 65% of the ex-
amined zones have two authoritative servers, and 20% have three or more servers. 55% of the
zones have two or more authoritative servers located in different /24 prefix networks. Only less
than 25% have two or more servers located at different autonomous systems (AS) or different
geographic locations.
An example for a bad configuration is Microsoft. In 2001 the complete microsoft.com zone
became unreachable because of a router failure. Unfortunately, all DNS servers shared the same
upstream link.
The authors of [PXL+04] argue, that even if the complete infrastructure of an organization is
behind the same router or link, it is useful to have a DNS server outside of it. This server would
in the case of a failure give precious knowledge to clients. The clients could actually figure
out that the DNS name exists while the host is unreachable. This is a significant difference
when pinpointing the error. In the case of a web browser, e.g., the user might be asked to check
the URL for typos if the name cannot be resolved, but if the host is unreachable, the browser
could produce a different error message, asking the user to try again later. Hence, the user could
identify that this is a problem of the service provider and he did not do anything wrong. A mail
server, for instance, can figure out that a timeout and a retry would solve the problem in the latter
case, while a typo in a URL would need an interection with some operator or administrator.
Attacks on DNS
DNS is a compelling target for denial of service (DoS) attacks since DNS servers are well known
and easy to find. A successful attack to a single server or pair of servers can cut of a whole branch
of the DNS name space, and DNS outages often cause outages of other services as well.
Such an attack (in this case ping flooding) hit the 13 root servers on October 23, 2002, causing
some slowdown in the Internet [Nar02]. Only four root servers were able to continue service
during the attack.
In January 2001, Microsoft suffered from such an attack resulting in downtime for its Web
presence [Thu01]. As a result, Microsoft hired Akamai Technology to ensure that such attacks
do not succeed in the future. Akamai maintains geographically separated DNS servers, while all
of Microsoft’s DNS servers were in the same location and thus easy to attack.
In 2007 and 2008 there have been incidents involving Russian hackers and victims in former
Soviet Union countries. For example in August 2007 Estonian infrastructure was attacked2.
2.3.2 Client-side problems
Many DNS outages are not caused by global network outages or server failures, but by problems
with local components, like recursive resolvers or stub resolvers. Stub resolvers are using local
DNS servers (LDNS) as recursive resolvers. These servers are responsible for resolving names
2Russian DDoS Attacks on Estonia, http://www.secure64.com/news-russian-ddos-attacks-estonia, August 21,
2007
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iteratively and also provide a cache for DNS resource records. Hence, they do the main part of
resolving a name. This is necessary since stub resolvers are too limited for this task.
If these LDNS servers suffer from network problems, more or less frequent overload situations,
or hardware and software failures, the DNS is unavailable. This seems to be a problem that can
be solved by the DNS administrators. As discussed by Park et al. in [PPPW04], there might
be reasons that are deterring administrators from solving this problem: Most of them optimize
cost-to-benefit ratio expressed by CPU utilization. DNS is not CPU bound and it typically
leaves enough CPU power to run other services on the same machine. Installing more services
improves utilization but introduces a competition between services for resources. Thus, if the




Figure 2.2: Typical error rates observable in the Planet-Lab [PPPW04]
Figure 2.2 shows the typical error rates that can be found in the Internet. For our paper [PFS06]
we used the same infrastructure as Park et al. for better comparison. The Planet-Lab [Ros05]
allows to compare many different name servers and to query them from the local network by
using the corresponding Planet-Lab nodes. One can see that there are servers that show a rather
constant high error rate, like the Cornell name server. There are also servers that show high error
rates during certain time periods, like the Texas A&M University’s server. Other name servers
show permanent low error rates, as given in the case of the University of Oregon.
In Figure 2.3 one can see the different reasons for such behavior. There are again three examples.




Figure 2.3: Typical error reasons indicated by error rates characteristics [PPPW04]
(1) Sometimes there is a well isolated incident that causes a higher error rate. Of course, it
cannot be determined exactly what happend here at University of Michigan, but it might be that
somebody started a service with a high memory pressure and then discovered his mistake. (2)
Sometimes servers host other services that are used more or less during the day. In the example
of the TU Berlin one can clearly see the working hours of the University staff and students (not
UTC). (3) The Moscow University seems to start a cron job each hour that needs a high amount
of memory at the beginning and then gives back more and more.
Park et al. propose to use an insurance-like service (CoDNS) where many partners share their re-
cursive resolvers. DNS requests can be forwarded, using a peer-to-peer overlay network, to other
recursive resolvers. The performance of the system depends on a good selection of time-out val-
ues and knowledge about the health of other peer’s LDNS servers. According to benchmarks in
[PPPW04] CoDNS outperforms standard DNS by 27-82 % (latency) and increases availability
by an extra 9. Regular DNS achieves 99% availability on about 60% of the nodes. In contrast,
CoDNS is able to achieve over 99.9% availability on over 70% of nodes according to [PPPW04].
This can be reached by exchanging information about the health of the LDNS server, i.e., its
performance and availability, with other peers in an overlay network. If the LDNS server fails,
the DNS request is forwarded to a nearby overlay peer with a good LDNS server. CoDNS
is deployed in Planet-Lab [Ros05], where we are using it to compare it to our stub resolver
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implementation, as explained in Section 4.2. For our comparison, CoDNS was configured using
one extra peer for lookups and 200 ms time-out for the initial DNS request to the LDNS server,
which is the default configuration. Its additional overhead apart from DNS traffic is, to monitor
10 other peers and keep track of their LDNS server’s health.
2.4 DNS Security Flaws
2.4.1 Trust Model
Resolving symbolic names typically requires DNS requests to be sent to a sequence of name
servers. Most operating systems use however very simple stub resolvers which are not able to
perform such recursive resolutions of names (nor a caching of results). As mentioned before,
a local DNS server is typically responsible for performing the recursive resolution of symbolic
names on behalf of the stub resolvers.
The correct resolution of a DNS name requires that correct information be provided by all DNS
servers involved in a recursive query. Because the communication between DNS servers is
neither encrypted nor authenticated, the correctness also depends upon the assumption that in-
formation is not modified by the network. While the latter could be enforced be using VPN
technology3 for the communication channels between DNS servers, using a VPN would not
prevent DNS servers from sending wrong information to other DNS servers. The basic reason
for this is that DNS entries are not authenticated and hence, detecting whether entries have been
modified is difficult or impossible.
DNS supports online updates because many DNS entries depend on the assignments of DHCP
servers, but it does not check the integrity of these updates, i.e., the resource records. Online
updates are a scenario, where the TSIG mechanism is usually used, which is feasible, since there
are only a few communication partners. This mechanism is used to authenticate messages, i.e.,
the channel instead of the data. If an attacker is able to tamper with DNS data before the DHCP
server set up this secure channel, she will succeed.
These scenarios demonstrate that DNS depends on the assumption that all DNS servers, their up-
daters, and the communication channels between the DNS servers are well behaved. Therefore,
a critical application should not rely on the assumption that a host name is properly resolved by
DNS to determine the authenticity of a host. Instead, critical applications need to perform an
application level end-to-end authentication.
DNS has the following major security problems:
• Denial of service attacks on DNS [CAI03] are supported by the following two proper-
ties. First, there are only a few root DNS servers. For an attacker it is easy to outnumber
his victims even with very limited financial background. Second, DNS queries are much
smaller than the corresponding server responses. Hence, it is easy for an attacker to pro-
duce queries in a higher frequency then the DNS server can produce responses.
3The TSIG extension, introduced in RFC 2845, is not suitable in this case. TSIG can be used if there are only few
authorized clients, since it is based on shared secrets. In a larger scenario there is a need for public key algorithms
and trusted third parties.
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• DNS entries are not authenticated. That means that a user is not able to verify whether a
particular entry has been forged or not.
• DNS client/server communication is not protected by any means of cryptography. The
message format of DNS requests and responses has been discussed in Section 2.2. Some
adversary could forge requests or responses on the way, or just keep sending certain an-
swers for a long period, hoping that sooner or later the victim would send a request that
matches it. For performance reasons, the latter alternative is much more feasible. This is
a main source of DNS poisoning.
• DNS servers do not authenticate themselves. Some adversary could pretend to be some
valid DNS server. Even if servers sometimes authenticate clients, e.g., when accepting
dynamic updates, clients do not authenticate servers.
2.4.2 Trusted Hosts Mechanism
There are quite a few articles focusing on security issues of DNS. An early article by S. Bellovin
[Bel95] points out the problems of the concept of trusted hosts which is used in connection with
DNS. Trusted hosts is a very simple mechanism that is used by a couple of remote tools like
rlogin, rcp or rsh. When one of these r-commands is used between two hosts, they must trust
each other via /etc/hosts.equiv4 files. This raises four major problems:
1. Some adversary might forge his IP address to get the permission to use a remote command
or tool on the victim’s host. This class of attacks is called spoofing and is not within the
scope of this thesis or Bellovin’s paper since it does not concern DNS directly.
2. Some adversary could prevent users to use r-commands using DNS vulnerabilities. En-
abled by the circumstance that DNS queries and responses are not authenticated and not
encrypted they can easily be manipulated.
3. Some adversary could forge DNS entries on the DNS server itself. These entries are not
protected by any authentication method. It could be done using dynamic update if it is
available and not protected by means of cryptography, or by attacking any other service
of this machine in order to get direct or indirect access to the file system to alter the zone
file itself.
4. To accept an incoming connection the server must check whether the client is a trusted
host. To find this information in the /etc/hosts.equiv it first has to look up the hostname
because it only can see the IP address within the source field of the incoming IP packets
resp. their headers. This can be done with a reverse DNS lookup. Inverse mappings are
implemented by a separate DNS tree, keyed by IP addresses. The fundamental flaw that
Bellovin exploited for his attack was that there is no forced linkage between the two DNS
trees. The forward mapping and the inverse mapping can be managed by different DNS
servers with different locations and different managers. Thus, introducing a wrong IP to
desired host name mapping is easy.
4This file contains a list of trusted users and hosts (host names). It allows these users to use tools like rexec.
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Bellovin’s paper was withheld from publication for 5 years. It took some time to find feasible
fixes for the vulnerabilities exposed in the paper. In the end Bellovin agrees with many other
authors that not the lack of authentication in DNS is the reason for the vulnerabilities but the
authentication method used by those applications.
Note, that this problem is still existing. Of course, nowadays tools like ssh are used instead of
rlogin, but we still trust URLs in unauthenticated connections like in our web browsers. There
are also many services, where you can grant user privileges based on a username and a host
name. An example is the access control of MySQL servers. Such servers have to use DNS to
find a hostname and then look it up in their ACL.
In contrast to the time when Bellovin wrote his article, nowadays the use of the Internet is much
more important for us. We get our telephone bill on the web site of the provider, our credit card
bill at the web site of our bank, and we buy tickets for theaters, concerts, and Formula 1 races
directly through the Internet. We trust all these web sites to handle our confidential information
according to our expectations. We also expect that we are actually connected to the right web
site.
One might argue that SSL solves this problem, because our client software, like a web browser,
would not trust the server if the certificate cannot be validated against a trusted third party.
Unfortunately, this does often not solve the problem. A trusted site could be loaded by the
fake site just to convince the user. A good example is the phishing attack on Bank Of America
customers from April 20055. Users were asked to click on a link to sign in to Online Banking.
Then the original Bank Of America web site and some popup window opened. The popup
did not show an address bar or status bar. The user was assured by the main window that the
connection was secure.
Of course, this was a phishing attack, not using DNS, but it shows that SSL is not a sil-
ver bullet to this problem. If DNS would be used for such an attack, the user could type
www.bankofamerica.com into the address field of the browser or use a bookmark. The DNS
server might then deliver the faked mapping pointing to the attacker’s web server and so launch
the same attack.
In Section 2.4.3 it is shown how DNS can be used to prevent users from accessing the desired
web sites and instead redirect them to other sites.
2.4.3 Common Attacks on DNS
The name of this Section might be misleading. Often DNS itself is not the target of an attack. It
is rather used to attack other applications or Internet hosts by exploiting the fact that DNS is a
power switch for the Internet like explained by [AMT03] or the fact that there are many servers,
which are well known and accessible to everybody.
Packet Interception
As explained earlier, DNS messages usually do not contain any means of integrity protection.
It is easy to intercept a packet and replace some of its content without any detectability for the
5Anti-Phishing Working Group, http://www.antiphishing.org/phishing archive/04-19-05 BOA/04-19-
05 BOA.html, April 2005
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receiver. It would not be a good solution to sign each DNS message since this would increase
the CPU load on DNS servers too much. For iterative resolvers it would also just have hop-to-
hop semantics, so the message signature would be dismissed after each step. Any intermediate
DNS server can modify the message. Furthermore, the signature would not in all cases assure
the resolver that the resource records have not been exchanged since this can happen before the
message is assembled.
DNSSEC uses authenticated resource records to address this problem. DNSSEC is discussed in
Section 2.5 on page 25.
Cache Poisoning
Cache poisoning [Irv01] happens when an adversary inserts bogus information into a DNS
cache. When a DNS server A queries the DNS server of an adversary B, B can add bogus
information to its reply message. A uses the content of the message to update its cache and
in this case, is poisoning its cache. The fundamental problem is that the correctness of the re-
ceived information cannot be verified because the DNS entries are not authenticated. DNSSEC
(Section2.5) addresses this problem.
The only thing a user can do is to prevent DNS queries to malicious DNS servers. Unfortunately,
this is very difficult to achieve. Often many users share a local DNS server. This could be
provided by some ISP. As soon as some user requests a name from a malicious DNS server,
the poisoning takes place. As an example one could assume that the overwhelming majority of
Internet users reads HTML e-mails. Let’s assume, there is some e-mail, e.g., a spam e-mail,
which loads some embedded HTML object. The URL of it could contain a name in the attackers
zone. Then the malicious DNS server is queried and the local DNS server is poisoned. All users
who are using the same local DNS server suffer from this attack. There is no defense for them.
To solve this problem, a mechanism called Bailiwickchecking has been implemented, which
makes resolvers a bit less greedy. It checks that all the records that are provided by a DNS
query reply actually are useful to resolve the name given in the QUESTION section. Therefore,
resolvers remember that if they have asked for www.bad − boy.cc , they are not interested in
caching a new address for www.google.com in the same transaction.
Another way to implement a cache poisoning attack is to send a DNS reply to a request that is
probably currently processed. Figure 2.4 shows the simplified scenario known as the birthday
attack. Of course, the prerequisite would be:
• the server actually asked for the mapping
• the answer uses IP spoofing to make the server believe, it comes from the right DNS server
• the 16 bit identification field matches the query
• the destination port is the port where the DNS server is waiting
Spoofing a source IP field is also not very complicated, given the use of a RAW socket and an ISP
that does not try to drop spoofed packets at routers. Guessing the identification field can also
be easy. Many older name server implementations just use sequentially increasing numbers.
Even if the numbers are randomly created, the birthday paradox helps to find a match with a









ID:    63233
● guess ID and port
● try as often as possible
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e.g. web site or HTML e-mail with Java script
Figure 2.4: A cache poisoning attack without message interception or malicious authoritative
name server
surprisingly small number of messages. The same technique can be used to guess the port, of
course. Some DNS servers would anyway use the same port for each query. If the attacker
itself is the authoritative DNS server for some zone it can figure out this port quite easily by just
asking the victim server for a name in its own zone.
The attack works as follows: A client sends a request to its local DNS server. There is no cache
hit. Therefore, a query is sent towards the authoritative name server for the queried name. Usu-
ally, the DNS server would randomize the port number and the transaction ID of the message,
to decrease the possibility of a match for a brute force poisoning attack. One key assumption
is usually that the attacker can only send messages from the point in time when the query is
sent to the time when the answer is received from the authoritative name server. Then the TTL
of the DNS record prevents the attacker from retrying for a while. But the TTL should not be
considered a security feature. Usually, the application domain decides how to choose the TTL.
Note, that the attacker could also have an out-of-band retry mechanism, depicted as red arrow
in Figure 2.4. There could, e.g., be a web site, which is opened be the client, but controlled
by the attacker. The web site could produce many DNS requests using embedded objects and
client-side scripts. The names could be chosen in a way, that they always produce cache misses,
e.g., by inserting some random strings. Nevertheless, they could all belong to the same zone,
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for which the attacker tries, e.g., to insert his own name server. The name server can, of course,
have any name, e.g., www, if that is an advantage.
This retry mechanism gives the attacker all the time in the world. The amount of noise produced
by the port and ID randomization would sooner or later be overcome. The algorithm is shown
in Listing 2.4.
Listing 2.4: DNS poisoning algorithm
while(true){
Send a query to a nameserver, for $RANDOM.foo.com
for TXID = 0-200{
fakeReply = {
$RANDOMwww.foo.com IN NS www.foo.com
www.foo.com IN A 6.6.6.6
}
Send fakeReply using TXID
}





All client-server-architectures are subject to DoS attacks. DNSSEC helps with many of the DNS
security flaws, but unfortunately, it does not help here. In fact, it makes the problem even worse,
since resolvers have to check signatures, which consumes CPU time.
DNS can also be used as DoS amplifiers - as well as DNSSEC. If an attacker with a limited
bandwidth can send messages to a victim only with a limited frequency, he might want to send
spoofed DNS queries in the name of the victim. This increases the usable bandwidth since DNS
replies are usually bigger than requests.
The attacker can even decide about the amplification factor on his own as depicted in Figure 2.5.
If the attacker can send N DNS requests of 60 Bytes per second to D name servers and the TTL








Unlike DNS, DNSSEC authenticates DNS entries. The main idea is that the owner of a zone is
not identical with the administrator of a DNS server. The integrity of the data is not based on the
fact, that there is a path from the root zone down to the authoritative DNS server, which answers
the request with an AA flag in the message header. Instead, the data authenticates itself, i.e.,
each resource record is signed using the key of the zone. The path of delegations from the root






of 60 bytes 
per second
D DNS requests








N 4k replies per second
Figure 2.5: A DNS-based denial of service amplification
server is also signed, since delegations are ordinary DNS records. The checking of signatures
is usually done by the stub resolvers. However, it can also be done by the local DNS server, in
order to reduce load on stub resolvers and have more benefit from caching. A stub resolver can
send a query to the local DNS server with the DO bit set (DNSSEC-OK), thereby requesting
the DNS data to be authenticated by the server. A local DNS server checks the signatures and
forwards the answer to the stub resolver with the AD flag set (Authenticated Data). The server
has to do many signature checking operations, but the results can be cached and so used by many
of its clients.
DNSSEC would definitely increase the security of today’s Internet-based services. However,
after more than ten years of development, DNSSEC has still not been deployed on a large scale.
Three RFCs have been published, describing the protocol, but there are significant shortcomings,
as explained in the following Section 2.5.1.
2.5.1 DNSSEC weaknesses
The main weak points in the DNSSEC protocol are: zone enumeration, DoS amplification,
increased complexity, increased configuration effort, the hierarchical trust model, and the still
missing root key roll-over mechanism.
DNSSEC does not provide confidentiality of data, in particular, it is easy to explore complete
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zone data, even without the help of zone transfers. This is a problem for organizations which are
committed not to disclose any internal data. If DNS names are disclosed, they could be used as
key to whois databases to find even more information. German registrar DENIC has stated that
DNSSEC’s zone enumeration issue violates Germany’s Federal Data Protection Act6.
DNSSEC does not protect against DoS attacks directly, although it provides the benefit to deposit
DNS data everywhere since nobody can manipulate it without being detected. Since DNSSEC
messages are usually bigger than DNS messages it can unfortunately be used as a better DoS
amplifier.
DNSSEC is complex to implement. As it was explained in Section 2.3.1, it is obviously difficult
to configure DNS servers and zones. DNSSEC makes it even more complicated. The key
management can have an influence on delegation. In asymmetric cryptography it is important
that keys expire within a certain period of time. As soon as a key pair is created or used for the
first time, attackers can use the public key to calculate the secret key. The assumption is that this
process takes time. It must not be possible before the key pair expires. Otherwise an attacker
could sign data, e.g., DNS resource records in the name of the key owner.
The problem for DNSSEC is, that the complexity of the key management grows with the number
of delegations in a zone. Administrators must replace their keys in time and administrators of
parent zones must sign the new key before the old one expires.
The trust model of DNSSEC is, like in DNS, totally hierarchical. Any security problem in a
parent zone leads to the inability of DNSSEC to assure the integrity of DNS data in a zone. The
trust anchor for the complete DNS tree is the key of the root zone. Since this key also has an
expiration period, it must be replaced from time to time. The root key is a very tempting target
for attackers, so the expiration period is probably rather short compared to other keys. Hence,
there is a need for an automatic mechanism to roll over the key.
TAKREM (Trust Anchor Key REnewal Method) for DNSSEC is one proposal for such a mecha-
nism7. It basically proposes that there is one central organization that is responsible for the trust
anchor over a certain period of time, e.g., 20 years. For this period the organization computes
key pairs and hashsums of public keys. The initial distribution of the trust anchor contains the
first public key and all hashsums of keys to follow. When a key roll-over takes place, a client is
notified with a key roll-over message. The message contains the new public key, which can be
verified using the hashsum.
Whether this mechanism or a similar one will ever be deployed, has not been decided so far.
2.6 Alternatives to DNSSEC
A problem that was not mentioned yet is the economic aspect of DNSSEC. As a matter of
fact there are many more hostnames and hosts with low security requirements than hosts with
high security requirements. If DNSSEC is used to protect them, the cost to benefit ratio is not
satisfactory. DNSSEC can only be used to protect the whole zone and there is a hierarchical
trust model. That means that the higher zones up to the root zone must also be protected, i.e.
DNSSEC-aware and signed. Hence, this is an approach that demands a global consensus. We
6http://www.denic.de/de/domains/dnssec/index.html
7http://www.connotech.com/takrem.html
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can assume that users would not pay an additional fee for security. The reason is that the majority
of them does not need additional security.
On the other hand, DNSSEC benefits must justify large investments required for its roll out.
DNSSEC-enabled servers need much more CPU time, memory and network bandwidth. This
could be reached by high consumer or industry demand but it seems that those players who need
the security did not wait ten years for DNSSEC. They found other suitable solutions. In Section
2.6.2 and 2.6.3 we show how a higher level of security could be reached without DNSSEC.
Therefore, the conclusion must be that the deployment of DNSSEC cannot be payed by its
customers.
There are several ways to improve the trustworthiness of DNS information without using DNSSEC.
One idea is to use other existing cryptographic solutions like SSL (Section 2.6.1) or to prevent
the most problematic attacks by small modifications of resolver behavior (e.g. [GCcC06]. An-
other solution which unfortunately has not been scientifically evaluated so far, but nevertheless
should be mentioned, is DNScurve by D. J. Bernstein. It simply encrypts all traffic between a
resolver and a name server using symmetric cryptography and exchanges keys using asymmetric
elliptic-curve cryptography. However, due to the missing evaluation I cannot compare it to other
approaches or estimate its overheads. It is also the official policy of the ISC that DNS traffic
is public and should not be encrypted. This has been a part of the requirements analysis for
DNSSEC from the beginning.
2.6.1 The Secure Socket Layer (SSL)
SSL is a tunneling protocol that provides authenticated and encrypted sessions between servers
and clients. SSL starts with a handshake that first establishes a TCP/IP connection. This means
that SSL is located above TCP in the Internet protocol stack. It is not suitable for protecting
UDP communication.
The participants are authenticated using public key cryptography. Once authenticated, they se-
lect the strongest cryptographic algorithm supported by both. SSL can use a couple of so called
cipher suites, that include several checksum and encryption algorithms. It was developed by
Netscape in the early 1990s. Version 1 was never released, a Version 2 client was included in
the Netscape Navigator 1.1 in 1994. Version 3 is available since 1995.
At first glance, it is not evident that SSL competes with DNSSEC, since SSL does not check
the integrity of DNS mappings. However, SSL provides a method to verify the address obtained
from DNS for a given host. SSL can tell the client that at least one trusted third party thinks
that the host reached using this address is in fact authentic. This does not exactly match the
semantics of DNSSEC, but the majority of the users or customers would not worry about that or
would even prefer the end-to-end semantics of SSL.
SSL is nowadays used in exactly those applications where DNSSEC would be most valuable. In
addition, SSL has several advantages over DNSSEC:
• SSL is mature and is well investigated.
• There is a kind of brand awareness. Browsers display a lock and the URL prefix “https”
for SSL connections, and users have the idea that this indicates a secure connection. The
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new Firefox 3 even presents an extra button in front of the address, where a user can get
extra information about the certificate.
• SSL is supported by many software products like operating systems, web servers, and
client programs for different purposes.
• SSL requires little or no further development. Of course, the cryptographic algorithms
used by SSL’s cipher suites are based on assumptions that continuously have to be checked.
Therefore, anytime one or another algorithm might be discarded. A recent example is the
MD5 hash algorithm, that should not be used anymore [MSL+08], since it is very easy to
produce collisions.
• SSL provides additional services: application-level authentication and encryption.
In short, SSL is a serious competitor to DNSSEC. It has taken the most valuable part of the
market. Thus, the need and the demand for DNSSEC has been reduced.
There are more DNSSEC competitors than SSL, e.g., many public key infrastructures could also
be considered as competitors. All of them rely on the existing DNS and, like SSL, perform
additional checks to authenticate their counterpart.
2.6.2 Cache Poisoning Countermeasures
Since cache poisoning is a severe problem, it cannot wait for DNSSEC to be solved. Some very
simple countermeasures have shown to be efficient to decrease the probability of a successful
attack. A DNS resolver accepts a reply message, when it matches a query actually sent by this
resolver. The matching is done based on the query itself and the transaction ID (RFC 1034).
BIND versions 4 and 8 are using sequential transaction IDs. Hence, an attacker can easily
produce a valid ID. To improve this situation, BIND version 9 uses randomized transaction IDs.
Matching is also done on source ports. BIND transactional IDs are in a 16k range. Hence, port
randomization [HvM08] adds a significant amount of entropy (additional 16k).
Random combination of lower and upper-case letters [DAV+08] also adds entropy. Unfortu-
nately, this is limited to one bit per letter in the name.
Dan Kaminsky’s poisoning attack (mid 2008, as described in Section 2.4.3), which allows the
attacker an unlimited number of retries without waiting for any TTL, renders these measures
useless and leads to success in a rather short time.
Wildcard DNS [PALL08] is a mechanism which uses the wild card mechanism to prepend ran-
dom strings to names before querying them. This provides a high degree of entropy only limited
by the size of a UDP packet. The authors of [PALL08] conclude that with 6 letters of random
prefix Kaminsky’s attack would take years. Unfortunately their solution also adds almost 100%
overhead to the average DNS response time. However, this mechanism is right now the most
promising solution.
2.6.3 The Proxy Approach
To address the weaknesses of DNSSEC, in particular, the roll-out issues of DNSSEC, we pro-
posed a new approach [FPJ05], that
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• needs a small initial investment,
• is evolutionary, i.e., is based on existing technologies (BIND, SSL),
• does not touch today’s stub resolvers, i.e., does not demand client updates,
• permits a simple implementation,
• provides a simple key roll-over,
• does not increase the resolver’s workload,
• uses the existing SSL certification authority (CA) infrastructure,
• provides a simple online update mechanism for DHCP users, and
• provides a simple heuristical denial mechanism (to verify that there is no entry matching
a given query).
Extending DNS An easy way of enhancing the integrity of the DNS service is to add new
resource record (RR) types and to use them for authenticated mappings. In the past, adding new
RR types was difficult because it required changes to the server software8. Deployment of new
server software is expensive and takes some time. It might be reasonable to change the software
of an authorative name server in order to provide new security features for this zone. However,
it does not seem reasonable to expect that the software of all DNS servers and clients will be
changed if only a small fraction of users wants to add new security features.
If we want to include new RR types in order to enhance the integrity of DNS entries, we must
make sure that all participants that are not aware of these records can deal with them transpar-
ently. BIND is the most frequently used DNS server implementation9. Since version 9.1, BIND
includes experimental support for the transparent processing of unknown RR types without any
additional recompilation. Our DNS security extension is based on this feature. I have tested the
solution also with a Mac OS X based DNS server and a Microsoft Windows Server 2003 DNS
server. Basically, both worked fine. However, editing the self-defined resource records in the
provided graphical tools did not work successfully. The Microsoft implementation destroyed
the zone file each time it was opend with the provided DNS server GUI confiuguration tool. An
ordinary text editor turned out to be more usable.
Owner-Signed Resource Records The most important problem of DNS resource records is
that they are not authenticated, i.e., do not have a signature. For example, if the CNAME RR
would be replaced by an authenticated RR, let us call it SEC CNAME, it would be extremely
difficult for an adversary to forge such a RR, even if the communication between DNS servers
is not protected.
A resolver with high security requirements could always ask for authenticated, i.e., signed, re-
source records. The signature would be created by the owner of the mapping. It is necessary to
8At least to relink or recompile.
9ISC Internet Domain Survey: http://www.isc.org/index.pl?/ops/ds/
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validate the certificate of the owner (given by the SSL infrastructure) with the help of a trusted
third party, i.e., a certification authority. It is no longer necessary to trust all DNS servers be-
cause a client can verify a DNS entry owned by a zone A even if it was received from a DNS
server of another zone B.
One could add signed entries, e.g., for the following important DNS resource record types:
A, NS, PTR, CNAME, MX, and AAAA. It would also be possible to use application specific
proxies, using only resource record types that are useful for the application and behaving trans-
parently for all others. This would furthermore reduce CPU overhead and still fully comply with
the concept of use defined resource records. This approach is much more flexible than DNSSEC,
but would not include an authenticated denial.
We implemented a prove-of-concept prototype and used it in our office for a very short time
to get an idea of the performance degradation when a Java proxy is used to authenticate DNS
resource records. We handcrafted such records and run local and remote experiments, which
means that the influence of the pure network runtime on the overall time to resolve a record
is different. Therefore, we used the Planet-Lab nodes of AT&T labs in New York as far-away
source and run 12.000 resolve operations. The same experiment was repeated in our LAN to get
an intuition about the network delay’s relative influence on the results. The results are shown
in Figures 2.6 and 2.7. For one resolver the runtime overhead is in both cases between 1 and
3 ms, which is quite reasonable. We also measured the effort to pipe the messages through the
proxy without cryptographic operations to find out, how expensive it is to climb up and down
the protocoll stack. This overhead is approximately 0.2 ms, but could probably be reduced
significantly by implementing the proxy as a kernel module. The proxy was run on a Athlon64
3400+ with 1GB RAM. Since authentications have to be done only once before the record is
stored in the local cache, such a resolver can be expected to scale well with a higher number of
requestors sharing a cache.
Shortcomings Unfortunately, this approach is not equivalent to DNSSEC. It does not provide
any authenticated denial method, i.e., if an entry does not exist, the service would not prove its
absence. This is of course a problem. It would be possible for an attacker to remove resource
records. However, the service would be more secure then DNS. Once the client received a DNS
mapping, it can check the signature and be sure that the mapping is right. Hence, it is not
possible to redirect a user, e.g., to another web site. But it is indeed possible to prevent him from
getting a mapping in the first place by intercepting messages.
Another shortcoming is, that the DNS server needs to support DNSSEC anyway. The reason is
that it is usually not allowed to have a record for a name which has a CNAME record. DNSSEC
makes this possible, because there is a need to have a signature and NXT, NSEC, or NSEC3
record for the same name.
However, not being equivalent to DNSSEC is also an advantage. We do not need a consensus
among DNS server administrators around the globe to roll out the solution, which is a main
obstacle for DNSSEC. This can be done on a per-name per-application manner. No insecure web
application would have to demand cryptographic operations from its clients or their resolvers.
Furthermore, NSEC walking is not possible with our solution.
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Figure 2.7: remote resolution of 12.000 names
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2.6.4 Nym-Based Security
Nym-based security for DNS names is a mechanism that proves the right of a user to use a
certain mapping, i.e., the integrity of this mapping, by embedding links to keys in names. It is
strongly supported by D.J. Bernstein from University of Illinois in Chicago.
A computer’s nym is a fingerprint of the computer’s public key. Unfortunately, there are two
problems that make this approach unrealistic: (1) in public key environments, keys have to be
changed once in a while, which means, that the names would also have to change. (2) The names
themselves would not be human-readable anymore. D. J. Bernstein argues, that users would use
bookmarks and search engines anyway, so there would not be a difference 10. The question
is if there is a use case for such a system at all, since one could also bookmark IP addresses
together with a HTML title or some description. Unfortunately, I am not aware of any scientific
publications that discuss this. Therefore, I cannot compare it thoroughly with our proposals.
2.7 Conclusion
Looking at the Internet protocol stack, DNS is an ordinary application. However, DNS con-
tributes much to the usability of the network layer protocol, i.e., IP. IP is well suited for address-
ing and routing in the Internet but not for the human memory. Hence, DNS is a vital part of the
Internet infrastructure.
DNS proved its scalability by growing with the Internet year by year. It still offers very good
response times and is utilized for many other services. Apart from its usability as universal
directory service, which stores arbitrary data, it is also used for load balancing and content
distribution.
Since the influence of the Internet on our daily life grows stronger each day, we also depend
more and more on DNS. It seems that most of the time DNS is doing a good job, being available
and responding quickly. At the other hand, it seems to be easy to use DNS to attack people,
computers, or applications. A sophisticated attacker could pick any point in time to launch an
attack, taking into account the TTL of cached records, of course. It is easy to gain knowledge
about which DNS servers are involved and which DNS infrastructure records11 are important. If
the victim would depend on a name server (or two) of a smaller company, it would be even easier
for the attacker to cut off the branch, because a small organization or company might not have
enough hard iron to counter an attacking bot network. The attacker also has the advantage of
choosing the weakest point in the DNS resolution process since there are usually many servers
involved. Of course, one could argue that administrators could force the attacker to bear up the
attack for a long time using high TTL values. As long as the client can get mappings from a
nearby cache, attackers have a hard time. But this cannot be a solution. Long TTLs are getting
rare. With the growing number of users and hosts in the Internet there is a need for growth,
flexibility, support of mobile clients and service providers, and load balancing. Therefore, often
short TTLs are used. Sometimes TTLs are zeroed to prevent any caching. This does not hurt
DNS performance too much as examined by Nokia in [WTL06], but makes attacks easier since,
10http://cr.yp.to/djbdns/forgery.html, February 2009
11E.g. MX, NS, and their glue records
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e.g., an overloaded DNS server has a direct influence on the client perceived performance, e.g.,
during DoS attacks. It cannot benefit from caches during this time.
DNSSEC was designed to overcome the weaknesses of DNS but it proved difficult to implement
and roll out. DNSSEC is certainly not a silver bullet since it shares some disadvantages with
DNS: It is a stronger, i.e., worse DoS amplifier. It is even more difficult to configure. Hence, the
probability of configuration-caused outages should be higher. Furthermore, the rollout is difficult
because it is not compatible to local law in some countries and the hierarchical trust model
assumes consensus among DNS providers to switch to the new technology. The hierarchical trust
model also assumes that there is some trust anchor, i.e., the key of the root zone. Unfortunately,
so far there is no protocol for a key roll-over of the root zone’s key which should be changes
often.
As a summery one could say, DNSSEC would increase security of DNS but it does not come
with an enhanced availability in comparison to DNS and it is not sure when we are going to see
DNSSEC deployed on a global scale.
Chapter 3
DNS Data Characteristics
When DNS deployment is discussed, data that is contained in DNS zones is an important factor.
But DNS data is often neglected altough it is used to connect the DNS server network by creating
delegation points.
Often when DNS dependability is criticized, the main focus is on architecture and protocol.
Typical points to be mentioned are the hierarchical trust model, retry policies, authentication,
etc.
In contrast to these aspects, we focus on another important factor that contributes to dependabil-
ity concerns is the configuration of DNS zone data. When resolvers are iterating through the
server infrastructure, they use delegation points to find the way to the responsible server. These
delegation points have to be up-to-date and should be cachable for future use.
The reason that DNS data has not played a major role in analyzing DNS behavior is, that it is not
easy to get. The DNS protocol is not designed to provide all information to anyone with a global
view. Many DNS server operators make sure, that not too much information is disclosed. DNS
is nevertheless usable, since the resolver typically asks for a name explicitly. Some operators
even raise alerts, whenever somebody tries to transfer too much data from their zones. We
experienced this a couple of times during our data retrieval.
Nevertheless, there are some mechanisms that can be used to transfer data as we discuss in
Section 3.2.
3.1 Related Work
Pappas et al. [PXL+04] studied the impact of configuration errors on DNS robustness using a
modified recursive resolver in conjunction with DNS traces. In this study, the authors identified
the following three different types of configuration errors in DNS: lame delegations, diminished
server redundancy and cyclic zone dependency (these terms will be explained later on). In
contrast to Pappas et al., we have identified several more classes of configuration faults that can
lead to performance degradation such as lame names and invalid TTLs.
Paul Vixie [Vix07] explained that DNS’ complexity is often underestimated. He points out that
DNS was specified loosely, on purpose. Therefore, inoperability between different implemen-
tations is the common case. He also believes that a stronger specification would not have been
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as successful and writing it today would fail. Hence, we do not try to rewrite the specification,
even with all the knowledge about configuration issues.
There exist some tool sets for administrators to check their zones and server configurations.
These tools do not intent to give an overview of the relevance of DNS configuration issues.
They usually focus on a single zone. This is also the main limitation compared to our approach.
One could imagine, that two zones are perfectly configured when they are analyzed one by one,
but when they are analyzed together, there might be emergent problems, e.g., CNAME loops.
The analysis is usually comparable to what we try to do with data mining. However, there are
some things these tools provide, which we do not. A typical example is to directly check servers
found in the DNS, e.g., connecting to mail servers or even checking their SMTP greetings. For
us, it is just not feasible to connect to thousands of mail servers.
The main purpose of our work is, to transfer as much DNS data as possible and to find configu-
ration issues in it as well as to provide it to resolvers. Any configuration issue, that we disclose,
must be visible in DNS itself. We do not check the applications, which are using the DNS data.
Therefore, we would not detect, e.g., a mail server sending the wrong host name in the SMTP
greeting or web servers, which have the wrong name in an SSL certificate.
dnsstuff.com offers DNSreport1 as part of their Professional Tool Set for $79/year. The tool can
be tried for free for a fixed set of domains on the web site. It creates reports of about 20 tests
checking for typical configuration bugs. The report is limited to an isolated zone, but not limited
to DNS, e.g., mail exchanges are also tested by setting up connections to them.
Men & Mice offers a diagnosis tool called DNS Expert2. Like DNSreport it also queries DNS di-
rectly to find configuration issues. Men & Mice also provide a DNS Management Module. This
module can directly interact with DNS servers like BIND and Microsoft DNS server. According
to the web site3, it is a GUI-based management layer right on top of an existing installation
of Microsoft and/or Bind DNS servers. It provides user management and fine-grained access
control allowing safe, distributed DNS operations by delegating administration to multiple op-
erators. This is an important feature, since most of the DNS configuration effort will be put into
security and key management once DNSSEC gets deployed on a larger scale.
The DNS Sleuth4 is a free online tool for checking DNS zones, written by Martin Mares. Unfor-
tunately, it does not work for the root zone.
An interesting observation is that some of the tools give contradicting hints or warnings. One of
the outputs of DNS Sleuth for our zone inf.tu-dresden.de was :
### Error: Unable to resolve www.ucw.cz: REFUSED
### Warning: deneb.dfn.de is unable to resolve www.ucw.cz
(maybe it’s non-recursive)
The tools seems to expect name servers to accept recursive queries, e.g., in this case deneb.dfn.de
is expected to resolve www.ucw.cz recursively. A recursive query is a query that indicates that the
sender expects an answer to its requested record, rather than a hint how to proceed. The recursive
1DNSreport, http://member.dnsstuff.com/pages/dnsreport.php, April 2009
2DNS Expert, http://www2.menandmice.com/2000/2100 dns expert.html, April 2009
3DNS Management Module, http://www2.menandmice.com/2000/2200 dns module.html, April2009
4The DNS Sleuth, http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/ mj/sleuth/, April 2009
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name server is then doing most of the work by following delegations and sending requests until
the requested name can be resolved.
Other tools rather emit a warning if a server accepts such queries, e.g., zone check as offered
at www.zonecheck.fr or zonecheck.denic.de. On the other hand, the VivilProject DNSTest5 even
offers a web site to list public recursive resolvers. This offers alternatives for users that are not
satisfied with their ISP’s servers, e.g., if they filter domains.
The conclusion is that still a user of such tools must beforehand know her requirements exactly.
Apart from tools, which help to find configuration issues in DNS zones, there are also tools,
which help administrators to write better zone files.
DNS Boss6 allows to create zone files with a very simple GUI. The software is available for
different Unix-like platforms. Pricing depends on the number of DNS hosts and starts at $4,995
for less then 1,001 hosts.
DNStool7 by Gordon Rowell simplifies the maintenance of DNS zones. It creates a host database
containing information about all hosts in a network. Changes to this database can be exported
as updated DNS zone files. Information about the domain itself are not contained in the host
database. Therefore, there are special domain configuration files. These files are in zone file
syntax and are copied directly to the zone files. They may contain site-based MX records,
delegated sub-domains, name servers, etc.
Having such tools at their disposal, administrators should be able to create valid and sensible
zone files. Our datamining results show, that this is usually the case, but not always, as we
present in the upcoming Section 3.2.
The advantage of our solution comapred to the tools presented here is that it is not limited to
the isolated view on a single zone. In DNS many configuration errors have to do with the way
zones interact, e.g., through delegations, CNAME referals, or inverse mappings. This aspect is
not covered by any tool I am aware of. It is only parially discussed by Pappas et al. [PXL+04].
3.2 DNS Data Mining
DNS is designed not to emit all requested data to requesters. Hence, requesters need to know
what they actually want to ask for. If a name is looked up, it will be provided, but there is
no mechanism to determine all names in a zone for a resolver or all the names in the world.
Unfortunately, this is exactly what we want. So we use the following mechanisms, which were
of course not originally designed for this purpose and thus do not deliver perfectly complete
results.
AXFR (Advanced eXchange of File Records) is a mechanism to synchronize primary and sec-
ondary DNS servers of the same zone. This mechanism can be used in an authenticated
way, by using a preshared key/secret, but often it is just allowed as default. Note, that
there is no requirement that sites replicate their data with AXFR. There are also alterna-
tives. The only thing that has to be provided is a way to copy a zone file to another server
5VivilProject DNSTest, http://80.247.230.136/dns.htm, April 2009
6http://www.dnsboss.com/, April 2009
7http://www.gormand.com.au/products/, April 2009
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and load it. This can be done by a shell script. The file can be copied using secure copy,
rsync, or even checked out from a version management repository.
We experienced that between 20% and 40% of all name servers allow AXFR. It is impor-
tant to note, that this is not a phenomenon of the smaller or lower level zones or inexperi-
enced administrators. We are also successfully using AXFR at some top level zones and
even at a root server. Usually this should not be the case since the AXFR mechanism is
only provided for the synchronization between primary and secondary authoritative DNS
server and a misuse might expose confidential data and consume lots of bandwidth.
NSEC Walking NSEC is a record type introduced with the DNS Security Extentions (DNSSEC).
It is used for the authenticated denial mechanism. It is a follow-up of the NXT record and
might be replaced in future RFCs by NSEC3.
In Listing 3.1 one can see an example. The name nonexist22.se is resolved, but does not
exist. Therefore, the DNSSEC-aware name server sends a signed record that tells us that
there is no record between nonex.se and nonfiction.se. One can also see that there is
a resource record signature record (RRSIG) for each record in the message, except in the
QUESTION section of course. The NXDOMAIN status code has the same meaning as in
the older DNS standards: the queried name does not exist.
In a DNSSEC-signed zone, all records are sorted in lexicographical order. When a re-
solver asks for a non-existing record nonexist22.se it gets an answer containing a NSEC
record which points from the lexicographical predecessor, e.g., nonex.se to the successor
nonfiction.se. This answer is sent with a signature, so that the receiver can authenticate
it.
Fortunately, this mechanism can be used to implement a zone transfer, i.e., copying the
whole zone like an AXFR does. One record has to be guessed to begin with, but this is
easy: just take the NS record for the zone or the SOA record. Than the NSEC record
points to the name and types of the successor.
Of course, this is much slower than AXFR. It also needs much more network bandwidth.
The records are usually hardly cached so one has to wait for each record to be fetched
from the authoritative DNS server. The reason is the power law distribution of popularity
of web references [BCF+99].
DNSSEC is also not widespread enough for this to be a generic way to transfer data. In
the first 2.2 million zones that we transferred, there were just 4 DNSSEC enabled zones.
However, their number is growing and we can hope that in a not too far future, we can
transfer significantly more zones using NSEC walking.
in-addr.arpa Guessing Each host or network interface that has a name assigned in DNS should
also have a mapping pointing from the IP address to the name. To find all hosts with DNS
mappings, one could just guess 232 IP addresses and ask DNS for these inverse mappings.
Of course, the number of samples can be reduced. As explained in the Internet Systems
Consortium’s (ISC) Internet domain survey8, it is only necessary to follow the delegations
8https://www.isc.org/solutions/survey, April 2009
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from the in-addr.arpa zone. When there is no delegation for a certain IP subnet, the IP
addresses do not have to be queried.
The main limitation of this mechanism is, that only host to IP mappings can be found.
For the ISC domain survey this is not a problem, since they want to count Internet hosts,
where a host is a computer with a network interface.
However, the DNS has much more entries with other types that are not used in the Internet
Domain Survey of the ISC. We also use in-addr.arpa Guessing to find new zones and than
ask for name server records (NS), mail exchangers (MX) and others.
Trace Analysis We use DNS traces to find new zones as well. This is a very simple approach.
We just pick each name from a trace and resolve it. So we find the records with this
name, the zone, NS and MX records. The problem with this algorithm is, that DNS
traces are difficult to get. However, this approach is also a proof-of-concept to use user
requests directly in the future. Once, a certain number of users is using the system, that is
presented in Chapter 6, the data base growth will be driven by user activity, comparable
to pull caches.
Other Sources All kinds of Internet traffic can be used to discover new DNS zones. We im-
plemented web crawlers that use Google’s web search with random dictionary samples to
find HTTP references. With a depth first search we extract all URLs from these web sites.
With a URL we proceed the same way as with DNS traces. Note, that the web crawler is
only used if the job queues in our system run dry and crawler nodes would be idle oth-
erwise (Section 3.3.1 contains details about the architecture of our system.). These job
queues are usually filled with newly discovered DNS zones and DNS data that is about to
expire and has to be refreshed.
We also try to guess popular names like www, mail, ftp, news, www2, etc. The list
of popular names is based on the observations of the Internet Domain Survey of the ISC.
These names are then concatenated with a DNS domain that we cannot pull by AXFR or
NSEC walking.
As already mentioned, these mechanisms were not designed for our purposes. Therefore, of
course, we cannot expect our results to be accurate and complete. This is just a best effort
approach, but it helped us to learn a lot of things that we did not expect beforehand. A summary
of our results is presented in Section 3.3.3.
3.3 Measurements
Once we have a certain number of DNS records in our storage, we can proceed with data mining.
DNS offers many opportunities for missconfiguration. Some of them may cause service outages
or performance degradation. In this Section, I present the implementation of our DNS data
collection and analysis system and analysis results. These results have led to a series of proposals
how to improve DNS’ robustness, which was published in [PMF08].
This Section is much easier to read if the reader is familiar with the concept of the map and
reduce functions in functional programming languages. Since we have only used this paradigm
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and not implemented or extended it, I would like to refer to [DG08, YDHP07, Bro09] as entry
point further reading. The documentation of build-in functions for functional programming
in Python might also provide some help. It can be found at A. M. Kuchling’s home page9.
Altogether, this would certainly simplify the understanding of this Section.
3.3.1 Architecture
Storage
After some experience with databases we decided to store raw DNS records. Databases need a
scheme that is optimized for the kind of data mining that is to follow. It seemed impossible to
find a scheme which allowed us to do all of our data mining jobs with a satisfying performance.
Changing the scheme on the fly is also not a solution since all components accessing the DB
would need upgrades in this case. Adding new indices to speed up data mining jobs also takes
very long time, depending on the total number of entries in a relation (table). A high number of
indices increases the storage footprint of the data. This conflicts with the idea to decrease the
storage requirements by using a single scheme for a high amount of data, as it is usually the case
for data bases. Altogether, our implementation using data bases was too slow and inflexible.
The Map/Reduce paradigm [DG08] gives us the chance to process huge amounts of data in
a reasonable time on a cluster. We use the free Hadoop implementation which comes with a
distributed file system, where we store all raw data.
The main objective of the Hadoop core10 is to operate on petabytes of data, larger than RAM,
therefore disk I/O is required and must be reasonably quick. Furthermore, it must operate eco-
nomically, i.e., minimize $ per cycle, RAM, and I/O cost and therefore use a network of com-
modity PCs. Nevertheless, it must be reliable. Since it is based on a batch processing scheme,
reliability is more important than availability in this case.
The superiority of the Hadoop idea compared to the use of data bases is based on the problem
of disk seek operation costs. This argument is very well known and wide spread across the
Map/Reduce community. The CPU and transfer speed as well as memory and disk size double
each 18 to 24 month according to Moore’s law, i.e., according to historical knowledge. The hard
disk’s seek times are unfortunately nearly constant (decreasing approximately 5% per year).
Therefore, it is easy to see that scalable cluster computing must go at transfer rate benefits.
When a data base is used for large scale data analysis, usually join operations are needed, be-
cause for structural integrity the data is stored in a high normal form. In a join operation, the
join parameter must be looked up for each pair of records. Usually there is an index for this
parameter to obtain a reasonable speed. Hence, there must be a lookup into the index, which is
hopefully in the memory and a seek operation to the right block location on the disk. Therefore,
the overall performance of data base oriented data analysis is bound to the seek time, while the
sorting/merging of file splits in Lucene or Map/Reduce is bound to the I/O transfer rate because
large amounts of data are read sequentially.
Hadoop itself is an Apache project, which consists of the Hadoop file system (HDFS), a dis-
tributed file system, Map/Reduce, and HBase, which is a free implementation of Google’s
9A. M. Kuchling’s home page, http://www.amk.ca/python/writing/functional, April 2009
10Hadoop core, http://hadoop.apache.org/core/, April 2009
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BigTable [CDG+06], which can be used to store large quantities of structured data, similar
to a relational data base.
Map/Reduce [DG08] is a programming paradigm for processing of large datasets. It is usable
for a wide range of data mining purposes. A Map/Reduce task consists of a map phase followed
by an optional combine phase, and a reduce phase. Details are shown in Figure 3.1. The compu-
tation of these three steps is automatically parallelized by the underlying Map/Reduce runtime
system. Locality of data on cluster nodes can be exploited. Node failures are handled automat-
ically. Inter machine communication is also managed and optimized automatically to trade-off
local disk accesses for network communication.
The experience at Google Inc. shows that programmers have no serious difficulties to use such
a system. The same applies for the free Hadoop implementation we are using, even if some
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Figure 3.1: MapReduce overview
Spiders
We use Planet-Lab [Ros05] nodes as spiders to collect DNS information. These spiders are fed
from a Job queue provided by server nodes. The data obtained by these spiders is persistently
stored in our Hadoop cluster for later processing.
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Planet-Lab is, according to its web site www.planet-lab.org, “a global research network that
supports the development of new network services. Since the beginning of 2003, more than
1,000 researchers at top academic institutions and industrial research labs have used PlanetLab
to develop new technologies for distributed storage, network mapping, peer-to-peer systems,
distributed hash tables, and query processing. PlanetLab currently consists of 988 nodes at 485
sites.”
The reason for using Planet-Lab is, that some DNS zones are used for content distribution net-
works (CDN). Using Planet-Lab nodes allows us to observe such situations from different van-
tage points around the globe. If we would only query DNS records from our campus, we would
not get all data, since we have only our local view towards a CDN, which usually picks answers
based on locality optimizations.
Job Management
Some nodes in our system hold job queues for spiders11. Spiders can fetch a new batch of jobs
whenever being idle or they can be assigned to certain jobs for CDN detection based on their
geographical location. A job just contains a DNS name or an IP address for processing of the
corresponding in-addr.arpa zone..
There are two queues on these server nodes: one for zones that are new and not yet transferred
to the HDFS and another one for DNS records that are already known to the system but expired
and must be refreshed therefore. To detect whether a job belongs to the first queue or the second,
we use a sufficiently large Bloom filter [Blo70].
Data Flow
There are five main components exchanging data as shown in Figure 3.2:
DNS Servers are the sources of all DNS information. These are the publicly accessible DNS
servers in the Internet. We use the DNS protocol for communication. Hence, there is no
extended demand for operator’s cooperation.
Spiders are running on Planet-Lab nodes to send queries to DNS servers. In our original design
they wrote the results directly into the HDFS. Their jobs are fetched from our servers,
which hold two job queues, as explained above. The results of these jobs are sent back
to our servers to create new jobs. This is faster than using Map/Red to create new jobs,
but creates a certain traffic overhead, since the data is written into the DFS file system and
sent to our servers.
For firewalling reasons we actually changed this design: all data is now sent through our
servers. Although there is a decreased performance when writing to the HDFS, it was a
precondition for using a small cluster of nodes in our university’s center for Information
Services and High Performance Computing.
Servers share the workload of providing job queues for spiders with the help of a distributed
hash table (DHT). We use Pastry to be able to tolerate failures and create new servers at














Figure 3.2: Overall architecture
any time. We also use Pastry to organize the Spider network since there are often failures
and it allows us to have a fair sharing of available jobs.
A Hadoop Cluster is used to (1) store all data and (2) execute Map/Reduce jobs for data min-
ing. Unfortunately, there is currently no support for atomic append since it was considered
an unnecessary feature at the beginning of Hadoop’s development. Therefore, several spi-
ders might discover and write the same data at the same time into the DFS. This creates
redundant data. We are periodically running cleanup and consolidation on our data to free
some disk space by removing redundant entries. Our new design, where only servers write
data into the HDFS, this amount of redundancy is slightly reduced.
Clients are nodes in the network that look up DNS data. Later, these nodes will drive the data
discovery. Whenever a client asks for a name, that is not known so far, a spider job will be
scheduled. This gives users the ability to bias the data that is stored in the system based on
their needs and interests. At the same time, we can use these clients to replay a DNS trace.
This is expected to accelerate the roll-out of our solution if DNS traces are available. The
cluster can then be filled in a very short time.
3.3.2 Map/Reduce Example
We use the Hadoop cluster to run Map/Reduce jobs. As explained earlier, this is much more
feasible than data bases and SQL scripts. It can also be expected to grow more powerfull with
Moore’s law.
The Map/Reduce paradigm offers a very fixed scheme for developers. There are only five things
that can be implemented:
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1. an input reader,
2. a map function,
3. a combine function,
4. a reduce function, and
5. an output writer.
In the rest of this Section, an example will give an intuition, how Map/Reduce can be used.
Example
Introduction: DNS often delegates authority from a zone to a server of a subzone, e.g., from
de to dresden.de. If the address of the subzone’s DNS server can be cached, the query
rate of the higher level server can be reduced. Since there are usually many delegations,
this is very important to prevent overloading servers. It also allows to spread authority and
distribute management activities and overheads.
Motivation: For better fault-tolerance of resolvers, an NS record with its A record could be
used if no higher level server can be reached, even if it is expired. This would increase the
yield in presence of temporary failures. The assumption is, that TTLs for such records are
usually very long and the records probably do not change. Note that, if DNS administra-
tors plan to change such records, it is recommended, first to decrease the TTL.
The purpose of our Map/Reduce example is, to find out, how often a resolver could make
such a decision. Since we expect this to be the normal case, we look for the opposite to
reduce the amount of data. Hence, we want to find all NS records with a TTL less than 10
minutes. We also take into account if an NS record has a longer TTL, but the A record of
the server has a TTL of less than an hour.
Data Format: all DNS records are stored in the Hadoop cluster (Example in Listing 3.2)
It shows an NS record. One can see the complete record: which server delivered this
record (137.194.2.218), when it was transfered (03/21/2008) and which spider did the
transfer (131.246.191.41, which is planetlab1.itwm.fhg.de.), and how the transfer was
done (AXFR).
Map Phase: We iterate over all records in each split. Splits are partitions of the input data
which are automatically assigned by the runtime environment (on the left in Figure 3.1).
Therefore, we do not have to take care of locality. It is automatically assured.
All NS records are mapped as depicted in Figure 3.3. The map output key is the RDATA
section, which shows the name of the record.
Furthermore, all A records with TTLs of less then 600s are added. Therefore, the heise.de
record is not used in Figure 3.3. The key is the name of the A record.
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Records from File System
abcpages.com.           3600   IN      NS      ns1.abcpages.com.
cnn.com.                600     IN      NS      twdns-03.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com.                600     IN      NS      twdns-04.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com.                600     IN      NS      twdns-01.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com.               600     IN      NS      twdns-02.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com.                300       IN      A       64.236.16.52
cnn.com.                300       IN      A       64.236.24.12
cnn.com.                300       IN      A       64.236.29.120
cnn.com.                300       IN      A       64.236.16.20
ns1.abcpages.com. 123       IN      A       64.69.35.3
heise.de.               16909   IN      A       193.99.144.80
abcpages.com.           3600   IN      NS      ns1.abcpages.com.
cnn.com.                600     IN      NS      twdns-03.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com.                600     IN      NS      twdns-04.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com.                600     IN      NS      twdns-01.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com.               600     IN      NS      twdns-02.ns.aol.com.
cnn.com.                300     IN      A       64.236.16.52
cnn.com.                300     IN      A       64.236.24.12
cnn.com.                300     IN      A       64.236.29.120
cnn.com.                300     IN      A       64.236.16.20












Figure 3.3: Map phase: The owner names of A records and the RDATA sections of NS
records are used as keys.
Reduce Phase: We iterate over a map. Keys are names of hosts as produced by the map phase.
Note, that Figure 3.4 shows that map outputs are partitioned according to the keys. This is
not shown in Figure 3.3 since it is not done by the mapper but by the runtime environment.
If there is an NS record with a TTL of less then 600s, it is added to the result map, e.g.,
the agrofert.cz records in Figure 3.4. The short TTL could be a hint for DNS-based load
balancing but might not be a good policy since it is up to the resolver, how to query these
servers. Each resolver might have its own policy therefore. DNS-based load balancing
is more typical for IP addresses of, e.g., web servers. The stub resolver, e.g., in a web
browser would use just one address that it gets from the DNS server, usually the first.
Stub resolvers do not cache the whole resource record set.
If there is an NS record (any TTL), like the abcpages.com record in Figure 3.4, and an A
record with a TTL of less then 600s, they also belong to the result. Since the key is the
RDATA of the NS record which matches the name of the A record, it is a glue record.
The cnn.com records in Figure 3.4 indicate that the name server might change every 10
minutes, but the IP addresses of the servers are very stable. In this case, a resolver could
still try to query a server, even if the NS record has expired. This solution would even
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agrofert.cz.            60      IN      NS      b.fastnet.cz.
agrofert.cz.            60      IN      NS      c.fastnet.cz.
agrofert.cz.            60      IN      NS      a.fastnet.cz.
Result of Map phase
abcpages.com.         3600   IN      NS      ns1.abcpages.com.




abcpages.com.         3600   IN      NS      ns1.abcpages.com.
ns1.abcpages.com. 123     IN      A       64.69.35.3
agrofert.cz.            60      IN      NS      b.fastnet.cz.
agrofert.cz.            60      IN      NS      c.fastnet.cz.











cnn.com.                600     IN      NS      twdns-03.ns.aol.com.
twdns-03.ns.aol.com.  3600 IN      A       207.200.73.85
twdns-03.ns.aol.com.
twdns-03.ns.aol.com.
Conclusion: Name server itself 
might change
Conclusion: Address of name server 
might change
Figure 3.4: Reduce phase
be fail-aware in the case that there is no DNS server running on the queried machine
anymore. The negative effect might be that the load balancing that the provider wants to
achieve it distracted. It might also be that a DNS server is reached, but it does not have the
current version of the zone if the provide uses a version management that does not involve
updating all DNS servers at the same time.
Result: The outputs of this Map/Reduce job can now be used as a black list for DNS outages.
That means that these name servers should not be delivered to clients much longer than
DNS was serving them, because they might change soon. If they are used nevertheless, it
might lead to unnecessary network traffic since the local DNS server would try to query
them for a rather long time. This delay would be perceived by the client and might de-
crease its overall performance.
3.3.3 Results
We wrote many data mining jobs to look for many typical issues in DNS configurations and also
for some strange things. We learned about many of these things by manually looking through
data or looking at other tools as mentioned in Section 3.1. In contrast to these tools, we focused
on DNS-internal functionality, with one exception, where we tried to send SPAM e-mails. This
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was done out of curiosity and to show how easy DNS data might be misused for attacks on
poorly configured services (Table 3.3.3). We did not sell any blue pills.
Some of the things we found to be strange might actually be wanted to support applications that
we are not aware of. However, we are convinced that they might result in degraded performance
or failures for other applications or the DNS infrastructure itself.
Note, that these are intermediate results. Our data collection and analysis can collect more
data to get a more complete picture. However, there are certain constraints, i.e., the size of the
cluster and the hard disk capacity. One can also see that many of the configuration issues we
discovered are very rare among the huge total amount of data. Nevertheless, they are important
and challenging for the implementation of our data collection application since it would be
very painful if the application crashes or looses consistency for one out of a million records.
Therefore, the data collection and data mining software must be very reliable and fault tolerant.
The examination of roughly 2.2 million zones shows the following results:
SOA timings were all set to 0 (zero) in 0.007% of all zones. In a SOA resource record (Start
of authority) there are timings for synchronization with secondary name servers and for
negative caching. Setting the latter one to zero results in a disabled negative caching.
This setting makes sense, if there are new records added to the zone very frequently and
the administrator thinks that the most recently added records are needed very quickly.
Actually, with the deployment of DNSSEC, the timings of SOA records will completely
loose their meaning.
Let me explain their meaning. Listing 3.3 shows a typical SOA record. The name of the
zone is tu-dresden.de. The record has a TTL of 86400 seconds and belongs to the Internet
class (IN). The record data section contains several values:
1. the primary name server, in this case rnadm.urz.tu-dresden.de
2. the e-mail address of a responsible person, in this case wuensch@urz.tu-dresden.de
3. the serial number, in this case a timestamp-based representation. The zone has been
updated March 25, 2009. There has only bee none update on this day since the day
passed and the last two digits are still 00. These two digits are incremented with
each update that takes place on the same day.
4. the refresh timing - It specifies how often a secondary name server should try to get
a fresh copy of the zone file from the primary server.
5. the retry time - It specifies how long a secondary server should wait after a failed
attempt to get an update from the primary name server before trying again.
6. the expiry time - It specifies how long a zone is allowed to be served from a sec-
ondary name server after an update from the primary server has failed. Once this
time has passed, the zone is not served anymore.
7. the default TTL - This TTL is important for negative caching. If a record cannot
be resolved, this failure is cached. Since the record itself does not have a TTL, the
caching name server must know, when it should retry getting the mapping. There-
fore, this value is used.
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The timings of SOA records are for many current implementations deprecated, since there
is a notification mechanism, that the primary name server is using whenever there has
been an update. The serial has actually been used by secondary name servers to figure
out whether or not it has to do a AXFR/IXFR. With an update notification this is also not
longer necessary. The default TTL, which is used for negative caching would be replaced
be the TTL of a NSEC or NSEC3 record, once DNSSEC is deployed.
Negative caching was switched off at 0.05% of all zones. Ignoring all other timings that have
been explained in the point before, we looked only at the default TTL here. It seems often
to be the case that zone administrators think that there is no need for negative caching.
This might of course be the case, e.g., if all users of the zone’s data access it directly at the
authoritative name server. One must note that the default caching TTL has no meaning in
this case anyway, so why touch it? If there is caching, however, a default TTL of 0s might
be useful for mobile applications, that need to be redirected rather often or that demand a
quick propagation of such updates.
Such applications are one of the reasons, that our Hadoop-based data mining infrastructure
cannot be used as a DNS backup service and therefore the design presented in Section 6
relies on stream processing rather than batch processing.
Refresh timing less than retry time was configured at 0.78% of all zones. This should not be
a problem to any resolver. As mentioned before, the refresh timing says, how often the
secondary name server should refresh a zone. The retry time says how long it should wait
before retrying a failed refresh. A retry value greater than the refresh is not very helpful. I
could imagine that it makes sense for a very overloaded primary name server to delay the
retry a bit longer. But if the primary is so overloaded that it does not respond to incoming
DNS queries anymore, e.g., from the secondary name server asking for the SOA record to
compare the serial, it is probably time for a hardware upgrade.
A low serial together with a low refresh timing tells us that the secondary name server must
refresh the zone quite often. But the low serial suggests that the zone rarely changes. This
was the case in 0.01% of the zones.
Zones without NS or address record for its name servers were found in 4.46% of the SOA
records discovered. This might be the case, e.g., if zones are not used any longer but the
parent zone still holds some stale delegation records. It is a very typical phenomenon,
that certain records are configured in DNS, but never removed when they are not used
anymore. This increases the maintenance effort, e.g., the time it takes to sign a zone. It
might also lead to failures, e.g., if a mail server tries to use an MX record that points to a
server that does not exist any longer.
Strange e-mail or NS in SOA record can be found in 0.25% of all zones. This applies, e.g., if
the e-mail address contains an ’@’, which would have to be replaced by a dot. In 0.36%
of the SOA records, the name server was specified as ’.’(dot).
Very many labels (> 10) in a name was found in 0.00036% of all records. Since DNS was
made to create human readable names, it can be questioned if this is the case here. Long
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names could be a problem for the transport layer, where the size of the transfer unit, e.g.,
a UDP packet, is limited. When very long names are used and DNSSEC is used to sign
this data, it might be necessary to set up a TCP connection more often. However, this is
really a very rare phenomenon.
Small TTLs (< 1000) can be found in 6.88% of all records. Small TTLs are interesting since
they distract the use of caches. This property can be used as an indicator of more and more
mobility in the Internet or DNS-based load balancing. When a caching infrastructure is
set up, e.g., for the access network of the approach presented in Section 6, such criteria
must be paid attention to.
Invalid TTLs were found in 0.0001% of all records. TTLs (Time-to-live) specify the time
interval that a RR may be cached before a resolver will consult the nameserver again. The
value is a 32 bit signed integer, ranging from 0 to 2,147,483,647, i.e., 231 positive values.
RRs with a zero TTL value will be used only once for the current transaction and thus not
be cached. TTLs are specified in seconds and they do typically range from a few seconds
up to several days or month depending on the type of the RR. We define TTLs as invalid, if
they are out of range, i.e., greater than 2,147,483,647 which is equivalent to an interval of
over 68 years. Such values could lead to crashes in resolver implementations, e.g., in Java
implementations a NumberFormatException is a RuntimeException, which is usually not
caught. The amount of RRs with invalid TTLs we have found is quite low (162 out of
156,639,518).
Local IP addresses represent 1.66% of all address records. It could be very comfortable for
some users to set up their local addresses in the DNS. However, there are options to set
up views in DNS servers, which experienced administrators would be aware of. If the
wrong addresses are exposed to external users, their applications might show failures due
to routing problems.
PTR records not in in-addr.arpa or with a inverse IP in the RDATA section instead of the
name of the record was found in 0.03% of all records. I am not aware of a use for this
configuration
Small TTL infrastructure records have been explained in the example in Section 3.3.2 on
page 43 We classified 26,966 of 156,639,518 infrastructure records as short TTL’ed.
Invalid comments (#) Sometimes administrators try to remove entries from a zone file using
the hash sign (’#’). Unfortunately this syntax is not allowed. Bind9 gives a warning
saying:
”dnsserver named[3717]: /etc/bind/db.local:19: #www.localhost: bad owner name (check-
names)”,
but keeps running and makes the wrong syntax even available via AXFR. We found 5923
such owner names out of 156.639.518 RRs, so this should not be a serious problem. It
could easily be solved by a name server implementation refusing to start up with an erro-
neous zone file.
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Wrong PTR Besides resolving DNS names to IP addresses, the DNS namespace can also be
used to reveal DNS names for IP addresses. Many Internet services and distributed ap-
plications use this feature in order to identify and retrieve a prettier (DNS) name for
their communication endpoints instead of using their IP addresses. The so called reverse
lookup requires a correctly configured PTR RR in the in-addr.arpa. domain. According
to RFC1035, a PTR RR may either be used to point from an IP address to a DNS name
using the following format:
< reversed−host− ip− address > .IN −ADDR.ARPA. PTR < dns−name >,
or to specify a sub network in the form of:
< network−name >PTR< reversed−host−zero−number > .IN−ADDR.ARPA.
However, some administrators do mistakenly use PTR RRs in place of CNAME RRs that
point from a DNS name to another DNS name. We have found 624,503 out of 156.639.518
of such incorrectly configured RRs. Some examples are shown in Listing 3.4. Again, we
have to mention that there might be an application that makes use of these records, that
we are just not aware of.
Invalid TLDs Customized top level domains can simplify local communication. If the local
DNS server of a company is used by all employees, it may introduce new top level do-
mains. We have observed this in several cases. However, this practice can lead to errors, if
somebody uses another local DNS server and tries to resolve such a domain, since there is
no delegation from the DNS root. It was already mentioned in Chapter 2, that there exists
a bailiwick checking algorithm for DNS replies messages, that should prevent this kind of
spread. It would be a kind of cache poisoning. An example is shown in Listing 3.5
Lame Delegations and Remote Lame Delegations Lame delegations are delegations that do
not provide an IP address and therefore cannot be used. Note that Papas et al. [PXL+04]
have a much wider definition. They also require that name servers have to be authoritative
for the child zone, if they are addressed in delegations, i.e., they reply an AA answer flag.
In addition to lamen delegations, we also looked at remote lame delegations, which are
delegations that come with an A record, pointing to a local address. Local addresses are
not routable and therefore the delegation is lame for any remote host, even if the NS record
is obtainable.
Moreover, we look at lame names in general, like CNAME or MX records pointing to
DNS names without address RRs. In our data set we have found 607,566 lame dele-
gations and 200,270 remote lame delegations in 15,367,927 delegations altogether. It is
certainly not possible to simplify name server implementations by removing delegations
since delegating authority is one of the intrinsic features of DNS. However, the extra ef-
fort currently required, i.e., resolving DNS name for the delegated name server might be
removed. It introduces the obligation to deliver glue records, since usually only the IP
address of a server is needed. If services are interested in the DNS name of this specific
DNS server, an inverse DNS lookup can be performed. RFC 1035 explains that if a ma-
chine’s address is copied into an NS record, then you have to watch for changes in the
address. Indirection avoids the opportunity for inconsistency since there is only one place
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to apply NS RR changes. On the other hand, we will always have inconsistencies with
or even because of this kind of indirection whenever a name is changed. We have seen
this quite often for MX records pointing to non-existing names. Note, that lame names
are sometimes useful, e.g., for name servers in SOA records. There they prevent update
attacks against the primary name server. However, in the cases mentioned above, we are
not aware of any such purpose.
Diminished Server Redundancy This phenomenon has also been discussed by Papas et al.
[PXL+04]. A zone in DNS does usually provide at least two name servers to serve RRs
in case one server is down or unavailable through maintenance, or hardware or software
failures. However, some zones provide at least one pair of name servers which are ob-
viously behind the same router in the same subnet, which thus results in having a single
point of failure. We examined the IP addresses of DNS servers as an indication of rout-
ing structures. In our data set we found 3,775,463 zones out of 3,890,409 (97%) to have
diminished server redundancy.
Note that due to Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR, RFC 4632) this might be over-
estimated. We classified DNS servers using network addresses of up to 24 bit. If CIDR
is used with longer network addresses, we have false positives since it allows hosts with a
common 24bit prefix to reside in different LANs.
DNS Server Implementations DNS server implementations are available for a great variety
of platforms and operating systems. The most popular DNS server software is BIND. We
used the same fingerprinting tool12 as ISC used for their Domain survey. The results of our
survey are shown in Figure 3.5. As expected, BIND is still the top choice. In contrast to
the ISC measurements, we found more TinyDNS instances than Microsoft DNS servers.
It is also interesting to see that BIND 8 is still on rank 9, even, there is no ISC support for
this software anymore. 17,398 out of 384,164 (4.5%) are BIND 8, 10,848 with recursion
enabled. In other words, 2.82% recursive resolvers are known to allow cache poisoning.
Paul Mockapetris said: “If my ISP was running BIND 8 in a forwarder configuration, I
would claim that they were not protecting me the way they should be, (...) Running that
configuration would be Internet malpractice.”
Namespace and Labels To get an idea of the shape of the DNS namespace, we measured the
fan-out at each zone, i.e., the number of delegations and the length of branches as reflected
by the number of labels in a name as depicted in Figure 3.6. We also had a look at
the typical length of labels, since it is interesting to estimate the effort of brute force
attacks on the proposed NSEC3 RRs as discussed by Rose et al. in [RN08]. We found
some rather long labels but they do not seem to be in use. Sometimes the names directly
contain descriptions of the purpose of a web site, but in general labels are rather short,
as Figure 3.7 shows. Long labels also contradict with the purpose of DNS to provide
easy-to-remember human readable names.
RR Type Statistic and IPv6 We evaluated how often certain RR types are used (Fig. 3.8). An
interesting result is that there is still some use of the HINFO RRs, which is leaking details
12http://code.google.com/p/fpdns/, April 2009
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Figure 3.5: DNS server software popularity
that could easily be used by hackers to gain knowledge about the system to attack as
described in RFC 1912. The high amount of RRSIG records is due to signatures changes
that occur with each zone update. NSEC RRs remain unchanged in those cases. We can
also see that IPv6 addresses still do not play an important role in the Internet. 42,450 out
of 49,939,414 DNS names with addresses were found to have an A RR as well as AAAA
RR. This is an important number to estimate the degree of preparation of the Internet to
the introduction of IPv6. IPv6 will only be deployed if Internet services are reachable
through IPv4 and IPv6.
Clients cannot be expected to switch to version 6 as long as this step would make some
services unavailable. We expect this number to increase. NAT and classless networks
helped a lot to make better use of the available addresses. However, recently the case of
YouTube and Pakistan Telecom13 has shown that CIDR makes BGP routing tables quite
complex and therefore becomes a liability for the Internet.
Zones without SOA or wrong SOA We were surprised to see that there are zones without SOA
RRs, e.g., 888melody.info. This strengthens our claim that one could use DNS without any
SOA records. SOA RRs are useless since email address can be found in RP (responsible
person RR) and timings are not longer needed since the notification mechanism is used
by default. The start a of zone can be determined through delegation from a parent zone.
The name server field in the SOA record is also actually considered optional since often it
is useful to omit it to defend against DNS update attacks.
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Figure 3.6: DNS name label count distribution
Wildcard Usage The wildcard mechanism of DNS is difficult to understand. Under certain
conditions, a DNS server creates RRs, which equal the queried name and contents taken
from wildcard RRs given in their zones. These conditions are different depending on the
implementation. According to RFC 1034, wildcard records are only used iff there exists
no other record, which would match the queried name. Note that this rule is not limited to
a matching RR type.
In reality, most name servers implement wildcards in a different way. A common practice
is to use wildcards whenever a pattern matching on the name is possible, but no record
for the desired type is available. MX records are the typical use case. Often all hosts in
a domain should be given the same mail exchanger. Hence, a wildcard for the host name
is used. Of course, although other records for a given host name exist, we expect the MX
record from the wildcard to be replied whenever an MX record for a host is requested.
This strategy is implemented, e. g., by the Microsoft DNS server. 166,524 out of 913,189
zones (18.23%) contained wildcards. This is less than we expected as, e.g., 673,137 of
these zones contained a record for the name www.
Note, that we only looked at zones which we transferred completely. Given the complexity
of the wildcard mechanism and the differences in the implementations, one could argue
that it should better not be used. However, since almost 20% of the zones make use of it,
we think this mechanism has its raison d’être.
CNAME Problems DNS allows mapping CNAME records to CNAME records which results
in CNAME chains of arbitrary lengths. However, this is considered bad practice since
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Figure 3.7: DNS name label length distribution
recursive resolvers often follow such chains to find the desired data, which furthermore
increases traffic and overall lookup time.
CNAME chains may even inadvertently form cycles which can crash recursive resolvers
or lead to many DNS messages in the WAN as explained by Jung et al. [JSBM01]. Table
3.3.3 lists the number of CNAME chains and cycles we have found in our data sets.
We have found 42,384 unique chains out of 7,069,234 CNAME records. If we consider
the total amount of these records in our data set, they account for 0.59 % of all CNAME
records. Apart from that, we have also found 3,014 identity CNAME RRs, i.e., CNAME
RRs pointing directly to themselves as shown in Listing 3.6.
The longest CNAME chain that we have found so far consisted of 99 elements, and pointed
from 99.bottles-of-beer.thegrebs.com down to no.bottles-of-beer.thegrebs.com. In order
to simplify implementations of (recursive) resolvers, we suggest that nameservers should
refuse loading zone files in case the configuration contains a CNAME cycle or chain, by
simply looking up names in the local zone and querying destinations of CNAME RRs.
www Representation Nowadays, the hostname www is often meaningless. Web servers are
hosted on many hosts in an organization for different purposes. The no-www blog ar-
gues that www is deprecated14. Website makers should configure their main sites to be
accessible by domain.com as well as www.domain.com.
The trivial way to achieve this is to put a wildcard record into the zone and omit www.
Then the wildcard would match any hostname that is not defined and leads to the web site.
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Figure 3.8: DNS recourse record type distribution
We have determined, how often this is the case as shown in Figure 3.9. For this figure, we
did not consider any in-addr.arpa zones. They should not have such entries anyway. The
results show that most of the zones contain www as an owner name and a wildcard. The
latter is often used to specify a mail exchanger for all hosts in the zone. In only 2% of
the cases there is www as an owner name and no wildcard at all. In 3% of the cases the
wildcard matches for www. 10% of the zones have neither a www entry nore a wildcard.
Therefore. a query for www would end up in a NXDOMAIN reply.
The 2nd obvious way to implement the desired behavior is to create a CNAME record for
the www entry. We also analyzed the popularity of this approach as depicted in Figure
3.10.
We share the opinion of the no-www blog. Unfortunately, it does not help to simplify DNS
zones. The CNAME and the wildcard approach have both their shortcomings. CNAME
configuration issues could lead to loops or chains and the wildcard mechanism is often
misunderstood and implemented in different ways by different server implementations.
Another approach could be to get rid of www entries in zone files completely and let
clients deal with the problem. Often web browsers suggest typos, hostnames, or even use
web search engines to find a web site in the case that the given URL does not resolve to a
host.
Open Mail Relays Our DNS database can be used for many kinds of analysis. We focused
on DNS configuration flaws, however, DNS knowledge could be used to study various
configuration flaws of many other services such as (1) SSH servers using blacklisted host












Table 3.1: CNAME chains and cycles of given length
www & wildcard
www & no wildcard







Figure 3.9: Relative popularity of – www vs. no-www approach
keys15, (2) databases without proper user authentication, (3) anonymous ftp servers, (4)
recursive DNS resolvers, or (5) detecting dead servers: often names are associated with
certain services, like www for web, mail for smtp, imap, pop, login for ssh, and db for
some database. Whenever the expected service is not found at one of those names, the
configuration may be obsolete.
We have extracted a list of mail servers (from MX RRs) and tested those for open mail
relays: Out of 208,822 mail relays, we have found 101 open ones that can easily be abused










Figure 3.10: Relative popularity of www approach – CNAME vs. A
for spam sending. Table 3.3.3 shows the results of our open mail relay test.
Altogether, one could say, that it is easy to find millions of records that might lead to failures
in resolvers or applications using them. The danger is here, that configurations that hardly ever
occur, might lead to control flows in resolvers that are hardly tested. Therefore, the risk to see a
failure is increased.
The same applies for our infrastructure. It takes millions of records and days of runtime to see
certain configurations. It is also difficult to write test cases since it is not trivial to think of the
most uncommon ideas of zone administrators.
A second thing to mention is, that it seems to be obvious, that the way administrators configure
DNS zones, with or without tools, can contribute to make DNS more reliable. More tool support
would be desireable.
We looked at DNS data to find out, which features of DNS are actually used and which errors
are common. If there are errors typically made in DNS features that have lost their meaning over
time, because of protocol extensions or changes in Internet usage or user behavior, we propose
simplification of implementations by omitting these features. We are aware of the fact that for a
distributed application to be able to work, all participants have to agree on a protocol. However,
we observed that for DNS this is already not the case, which is on purpose according to Paul
Vixie [Vix07]. At least some server implementations usually emit faulty RRs or refuse to supply
certain RRs. Therefore, we expect DNS resolvers to be fault tolerant enough to take a few other
changes exploiting Vixie’s viewpoint.
We propose sufficiently DNS server implementations not to accept CNAME chains if they can
be detected locally during startup of the server. We know that this adds some lines of code, but
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# Success / error message
101 Success – open mail relay
109,051 Invalid address
23,214 mal domain missing or malformed
488 EOF
464 Exception reading response
281 No such user here
170 sorry, sender address has invalid format
108 mailfrom without country or top level domain is administratively denied
60 could not parse your mail from command
42 Syntax error in return path
37 Syntax error.
22 Syntax error in parameters or arguments
12 Error parsing sender address
5 Please try again later
5 Client was not authenticated
3 Start domain with an alphabetic character.
2 Sender validity not confirmed
Table 3.2: Results of our search for open mail relays
it should simplify operations and maintenance. DNS servers should not start up or reload when
zone files contain bugs. Often zone administrators have wrong expectations and might ignore
warnings.
AXFR and IXFR features could be omitted in server implementations. Most servers have zone
files which could be updated with other mechanisms, as shown by the TinyDNS manual16. This
would not just remove some lines of code, it would also prevent that administrators allow zone
transfers to everyone.
Name server RRs are often redundant. Therefore, there may be inconsistencies if they are up-
dated but some remainders are left, e.g., a name server could be replaced, bit the old one is left in
the parent zone. We propose to store name server entries at only one place. A recursive resolver
would find them in the parent zone, where they are needed for delegation. In the zone itself,
there might be additional servers defined optionally for internal use. Then an update would also
take effect atomically on a single location.
If no dots are used in a host name, which is usually the case, SOA records are not needed any
longer. NS records are enough to define a delegation to a zone and SOA timings are not needed
since the introduction of the NOTIFY mechanism (P. Vixie, RFC 1996, August 1996). The name
server and e-mail contact are often not correct anyway. NS and RP resource records can replace
them. The only field in a SOA record that is actually used is the minimum TTL. However,
according to the IETF mailing list, the NSEC RR will have a TTL with the same semantic.
Hence, all fields of a SOA record are obsolete or become obsolete with DNSSEC.
Furthermore, DNS servers should never propagate any invalid TTL. This may crash resolvers
16djbdns - TinyDNS manual, http://cr.yp.to/djbdns.html, April 2009
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and is easy to prevent.
For obsolete RR types such as HINFO, which could be used to leak confidential information,
there should be a type blacklist. A DNS server could refuse to propagate RRs with blacklisted
types. This forces the administrator to remove the RR type from the blacklist explicitly and to
think about its purpose once more.
The results found in our analysis will be used to detect fraud and maintain consistency in a DNS
backup repository which is used to serve DNS records in the case of DNS outages, as presented
in Section 6.
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Listing 3.1: NSEC answer for a non-existing name
; <<>> DiG 9.5.0-P2 <<>> +dnssec @192.36.144.107 nonexist22.se
; (1 server found)
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NXDOMAIN, id: 1049
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 6, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; WARNING: recursion requested but not available
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:




se. 7200 IN SOA catcher-in-the-rye.nic.se.
registry-default.nic.se. 2009032505 1800 1800 2419200 7200
se. 7200 IN RRSIG SOA 5 1 172800 20090331204456




se. 7200 IN NSEC 0-0.se. NS SOA TXT RRSIG NSEC
DNSKEY
se. 7200 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 1 7200 20090329114252




nonex.se. 7200 IN NSEC nonfiction.se. NS RRSIG NSEC
nonex.se. 7200 IN RRSIG NSEC 5 2 7200 20090330022443




;; Query time: 36 msec
;; SERVER: 192.36.144.107#53(192.36.144.107)
;; WHEN: Wed Mar 25 12:58:46 2009
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 674




Listing 3.3: Example SOA record
tu-dresden.de. 86400 IN SOA rnadm.urz.tu-dresden.de.
wuensch.urz.tu-dresden.de. 2009032500 10800 3600 3600000 86400
Listing 3.4: wrong PTR records
73.reverse.4tune.fi. PTR IN 43200 ebay.ihku.org.
news.aclu-nj.org. PTR IN 300 nstest.tzo.com.
www.advisorsites.net. PTR IN 3600 nstest.tzo.com.
www3.catholicsforamerica.org. PTR IN 600 domain.not.configured.
Listing 3.5: Invalid TLD example, resulting in a invalid/alternative set of root servers
; <<>> DiG 9.5.0-P2 <<>> look4. @dpns4.dnsnameserver.org.
;; global options: printcmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 57239
;; flags: qr aa rd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 1, AUTHORITY: 4, ADDITIONAL: 4




look4. 3600 IN A 208.87.149.250
;; AUTHORITY SECTION:
. 3600 IN NS dpns4.dnsnameserver.org.
. 3600 IN NS dpns1.dnsnameserver.org.
. 3600 IN NS dpns3.dnsnameserver.org.
. 3600 IN NS dpns2.dnsnameserver.org.
;; ADDITIONAL SECTION:
dpns1.dnsnameserver.org. 3600 IN A 208.87.148.191
dpns2.dnsnameserver.org. 3600 IN A 208.87.149.192
dpns3.dnsnameserver.org. 3600 IN A 208.87.150.103
dpns4.dnsnameserver.org. 3600 IN A 208.87.150.104
;; Query time: 177 msec
;; SERVER: 208.87.150.104#53(208.87.150.104)
;; WHEN: Thu Mar 26 15:01:58 2009
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 196
Listing 3.6: CNAME cycles
ftp.creativemedia.fr. 86400 IN CNAME ftp.creativemedia.fr.
www.bcrst.org. 3600 IN CNAME www.bcrst.org.
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Chapter 4
Peer-to-peer approaches
Walfish et al. [WBS04] describe it as a sad state-of-affairs that the world wide web is constrained
by the limitations of DNS and that the DNS is unduly burdened by the way it is used in the web.
A very common idea is to use a distributed hash table (DHT) [GBHC00] as a lookup service for
Internet resources. A DHT provides the same functionality as a normal hash table, i.e., it maps
keys to values. These key/value pairs are stored in buckets, where each bucket might be stored
on a different host in a network. To prevent a single point of failure, these buckets are usually
replicated among neighbor hosts.
Walfish et al. argue that references to Internet resources should be free of any semantics and not
human-readable, otherwise there would be disputes [Gra03] over the right to use these references
or identifiers. Of course, there must be some mapping from human readable keywords to these
identifiers, otherwise users would not be able to use these resources. It is an interesting side-
effect that this concept might work together well with D. J. Bernstein’s Nym-based security
concept (Section 2.6.4). Hyperlinks pointing directly to web resources could then look like
sfr://fbcd123/pub1.ps , where the SFRTag (SFR - semantic-free referencing) would abstract the
DNS name (or IP) of the web server as well as the path to the document.
SFR was implemented on top of MIT’s DHash/Chord [SMK+01] similar to the DHT-based DNS
implementation of Cox et al. [CMM02]. Benchmarks were exercised on 130 physical hosts and
390 virtual nodes using the Planet-Lab. This is of course not quite representative compared to
the number of DNS servers that we can find in the Internet1. As consequence of the small setup,
98% of the almost 15,000 lookups resolved in only two Chord hops.
The lookups were a replay of the traces of Jung et al. [JSBM01]. Unfortunately, the authors did
not incorporate A-Record cache misses, so that the hit-rate of the experiment was unrealistic
high. There is also no evaluation saying whether a DNS cache hit and an SFR cache hit cause
exactly the same delay.
At the end, DNS (Cache misses) is better for 70% of the requests from the trace compared to 2
hop Chord lookups (Figure 4). It can also clearly be seen that only the 5s timeout of DNS is the
reason, that DNS is for a short period slower than Chord. DNS just retransmits a query while
SFR probably has a better way to deal with it.
The performance of DNS seems to be difficult to match for peer-to-peer systems, while the
1They also simulated 1000 nodes, which is in my opinion not much better.
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Figure 4.1: Performance of SFR on top of Chord. [WBS04]
dependability and management effort are superior. Therefore, many researchers have tried to
implement DNS on top of peer-to-peer routing structures as explained in Section 4.2 to overcome
server-side failures (Section 2.3.1) that are related to configuration issues. Before I introduce
our own peer-to-peer implementation to serve DNS there will be an introduction to peer-to-peer
systems in general, which will motivate our design decisions. Therefore, I will present some
examples for the important steps in the evolution of peer-to-peer systems. Among them, our
system belongs to the “nanos gigantum humeris insidentes“.
This very long Chapter about peer-to-peer techniques is necessary since I made the strong state-
ment that current peer-to-peer networks are not able to replace the DNS client-server infrastruc-
ture. Therefore, I want to provide a documentation about the networks and features I considered.
Albeit, this list is not complete. Some copy cats have been removed and some overlays that share
ideas have been grouped.
4.1 Introduction to Peer-to-Peer systems
The first popular peer-to-peer system was Napster. The idea was to have a server, which provides
locations for keywords. These keywords can are given by clients which want to find certain
content. Therefore, a request is sent to the server and the server returns a list with locations of
files on other peers. There might be a ranking concerning the performance of these peers and
the quality of the match of the keyword search.
As in the majority of Peer-to-Peer systems, all clients (peers) in Napster have the same function-
ality. They can share a folder which is then listed by the index server. Furthermore, they can
search for files using keywords and download data directly from the other peer. A concurrent
download from several peers, like with BitTorrent, is not possible with Napster.
Napster’s disadvantages are the need for a central server, the limitation on mp3 files, and missing
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privacy measures. Until it was shut down in 2001, Napster had up to 80 Million users. The
service was terminated because of the permanent infringement of copyright.
The simple design of Napster made it easy to shut it down. Without the central index server,
Napster was unable to operate and any new index server would be discovered quickly.
The end of Napster was the dawn of other peer-to-peer services, like Gnutella, which learned
from Napster and offered the same service without the need for a central index server. Probably
the most popular successor of Napster is the FastTrack-network. FastTrack and also the later
version of Gnutella implemented index servers like Napster. The difference was, that there were
many such servers with the purpose to offer the same rapid response lookup service like Napster,
not including any single point of failure. For these index servers, nodes were selected which had
stable Internet connections and enough resources to host the index.
Again, these services became quickly known for the permanent infringement of copyright.
Nowadays, peer-to-peer networks are very popular for economic aspects. Each user of a peer-to-
peer application contributes some resources to the network. This includes network bandwidth,
disk space and CPU time.
In a client-server-architecture, the provider of the service or the servers must pay for them. The
total cost of ownership includes buying hardware, operating cost, like air conditioning, ISP,
operators, maintenance, etc. For peer-to-peer systems there is usually no such cost. Instead of
this the software must be made more fault tolerant and flexible, because of the permanent churn
in the network, i.e., peers entering and leaving and customers of the service must provide their
hardware and network connection.
Applications for peer-to-peer networks include
• file sharing or distributed file systems (eMule [KB05], Overnet/eDonkey [HKLF+06],
Limewire [SR02], Mnemosyne [VM02], CFS [DKK+01]),
• (group) communication (Scribe [CDKR02], Bayeux [ZZJ+01], CAN-MC [RFH+01]),
cooperative caches (Codeen [WPP+04], Coral [FM03]), and
• global storage networks (OceanStore [REG+03], PAST [DR01]), etc.
Peer-to-peer systems are usually classified according to the routing process and the amount of
routing knowledge. In the upcoming sections, the most widely used classification is used.
4.1.1 Unstructured Peer-to-Peer Systems
Lookups in unstructured peer-to-peer networks are done with flooding or random walks. Each
node knows at least one other node’s address. These nodes are called neighbors.
If a node got a request to look up an object, like an mp3 file, it first looks it up locally and if it is
found, sends an answer to the requester. Otherwise, the request is forwarded to all or a certain
number of its neighbors. If this number is 1, the routing strategy is called random walk. If it is
forwarded to all neighbors, the routing strategy is called flooding, otherwise it is usually called
bounded flooding.
The node’s neighbors proceed with the same algorithm until the object is found or the upper
bound of routing steps (TTL, explained later on) is reached and the lookup is dismissed.
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Random walks are usually used to discover new neighbors. This prevents nodes from clustering
in groups that might sooner or later be partitioned from the rest of the network.
In some unstructured peer-to-peer networks, like Gia [CRB+03], the selection of the neighbors
to forward a query to is biased: Each node selects a weight that abstracts the amount of resources
that it is willing to contribute to the overlay.
Usually the flooding is bounded by a TTL which is decremented each time the request is for-
warded. Of course, flooding creates a huge message overhead and gives no guarantees that a file
is found if it exists. Often this is not a problem since in many applications users are “looking for
hay, not needles” [CRB+03].
For very popular contents, flooding delivers very good results because there is usually always a
neighbor with a local copy.
It is worth mentioning, that there is a set of believes about unstructured overlay networks which
are often not true. Castro et al. [CCR05] run several experiments with some versions and config-
urations of Gnutella and Pastry [RD01]. They show that coping with churn, exploiting hetero-
geneity and supporting complex queries are not fundamental problems for structured overlays
(Section 4.1.2). Furthermore they show that one can build hybrid systems, that exploit the prop-
erties of unstructured peer-to-peer networks to quickly find popular objects.
To implement a naming system, unstructured peer-to-peer systems are not sufficient. With a
growing size of the network the probability of a successful lookup decreases. This might be
feasible for a best-effort distributed cache but not for a DNS-like implementation.
4.1.2 Structured Peer-to-Peer Systems
Structured Peer-to-Peer systems are usually used to implement Distributed hash maps (DHTs)
[GBHC00]. A DHT is a hash table that is distributed over several participating nodes in a system.
To look up a bucket in the DHT, first the responsible node is determined. This is usually done
by assigning some overlay address (node ID) to all nodes in the system and partitioning the hash
keys according to the node IDs. To find a hash bucket, the overlay routing is used. This process
is often simplified by choosing the node IDs from the same domain as the hash map keys. It
is often refered to as key-based routing (KBR). Mislove et. al. [MPHD06] show how different
distributed applications can be mapped to KBR.
The advantage of DHTs compared to unstructured peer-to-peer systems is, that the probability
of finding a key or an object does not decrease with increasing size of the network. This is a
crucial property, if one tries to implement DNS based on peer-to-peer systems. Such a system
must have a very high success rate for queries in order to by acceptable for clients. Therefore,
some of the most important structured peer-to-peer systems are presented in this section.
To map a key to a node consistent hashing [KLL+97] is used usually. Consistent hashing makes
sure, that the size and the borders of a bucket do not depend only on the size of the network.
Instead, they depend on the position of the local node’s ID in the key space and the IDs of the
local node’s direct neighbors. This has the advantage that in most cases, e.g., Pastry leaf-set
replication, replication is done between neighbors. Therefore, the arrival or departure/failure of
a node can be compensated instantaneously by its neighbors, which already have copies of its
DHT buckets.
Most structured networks use a collision resistant hash function like the secure hash algorithm
4.1. INTRODUCTION TO PEER-TO-PEER SYSTEMS 67
(SHA) to compute keys of objects and IDs of nodes. The term collision resistant does not mean
that collisions cannot occur. It just says that it is very difficult to compute such collisions, i.e., to
compute a value for a given hash. This is important, e.g., if large messages are cryptographically
signed by actually signing a hash sum of the message.
In fact, the ID space must be large enough to make such collisions unlikely. In the case of
SHA-1, 2160 IDs are possible, but the birthday paradox [McK66] holds in this case of course.
Therefore, only a small part of the ID space should be populated.
Since there appeared many newly designed peer-to-peer networks in the recent years, Dabek et
al. [DZD+03] tried to simplify application design for these overlays by defining a simple API.
This API should be usable with all key-based routing (KBR) schemes and is presented here
only for better understanding of the typical function calls between a peer-to-peer overlay and the
applications on top of it. The authors also give an idea on how to implement different algorithms
on top of KBR, like distributed hash tables, anycast, and multicast.
There are two datatypes introduced: a key which is a bit string of a constant length and a
nodehandle which encapsulates the identity of a node and its network address.
There are three API functions to route messages in an overlay:
route is called by the application to forward a message towards a key. If a nodehandle is given
as optional parameter, the message is sent directly to this node, otherwise the routing al-
gorithm of the underlying P2P network is used to determine the next hop for the message.
forward is called by the overlay node and implemented by the application. This gives the
application the opportunity to modify the message, modify the next hop, or terminate the
message.
deliver The deliver upcall informs the application that a message for the local node arrived and
provides the message. The application can then deal with the message according to its
higher level semantics.
There are also several API functions to deal with routing state. Some of them depend on the
underlying P2P network and might show a slightly different behavior than described in the paper.
The most important of these API functions are:
range provides the set of keys for a given node ,i.e., the range for which this node is currently
responsible. It may also be used to find the range for the node under the assumption that
a certain number of neighbors fail. This helps do implement a proper replication scheme.
replicaSet works the other way around. Given a key and a rank, i.e., the number of neighbors
to fail, the function returns the set of nodes on which replicas should be stored.
update is an upcall, implemented by the application. It is called to inform the application that a
node has joined or left the network. Of course, due to the intrinsic characteristics of P2P
networks, this is only possible for neighbors of the local node in the ID space.
As a conclusion of the reasoning about the common API as it is used, for instance in FreePastry,
one can say that it is possible to implement peer-to-peer applications using only 4 API functions
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or 6 functions if replication is needed. If programs are restricted to this API, it is also easier
to port an application to another overlay network as it can be seen in the network simulator
planetSim [LPM+04]. We used this simulator to evaluate DNSPastry as shown in Section 5.4.2.
Now I want to present some of the most important structured peer-to-peer implementations.
Each of them is selected based on an additional idea that it contributes to the development of
such systems. Table 4.1.2 shows a summary of these ideas to allow the reader to skip the details.
Table 4.2 on page 80 shows which of them we used for our overlay design.
System important features
Chord [SMK+01] 1st full fletched DHT implementation with O(log N) routing com-
plexity for N nodes in the network, (DHTs [GBHC00] have been
known before), periodic stabilization
DKS [AEABH03] improves the Chord routing by increasing the base to O(logk N) -
offers flexible trade-off between the number of hops and the amount
of routing state at each node by selecting k
Pastry/Tapestry
[RD01, ZHS+04]
prefix routing scheme, routing convergence, push caching/replica-
tion, e.g. in Beehive [RS04a, RS04b]
CAN [RFH+01] torus-like ID space instead of a ring, flexible selection of node IDs
- can be based on proximity
Symphony [MBR03] puts more constraints on neighbor selection: long- and short-
distance neighbors, balances in- and out-degree of nodes
Hieras [XMH03] improves routing performance using hierarchical structure, similar
to the ePost extentions to Pastry [MD04]
SmartBoa [HLZ+04] exploits heterogeneity of nodes to assign more routing state
(unnamed)[MCKS03]exploits heterogeneity and creates full membership views
Table 4.1: Structured overlays, reasons for being presented here.
Chord
A very simple design of a DHT-based peer-to-peer network is presented by MIT researchers
in [SMK+01]. Chord, as the system is called, shares many properties with other structured
peer-to-peer solutions:
Load Balancing: Load balancing in Chord depends on the hash function that is used to create
the keys. It is expected to spread keys evenly among the participating nodes.
Decentralization: In Chord there are no central components. No node is more important than
any other. This is also a disadvantage since nodes with better hardware or network con-
nectivity cannot take more responsibility.
Scalability: The cost of a Chord lookup grows as the logarithmus dualis of the number of nodes
N , so even very large systems are feasible. The reason is that at each hop the finger table
(explained below) helps to reduce the distance to the destination by at least 50%.
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Availability: Chord nodes monitor their neighbors along the ring. If a new node joins or a node
fails, the ring usually stays connected. Even if a network with many nodes fails (correlated
node failures), the Chord ring might stay connected since the node IDs of these nodes can
be expected to be equally distributed over the ring thanks to the hash function.
The authors of [SMK+01] use consistent hashing to create object keys and node IDs. A key is
stored on the node with the smallest ID greater or equal to the object’s key.
To locate a key in a scalable manner, i.e., in O(logN) routing steps, each of theN nodes stores a
successor list and a finger table. In the finger table of node n, the ith entry contains the identity of
the first node, s, that succeeds n by at least 2i−1 on the identifier ring. In the successor list, node
n stores its r nearest successors on the Chord ring. This list is needed to ensure consistency in the
case of node failures. It is used to reconnect the neighbors. If node n notices that its successor
has failed, it replaces it with the first live entry in its successor list. Each node periodically runs a
stabilization protocol to check liveness of its successors. It also periodically refreshes the finger
table entries.
Application programming for Chord is very simple, as for almost all DHT-based peer-to-peer
overlays. The API only contains two functions: One is called lookup and takes a key as ar-
gument. It tries to deliver an object that is associated with this key in the DHT. The other one
is called put and associates a given object with a key in the DHT. Both functions are imple-
mented in a distributed, decentralized fashion, forwarding the request according to the routing
information of the current node until a node is reached that is hosting the bucket for the given
key.
Using these functions it is possible to implement, e.g., send operations in a multicast application
or store functions in a distributed storage application.
In the design of you own peer-to-peer system the application interface should keep the simplicity
of Chord’s API. The routing state size and complexity should also be in O(log N). The concept
of consistent hashing is used in our overlay as well.
DKS
DKS [AEABH03] (Distributed K-ary Search) is a peer-to-peer system developed at KTH/Royal
Institute of Technology and the Swedish Institute of Computer Science. DKS is very similar to
Chord.
In comparison to Chord, DKS shows that Correction-on-Change saves cost in terms of mainte-
nance traffic. Correction-on-Change means that there is no periodic routing state maintenance
protocol. Entries are repaired only when they are being used and there are failures. In DKS a
node is able to notify nodes which hold a reference to him in their finger tables about changes
in the routing state.. This is very useful for nodes joining or leaving and reduces the number of
maintenance messages in a stable network.
DKS also reduces the number of routing steps from O(ldN ) to O(logkN ). This is reached by
dividing the identifier space into k equal intervals. Each DKS node maintains logkN levels, and
each level contains k intervals with pointers to the first node encountered in the interval. In other
words, there is a finger table for each level maintained by each node. By selecting the value of
k, the application designer can trade-off routing performance for routing state size.
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Like DKS, the design of you own peer-to-peer system should also allow a fine tuning of the
trade-off between routing state and routing complexit.
Pastry and Tapestry
Pastry [RD01] is a prefix based overlay network. Node IDs and object keys are computed by
the SHA-1 algorithm.
Similar to Chord’s successor lists, each node maintains a leaf set, which contains the direct
predecessors and successors of the node. There is also an additional data structure that allows
O(log2bN ) routing complexity, i.e., the prefix routing table (or short: routing table).
In Pastry, node IDs and keys are thought of as a sequence of digits with base 2b. The length
of this sequence is determined by the hash function that is used. The parameter b influences
the trade-off between the expected number of routing steps and the size of the routing state
at each node. The prefix routing table contains 2b − 1 columns and 2160/b rows (for 160-bit
SHA-1 IDs). Of course, not all of these fields are expected to be populated. Because of the
hash collision problem, the ID space can only be sparsely populated and thus the size of the
routing table depends on the number of nodes instead of the size of an identifier. The size of the
routing table can be expected to be dlog2bNe. With a value of b = 4 and N = 106 , a routing
table contains on average 75 entries and the expected number of routing hops is 5, whilst with
N = 109 , the routing table contains in average 105 entries, and the expected number of routing
hops is 7 [RD01].
In each routing step, a node tries to increase the prefix match of the message key, i.e., the target’s
ID and the next node’s ID. With b = 1 the distance to the target would be reduced by at least
50% at each hop, comparable to Chord.
To find a better prefix match, the routing table is used. The common prefix of the current node
with the target determines the line index. The column is determined by the first digit after the
common prefix. At this position there is a node, which shares a prefix match with the target
which is at least one digit longer then the current node’s prefix match. If no node with a better
prefix match can be found, the leaf set is used to find a neighbor which is numerically closer to
the destination.
Pastry uses two kinds of maintenance principles. Since the leaf set is important to ensure cor-
rectness of the routing algorithm, it is periodically checked. The routing table is only checked
on use. If the routing table is not complete, the routing efficiency suffers, but correct routing can
still be established with the help of the leaf set.
Tapestry [ZHS+04] is a suffix routing scheme similar to Pastry. It just reads the IDs in the other
direction. In contrast to Pastry, a key is not routed to a node, which is numerically closest to the
key. Instead, surrogate routing is used, i.e., when a digit cannot be matched, Tapestry looks for
a close digit in the routing table. Pastry would in this case use the leaf set, which does not exist
in Tapestry. Hence, a Tapestry routing table must contain up-to-date information.
The Pastry leaf set also provides a very simple solution to replication. Since most of the time
the last hop has to be determined in the leaf set this is a good place to have a replica copy. It
also reduces the load on the home node. Another nice aspect is that thanks to the hash function,
the replicas can be expected to be equally distributed in the whole network topology (not in
the identifier ring!). That means, by incrementing the replication degree by one, the average
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network distance to the next replica can be halved.
In Tapestry, replica locations are defined by the prefix match they share with the target key.
During the routing towards this key the prefix match gets longer. The lower the prefix match has
to be, the more replicas are available and the earlier one of them is found.
Prefix or postfix routing schemes are very similar to the DNS delegation chain. Therefore, they
seem to be the natural choice for a DNS-serving overlay network. It would allow to provision
certain subtrees of the DNS with spcific caching capabilities, etc.
CAN
The Content Addressable Network (CAN [RFH+01]) was proposed at approximately the same
time as Chord, Pastry, and Tapestry. In contrast to these other overlay networks, CAN does not
use a cyclic ID space. It uses a d-dimensional torus.
Each node is free to pick any coordinates (that do not exist so far) when it enters the network.
These coordinates can be picked according to locality properties or other information.
Each node maintains a routing table, which contains the nodes neighbors in each dimension.
The number of dimensions can be used to trade-off the amount of routing state and the number
of hops needed to reach a destination. A message is forwarded towards its destination by simply
selecting the neighbor with the minimal distance to the target.
Each node stores a part of the DHT, called a zone. The zone of a node is determined when the
node joins. Its new coordinates are in the zone of some other node. This node just gives half
of its zone to the new node. If the destination key is within the zone of a node, the node is
responsible for this key in the DHT.
For a d dimensional space partitioned into n equally sized zones, the average routing path length
is (d/4)(n1/d) hops and each nodes stores 2d neighbors. There is also an optimization which is
called realities. Every node can exist in several realities, which are separated coordinate spaces.
In each of them a node is assigned a different zone and has 2d neighbors. When an object is
stored in the coordinate space at position (x1, x2, ..., xN ), then it is stored on these coordinates
in each reality. Hence, it is unavailable only when all responsible node (one in each reality) fail.
Furthermore, when routing towards such an object, it does not matter in which reality the object
is retrieved. A node can choose any reality to forward the request. Therefore, the number of
routing steps can be reduced since each node has a different position in each reality.
The difficulty with a torus-based KBR scheme is, that it is not trivial to put a DHT on top of
it, which reaches good locality. If the locality is reached only in a subset of the dimensions,
there would be many long distance links which are more difficult to maintain. Therefore, we
preferred a simpler design, nevertheless using an oracle for locality as proposed by Ratnasamy
et al. [RFH+01].
Symphony
Pairs of people in a society are connected by short chains of acquaintances. This is known as the
Small World Phenomenon. This observation and web 2.0 technologies boosted the development
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of social networks like Facebook2 and Myspace3. People can send messages to unknown persons
with a few hops by forwarding them through acquaintanceships. It has been shown that the
routing complexity is O(log2N ) hops [Kle00] for N nodes in the network.
In Symphony [MBR03] the Small World Phenomenon is exploited to reduce the number of
neighbors a node maintains (outdegree). The number of nodes that maintain a certain node
as a neighbor (in-degree) is also reduced. The motivation is to keep the number of overlay
maintenance messages low. In a Symphony network with k links per node, every node maintains
2k + 2 connections: 2 links to direct neighbors, k long distance links and k long distance links
initiated by remote nodes. The routing state can be complemented by lookahead neighbors,
which are neighbors of long distance neighbors. These are exchanged piggy-back to minimize
overhead and can be used to optimize routing decisions.
Like in Pastry or Chord, nodes are chained along a cyclic identifier space. Each node manages a
range between its own ID and the ID of the clockwise neighbor. In Symphony all node IDs are
between 0 and 1.
Symphony nodes can be used to cooperatively maintain a DHT. An object with an m-bit identi-
fier key k is stored at the node which is responsible for the real number k/2m in its range. The
authors of [MBR03] argue that the outdegree of a node does not depend on m, which would be
the case for Chord, Pastry, Tapestry, CAN, and others. When routing towards a key k a node
forwards the request to the neighbor with the minimal clockwise distance to k.
Experiments have shown that the number of long distance links influences the latency: increas-
ing the number from 1 to 2 decreases the latency by roughly 50% while increasing from 6 to 7
hardly changed anything. As expected the number of links also influence the effort to join and
to leave (repair) the network. The effort is proportional to the number of links. Hence, it is a
good choice to reduce the outdegree to 4 to 6 links and use lookahead neighbors.
Since the idea of balancing short and long distance links is compatible with prefix routing tables,
we also use this concept in our overlay design but do not constrain the number for such links.
Instead of this, there is a contraint on the prefix. The hash algorithm takes care, that these
constraints lead to the same results.
Hieras
Hieras [XMH03] keeps the scalability properties of current DHT algorithms but improves rout-
ing performance using a hierarchical structure. In Hieras, the overlay is divided into several
hierarchical peer-to-peer rings. P2P rings are created in a way that the average latency between
two peers in a lower level ring is much smaller than in higher level rings. To group nodes accord-
ing to their location a landmark-based binning scheme is used. This scheme achieves a reduced
latency, i. e., an increased locality in lower level rings. The amount of routing state that a node
must store depends on the depth of the hierarchy.
Like in Pastry or Chord, each node ID or object key is a unique identifier generated by a collision
free algorithm such as SHA-1. Hieras uses Chord for routing inside a ring. Of course, other
algorithms could be used as well. Besides the routing structures inherited from the underlying
peer-to-peer algorithms, Hieras nodes store a landmark table and sometimes a ring table. Each
2www.facebook.com, April 2009
3www.myspace.com, April 2009
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landmark must be a host, which is visible for all nodes in the overlay and which allows them to
measure the distance to it.
The landmark table is used to define ring identifiers. The landmarks are sorted according to their
relative distance from a given Hieras node, e.g., the ring “012” contains all nodes that are very
close to landmark 0, quite close to landmark 1 and rather far away from landmark 2.
A ring table is stored (with some redundancy) on the node whose node ID is the numerically
closest to its ring ID. It contains the two members with the lowest and the two members with the
highest IDs in its ring. A ring table is used to boot into a ring and find members.
When a message is forwarded towards a key, it is first routed in the lowest ring to the node with
the closest ID to the key. Then the message goes up one ring and the algorithm repeats. This
way, the first hops cross significant parts of the ID space without causing much delay. This
characteristic is similar to Pastry with PNS as explained in Section 4.1.3.
Hieras comes up with the findings, that up to 4 layers are sufficient to greatly reduce delay of
overlay routing and that the number of overlay hops is not a good indication for round trip time
in hierarchical networks. We observed the same in our DNSPastry simulations [PFH07].
Of course, Hieras is not the only example of hierarchically structured overlays. Based on over-
lays like Chord and Pastry, there are many solutions. Our implementation of DNSPastry is one
instance, but also the ePost infrastructure [MD04] and also the Peer-to-Peer Expressway over
Chord [TnM06].
Exploiting Heterogeneity
Usually all peers in a P2P overlay have the same task and take care of the same routing infor-
mation. Often it has been proposed to exploit the resources of the more powerful nodes. They
could route more messages or store more objects,i.e., be responsible for a larger range in the
DHT.
A simple way to do that is to increase the number of virtual nodes on such physical nodes.
Unfortunately, this increases the number of active identifiers in the system and so increases the
average path length due to the higher number of nodes. Another problem is that replication is
more difficult. It cannot be assumed that there are independent node failures when there might be
several virtual nodes on one physical node. The physical node might fail and cause all replicas
to be lost.
With SmartBoa [HLZ+04] nodes maintain different sizes of routing tables according to their
abilities. The extra entries optimize the first hop of a message. For later hops a Chord-like rout-
ing is used. Unfortunately, there are no experimental results or theoretical analysis of Smart-
Boa’s performance and maintenance cost.
The authors of [TnM06] proposed to build a Chord expressway. All nodes join an ordinary
Chord ring. But those which have more free resources can, using the same ID, join voluntarily
the expressway, where only such powerfull nodes are connected. Expressway nodes route a
request among each other with a longer forwarding distance towards the destination until the
request cannot be forwarded to another expressway node. Then, the underlying ring is used for
the final hops. Normal nodes maintain additional routing state to find expressway entry points.
To maintain the expressway routing information, an additional stabilization protocol is used. It
is triggered by events, i. e., joining or leaving expressway nodes.
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The cost of a lookup using the expressway is O(logpR) compared to Chords O(log2N) where
N is the number of nodes in the network and R is the number of nodes in the expressway. p is
the forwarding power of the finger list in the expressway 4.
The next improvement could be to exploit heterogeneity to provide constant time lookup as
presented in [MCKS03]. In this approach there is not only an expressway, called “inner ring” to
speed up routing, but the nodes in the inner ring, called superpeers, have complete knowledge
about their arc, i. e., a part of the “outer ring” and all other superpeers and their arcs. The query
routing towards a key k is very straightforward and consists of 3 steps: (1) forward directly to
the sender’s superpeer, (2) forward directly to the superpeer, responsible for the arc containing
k, and (3a) forward directly to the peer responsible for k in the DHT or (3b) just return the
nodehandle of the responsible node to the requester.
The problem of this approach is obviously the missing scalability. A superpeer must have the
resources to store and to maintain the handles of all other superpeers and all nodes in it’s arc in
the outer ring. With limited resources there must be an upper bound for both of them - number
of superpeers and number of nodes in the arc - leading to a limited size of the network.
4.1.3 Locality-Aware Structured Peer-to-Peer Networks
The routing performance of overlays like Chord is often suboptimal. This is easy to see whenever
link stress or, as we call it, stretch is measured. Stretch is defined as the ratio overlay distanceIP distance .
The selection of neighbors is usually based on constraints on a node’s ID or the load or in-degree
of its neighbors. If some knowledge about the underlying topology could be exploited, one could
expect the routing performance to improve.
There are two ways to achieve this improvement [CDHR02]:
Geographic layout is a not self-organizing method, where each overlay node chooses an ID
according to geographic knowledge. This has been done in CAN: Each node measures
its distance to some well known landmark nodes. Nodes which are close to the same
landmark choose similar IDs. In CAN each node can pick an ID without any constraints
but when the topology changes after some time, it is difficult to change the ID since it
might be a problem for applications. It also leads to imbalance in the torus and to hotspot
problems, i.e., overloaded nodes.
Thit has also been done in Hieras, to find the appropriate ring for a node.
This method cannot be used in P2P networks that assume equal distribution of nodes in
the ID space. E. g., Pastry would fail if all nodes in a leafSet fail. If these nodes would
be in the same leafSet because of a geographic layout they might all be behind the same
power supply or network switch, which increases the risk of a complete black out.
Proximity routing selects the next hop in a path according to the network distance and progress
in the overlay routing. It is less optimal then geographic layout since there is a trade-off
between the number of hops in a path and the actual network distance per hop. It might
4 An expressway finger table entry is denoted as entry (a, i), where 1 ≤ a ≤ (p− 1) and 0 ≤ i ≤ (logp2m)− 1.
For an expressway node x, its expressway finger table entry (a, i) maintains the nodehandle of the closest expressway
node whose ID is higher than x in the interval [x + api, x + (a + 1)pi).
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also happen, that there are good close-by neighbors that are selected as next hop, but
increase the distance to the final destination rather than decreasing it.
An example where proximity routing in Chord is used is CFS [DKK+01]. Each fingertable
entry stores several topologically nearby nodes, which are topologically close to a certain
finger. Messages are forwarded to them if their IDs are not clockwise from the target key.
The improvement that proximity routing can reach depends on the number of samples,
e.g., round trip time measurements, that can be used to make a routing decision. If all
nodes in the network would be considered, it would reach the best performance, but this
is not feasible for scalability reasons.
In [CDHR03], Castro et al. propose to use a Proximity neighbor selection (PNS) to sort nodes
in the fields of the routing table according to round trip time and a technique called constraint
gossiping (CG) to reduce routing overheads. The obvious disadvantage of PNS in prefix routing
tables is that the constraints on nodes for the next hop increase in the routing table as the prefix
match increases. So only the first few hops can be optimized. However, this leads to a routing
convergence which helps to organize caches, since messages to certain nodes tend to take the
same route towards it.
CG means that knowledge about locality in routing tables is gossiped. In contrast to full gossip-
ing, the constraint to accept such knowledge is, that the sender is the closest node to the receiver
which can provide such routing information. This procedure only produces the overhead to find
a nearby bootstrap node.
When routing table entries have to be repaired, this is done lazily. Dead nodes are just removed.
If there is a hole in the routing table a node just forwards a message to some node which is
numerically closer to the destination and can usually be found in the same routing table row and
is therefore nearby. This node will then provide a replacement for a hole in the routing table. To
prevent a slow degradation of routing table quality there is also a periodic CG protocol, where
members of the same row in a prefix routing table exchange this row. The authors show that
PNS and PNS with GC are very effective means to reduce stretch.
As we have seen before, overlays like Chord, CAN, and Pastry offer some options to optimize
routing and balance load by using a DHT for uniform data diffusion. A disadvantage is, as
explained in Section 5, that there is no control over where data is stored. This is decided by the
hash function and the node ID creation, which is usually done with the same hash algorithm. In
standard peer-to-peer overlays hash functions are used, which are not locality-aware.
Skipnet [HJS+03] offers some advanced locality properties. Of course, a DHT can help to
balance load, but controllable locality offers the chance of better selection and provisioning of
the nodes which offer a certain service. This might be necessary with DHTs as well since they
only diffuse the number of objects or keys per bucket, but do not consider relative popularity of
them.
Control over locations, where data is stored, is important not only for performance reasons.
There are some security and privacy aspects as well. When data is stored on remote locations,
access control is usually reached by encryption, like in OceanStore [REG+03]. Key distribution
can be used to control which users are allowed to access certain data. Unfortunately, there are
some basic security aspects that encryption and signatures cannot assure, like prevention of DoS
attacks and traffic analysis.
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SkipNet actually implements a hybrid solution. A uniform distribution of keys is supported but
for a well defined subset of nodes.
SkipNet uses two ID spaces: (1) node names and object names are mapped into a name ID space,
while (2) their hashes are mapped into a numeric ID space. Nodes and objects are clustered
according to their name IDs. Hence, it is possible to cluster nodes of a certain organization. This
has obvious advantages in the case of network partitions in the case of, e.g., a switch or router
failure.
The basic routing structure of SkipNet is a probabilistic skip list. Each node can independently
determine the number of node handles in its skip list entry, i. e., the level. A pointer at level
i skips 2i nodes in the ring. Level 0 is called the root ring, which contains all nodes in the
overlay. There are 2L rings in level L. Each ring is split into two subrings at each following
level. Each node decides randomly and uniformly to which of the subrings it belongs. This
choice is represented by the numeric ID of the node. Each bit in this ID refers to one selection
of a sub ring.
The set of pointers maintained by a node is called its routing table. The skip list forms a doubly-
linked ring.
Routing can be done using the skip list with name IDs or using a prefix routing scheme on
numeric IDs.
Locality can be reached by incorporating a node name into the name of an object. Simulations
and deployment of SkipNet use DNS names of nodes. For constrained load balancing the name
of an object is divided into two parts. One part is used to specify the set of nodes using the name
ID and the other part is used as input to a hash function to reach equal distribution.
Unfortunately, achieving routing proximity in SkipNet is rather complicated. A second routing
table has to be maintained for network proximity management. It is called P-table. It needs its
own bootstrap and periodic stabilization protocol. To incorporate network proximity for numeric
ID routing a third routing table is needed: the C-table.
DNSPastry (Section 5) inherits the simplified PNS with CG from Pastry and offers key and
routing locality based on name prefixes like SkipNet.
While SkipNet [HJS+03] and DNSPastry group nodes by their names, Toplus [GERB+03] uses
IP addresses for grouping. The main goal is to reach a stretch close to one, i.e., a routing that
is as efficient as IP routing. As mentioned before, the stretch is the ratio of travelled overlay
distance over IP distance.
The authors use Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing tables to group nodes according to
their automomous systems (AS). A group is just a set of IP addresses. Each node belongs to
an inner group, i. e., a group that does not contain another group. Each node also belongs to a
collection of telescoping sets of groups. Each of these telescoping sets has a number of siblings
in a tree.
A node knows all members of its inner group. Furthermore, a node is aware of at least one IP
address of a node in each group of its corresponding telescoping set of siblings. This information
is the routing table of a node.
Like in Kademlia, Toplus uses an XOR metric to determine the distance between keys. A node
is responsible for a key if it is the node with the minimal distance between its node ID and the
key. The node ID is just the 32-bit representation of the IP address.
Like DNSPastry, Toplus suffers from the fact, that keys are not equally distributed among nodes.
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While DNSPastry can solve the problem by assigning almost arbitrary DNS names to nodes and
also by creating virtual nodes, Toplus is bound to IP assignment. The countermeasure for Toplus
is to use non-uniform creation of keys. Another enhancement is the creation and use of virtual
nodes in the inner group. This allows more powerful nodes to own more keys.
The second similar problem is the behavior when suffering from correlated node failures. Since
Toplus nodes are grouped by IP addresses, a router failure would be very likely to partition the
network. In DNSPastry the DNS naming scheme is responsible for grouping. To counter the
effects of network partitions, some nodes in remote networks can be named in a way that makes
them available for replication in the leaf set. Toplus does not offer such mechanism but it should
be possible to assign more IP addresses from other parts of the IP address space to an interface
and then use classless inter-domain routing to make it reachable.
Toplus was also extended to implement some features which are usually supported only by
unstructured peer-to-peer networks as presented in [FRB+05]. Usually, in structured peer-to-
peer overlays one can only lookup an object if the key is known. The key could be calculated,
e.g., by hashing the name of a file. But if the name is not known, the object cannot be found. The
idea for looking up objects without knowing their key is to extract all keywords from a file name
and create an indirection infrastructure, which points from keywords to filenames containing
these keywords. This bridges the gap between unstructured peer-to-peer overlays and structured
overlays. It combines the useful feature of keyword search with a deterministic routing.
4.1.4 Hybrid Approaches
To speed up routing and message delivery in overlay networks, one basic idea is to reduce
the number of routing hops. The extreme case is discussed in Section 4.1.5, where each node
is known to each other and any target can be reached within one hop. Since it is difficult to
maintain big groups, hybrid approaches were proposed.
Z-Ring [LZWZ05] is an implementation of a Pastry-like prefix routing scheme using group
membership ideas. The basic problem with membership approaches is that the maintenance
overhead increases with the size of the group.
Z-Ring uses groups which are small enough to be well maintained to reduce the number of
routing hops. The authors used 16 million peer IDs. They were organized in a 4k ∗ 4k matrix.
Each row in this matrix contains peers in one X-group. These are nodes with the same bits at
positions 0-11 of their IDs. These bits represent a prefix. Therefore, the nodes in an X-group
represent an continuous arc in the Pastry ring. Routing within an X-group takes one hop since
each node maintains the full membership list.
Each column of the matrix contains peers in one Y-group. Nodes belong to the same Y-group if
their bits 12-23 match.
Using X- and Y-groups, Z-Ring needs 2 hops for lookups in a network of 16 million peers with
perfect routing tables. In each group, routing takes one hop. Y-group routing resolves bits 0-11
and X-group routing resolves bits 12-23.
Z-Ring is not limited on two groups and a 2-dimensional matrix. If the size of the network is
too large to allow a reasonable number of hops with two groups the number can be increased.
Of course, the size of a group is limited due to the membership maintenance.
Apart from membership-structured Overlay hybrids there is also the option to use some of the
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lessons learned from unstructured overlays in the construction of better structured overlays or
hybrids.
The authors of [CCR05] examine several Pastry-based hybrids. SuperPastry uses superpeers
like Gnutella 0.6 and HeteroPastry uses topology adaptation like Gia. Ordinary peers in Super-
Pastry select superpeers to attach to by routing to random destination keys through a bootstrap
superpeer. Only superpeers form the Pastry overlay network.
HeteroPastry nodes take node capacity into account when selecting neighbors to fill their routing
tables. Therefore, nodes can define an upper bound on their in-degree, i.e., how many nodes are
allowed to use them in their routing tables. The expected benefit is that routing relay is reduced
by not overloading any forwarding node. HeteroPastry nodes can monitor their backpointers as
well and send some backoff message when there are too many.
4.1.5 Membership approaches
Often it is possible to use a network where each node knows each other node’s status. These
networks allow to send messages directly between any pair of alive nodes using the underlying
network, e.g., IP. The obvious trade-offs of such approaches is that with growing number of
nodes or increased churn, the message overhead increases dramatically. However since we have
seen in Z-Ring [LZWZ05] that membership protocols can be used to decrease the number of
routing hops significantly with a reasonable size of groups, such systems are presented here.
In [GLR04] Gupta et al. present an one-hop and a two-hop routing scheme. The motivation
for their work is the high routing delay of peer-to-peer networks. The routing delay is basically
caused by the small amount of routing state on each node. The paper questions the need for a
small routing state.
If each node would have a complete knowledge of all nodes, all membership changes would
have to be detected to keep the routing state consistent. In the paper, Gnutella and Napster traces
are used to estimate the number of membership changes to 20 per second.
Membership changes are detected using a periodic stabilization routine. It monitors predeces-
sors and successors in a ring, like in Pastry or Chord. When status changes are detected, this
information has to reach all nodes in the network. Therefore, an hierarchical dissemination
protocol was designed. It also helps to save bandwidth, compared to a naive approach.
The 128-bit circular identifier space is divided into k equal contiguous intervals, called slices.
Each slice has a slice leader, which is known to all other slice members. For the slice leader a
well provisioned node is chosen. Therefore, a sufficient number of such supernodes is required
to ensure that there are at least a few per slice.
Slice leaders aggregate messages they receive during a short period of time and then dispatch
them to all unit leaders of their respective slices. A unit leader is the node closest to the middle
of a unit. A unit is a part of a slice.
For the two-hop scheme, the one-hop architecture was enhanced: Each slice leader chooses a
group of its own nodes for each other slice. This selection is sent to the other slice. The in-
formation is then forwarded to each member of the other slice. Hence, each node can collect
information about nodes in all other slices. This information together with the routing informa-
tion for nodes in its own slice is the routing state of a node.
Unfortunately, the evaluation of the one and two hop algorithms is very simplified. There are
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no proximity probes in the overhead calculations. Slice leaders and unit leaders do not fail. The
simulations are run for at most 20.000 nodes. It is not concluded if the approach is suitable for
networks larger than 20.000 nodes.
For the DNS server this approach would be interesting, but it must be evaluated in a scenario
with much more nodes and realistic failure rates for DNS servers.
Fireflies [JAvR06] focuses on intrusion tolerance and eclipse attacks. The authors argue, that
DHTs are inflexible in the way they dictate routes and that they are hard to secure. Hence, for
critical applications they should not be considered.
In the proposed solution, called Fireflies, each node has a complete view of its live peers. A set
of nodes, called neighbors, is connected to each node. To allow reasonable routing performance,
the network formed by neighbor links has a logarithmic diameter in the number of live peers.
The number of neighbors is also chosen to be logarithmic in the number of live peers.
To keep the membership information about live nodes up-to-date, nodes send accusations using
a gossip channel. Correct nodes may send rebuttal messages when being accused. Correct nodes
may accuse other correct nodes in certain situations. To make sure a correct node does not get
removed from a membership view, the gossip channel must be able to deliver messages within a
time ∆. Nodes then wait 2∆ for a rebuttal before removing a node from the view of live nodes.
Like DNSPastry, Fireflies assumes that Byzantine nodes cannot break cryptographic measures
like signatures. A Certification Authority is used to create a certificate binding together the
identity of a node, its public key, and its network address. Note that DNSPastry does not require
network addresses to be part of the certificate. Hence, mobility is supported without the need to
recreate a certificate.
Certificates and private keys are used for accusations and notes. A note is a tuple (cert, epoch,
enabled), signed using the private key of the member showing that the member is alive in the
given epoch. enabled is a bitmap containing 2t + 1 bits. The certificate is needed to link the
signature to the identity of the node.
For accusations, members are organized in 2t+ 1 rings. In each ring a member can be accused
by its live predecessor. For an accusation, the last note of the accused node is used together
with the ring ID and the accuser with its signature. A requirement on the accusation is that
note.enabled[ring] is set. So a node can control who is allowed to create accusation.
The number of rings is defined using t, which is the number of Byzantine predecessors a node
can tolerate. The probability of having more then t such nodes must be small. In the enabled
field of the note message a node enables t+ 1 bits. This allows to disable t Byzantine predeces-
sors that send false accusations.
The gossip protocol used in Fireflies makes sure that Byzantine nodes do not request information
from arbitrary nodes as a kind of DoS attack. Each member is allowed to exchange gossip with
a small group of other nodes.
The evaluation by simulation and using Planet-Lab shows that Fireflies performs well for small
networks. In the experiments the rate of failures and recoveries was growing linearly with the
number of members. Hence, the traffic at each node was growing at least linearly as well. The
traffic per correct member also grows linear with the churn rate. The authors believe that Fireflies
will be able to scale up to thousands of nodes.
The scalability of Fireflies seems to be the great obstacle. In most peer-to-peer networks Churn
has only influence on a limited number of nodes. To replace DNS, Fireflies would need to
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scale up to millions of nodes. However, Z-Ring has shown that membership approaches can be
combined with peer-to-peer networks to greatly reduce the number of routing hops. This might
be done with Fireflies as well.
4.1.6 Summary
In this Section, I presented related work, which guided us to design decisions for DNSPastry,
which is presented in Chapter 5. Table 4.2 lists design ideas from this Section and gives reasons
for supporting them or not supporting them in DNSPastry. In the next Sections, I discuss two
important aspects of peer-to-peer systems that are of paramount importance for a DNS imple-
mentation. DNSPastry is presented in Chapter 5.
4.2 Using Peer-to-Peer systems for low latency services
It has been known for a long time that the restrictions of key-based routing an DHTs make them
sometimes incapable of offering low-latency services. Therefore, many researchers have looked
into the reasons and tried to find workarounds not compromising the ability of such networks to
self-organize and scale to almost arbitrary network sizes.
Cox et al. [CMM02] evaluated the performance of a DHT-based DNS solution. The basic
contribution is to show how bad the situation really is.
The authors argue that DNSSEC allows to separate authentication of data from the service of this
data. Therefore, it should be possible to serve DNS data from any service implementation avail-
able. Since DNSSEC does not provide any better availability compared to DNS, the underlying
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servers could try to take over this job. Using a DHT to serve DNS data would prevent DNS
server configuration issues from decreasing quality of service. The DHT would self-organize
and be more robust than a server hierarchy.
To evaluate the use of Chord to serve DNS data, data from the study by Jung et al.[JSBM01]
has been used on a simulated network with 1000 nodes. Roughly 260.000 answers to queries
from a on-day trace have been inserted into the DHT. Unresolved queries were also simulated in
a second experiment where roughly 22.000 such queries were executed on an empty DHT.
The results of the experiments show that the DHT-based DNS is much slower than DNS. While
90% of the successful queries were resolved within less then 200ms, the DHT only resolved
roughly 30% in this time. The median response time is 350ms while it is about 43ms for con-
ventional DNS. On the other hand one can clearly see that the slowest queries are better for the
DHT-based DNS. This is also comparable to the results of Park et al. [PPPW04].
The authors of [DLS+04] look at some design alternatives for DHTs to reduce latency and
increase throughput. They use DHash++, a persistent block storage, on top of Chord. Chord
becomes location-aware by using Vivaldi [DCKM04]5.
The design improvements that are evaluated in the paper are recursive rather than iterative rout-
ing, proximity neighbor selection, fetching of data from the closest copy, and integration of
lookup routing and data fetching.
In the end, the effect of all improvements reduced the lookup and fetch latency by roughly 50%.
Li et al. [LP02] developed a new improved version of the Plaxton routing scheme used by many
overlay networks like Tapestry, Pastry, etc. The main focus is to increase locality.
First they create a simplified routing Plaxton scheme caller SPRR. All nodes and object have
identifiers which are fixed length random bit strings. The probability of collisions, i. e., having
two identical IDs must be negligible. Each node has a set of forward neighbors. It is very similar
to the prefix routing table in Pastry. The ith forward neighbor must share a common prefix of
length i.
Each node has a set of backward neighbors. The backward neighbors are just the nodes that are
using this node as forward neighbors. As in Chord, each node also stores a predecessor and a
successor. For a fault-tolerant scheme there must be multiple predecessors and successors.
Choosing forward neighbors is a crucial problem in DHTs. For example, Pastry uses PNS to
select a set of closest neighbors. The problem of this and other algorithms is that some nodes
might have a high in-degree. When such nodes fail or leave the network, many nodes must
reorganize their routing state. The authors of [LP02] propose to organize all nodes with a certain
prefix on a logical ring and always to use the successor as a forward neighbor. Since each node
has one successor, the in-degree would be well balanced.
When a name is to be stored in the network, a handler has to be found. The handler of a name
is some node which belongs to the set of nodes with the best prefix match with the name of
the object. For an insert or store operation any node in this set suffice. For a lookup, there is
a bitcorrection phase to find a member of the set of nodes with best prefix match. Then in a
walkingphase the successor and predecessor pointers are used to find the handler.
Exploiting locality in SPRR comes with the definition of forward pointers. There is some degree
5The term location − aware expresses the knowledge of network positions. In contrast to this, the term
proximity − aware only expresses knowledge about point-to-point distance measurements.
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of freedom to select a forward pointer. Hence, like in Pastry’s PNS, the “best” node can be
selected. Another way to improve locality is to actively replicate names across the set of nodes
with the best prefix match. This shortens the walkingphase of lookup operations. Like in
Pastry’s Leaf-Set replication, it is achieved by walking along the predecessor and successor
pointers. The intuition behind this mechanism is the same. In Pastry to total distance traveled
for a lookup is dominated by the last hop. This is due to the fact that with growing prefix match
the number of candidate nodes is shrinking for each forward neighbor. For the walkingphase
in SPRR or the Leaf-Set routing steps in Pastry there is no more choice.
For DNSPastry we used the idea to arrange nodes located in the same geographic region along
a contiguous arc on the ring. This helps to reduce the distance to be traveled by the last hops
of a lookup. We did not try to balance in-degree and out-degree of nodes (like, e.g., Symphony
[MBR03]) since it would not work together well with DNS workloads. Such workloads, no
matter if they are caused by web traffic, mail exchanger lookups, etc., usually follow a Zipf-
distribution [BCF+99]. Therefore, there would be a few very popular locations in the DHT. A
balancing of in-degrees would have the effect, that the most popular objects need more overlay
hops to resolve. This problem is better solved by, e.g., leaf-set replication or by provisioning
nodes according to popularity.
In [PFH07] we have shown the positive effects of this measure under the assumption that geo-
graphical proximity can be reflected by DNS names. This is quite obviously not always the case,
but Internet hosts can be assigned several names to support this idea and it is also enough if the
distance between Leaf-set neighbors is small in most of the cases since the size of the Leaf-set
can be carefully configured.
To use a DHT to improve DNS performance is not trivial as discussed by Cox et al. [CMM02].
Park et al. designed CoDNS [PPPW04], which is using DNS to benefit from its good per-
formance but switches to a peer-to-peer solution as soon as DNS shows performance failures.
Therefore, clients in the CoDNS network share information about the local DNS resolvers. Each
node monitors the fitness of these servers and provides this information to other nodes in the net-
work.
The CoDNS resolver uses a very short timeout to query a local resolver. If the timeout is trig-
gered, it selects another DNS server from the overlay neighbors and uses it to resolve the name.
In [PFS06] we proposed another approach to this problem: parallel DNS. We observed that often
outages of local resolvers are caused by overload on one of the local resolvers.
If several resolvers are available, which is usually the case, they can be used for overlapping
requests. Overlapping means in this case, that a second request is sent to a second DNS server
without waiting for the first one to reply. The idea behind this mechanism is that a small timeout
is sufficient to detect whenever a local resolver has problems to resolve a name. Usually this
computer is in the same LAN and the time to query it is quite constant.
If the server does not answer immediately, i.e., within a very short period of time, a second
server is asked. If the response to the first query arrives in the meantime it can be used, of course.
Compared to CoDNS this approach reaches similar or better performance, as shown in Figure
4.2 and presented [PFS06], and does not use any additional infrastructure. The implementation
only effects the local stub resolver configuration.
Another even more important advantage is that no data, like DNS queries, is exposed to other
peer-to-peer nodes. The health of the local DNS server does not need to be monitored. The
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Figure 4.2: Comparison of average answer time without caching
better one will always win the competition. The trade-off is, of course, the message overhead.
When two or three name servers are used instead of just one, there are more messages created.
While this is cheap in a LAN, it the case of cache misses also WAN messages will be created.
The message overhead can be reduced by adjusting the timeout. We also expect, that the external
traffic can then be reduced, by fixing configuration issues, as discussed in Section 3 and in
[PMF08]. The observations made by Jung et al [JSBM01] suggest, that huge amounts of DNS
traffic are caused be configuration issues, and could therefore be reduced accordingly.
Beehive [RS04a, RS04b] uses replication to decrease the number of hops needed for a lookup.
The replication scheme that is used is very similar to replication in Tapestry. If the number of
replicas is to be increased one has to relax the constraints on replica holders. This constraint is
the minimum length of the prefix match between the node ID and the object’s key.
The basic idea behind the approach of Beehive is that the popularity of an object can be mea-
sured. In the Internet interest in web sites and hence the names in their URLs is Zipf-distributed
[BCF+99]. If the popularity of a name is known, it can be replicated proactively to reduce the
average number of routing steps for a lookup. Of course, there is a trade-off between lookup
time and memory or storage utilization. Beehive minimizes the number of replicas needed to
reach a target performance. This target can be specified as the fraction of lookups that should be
resolved at the local host without any routing steps.
Beehive nodes measure the number of requests received for each object they are hosting. Peri-
odically, these measurements are sent towards the home node of the objects. Therefore, a node
sends the aggregated values for an object with replication level i to all nodes at line i of its prefix
routing table having a prefix match of at least i+ 1. This process continues until the home node
of an object has been reached. The dissemination of the total popularity is the send back the
reverse way to the replica holders.
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A replica at level k shares a common prefix of length k with the replica holder. If an object
needs to be replicated at the next level k + 1, the replica holder pushes it to all nodes in the
prefix routing table that share one digit less then the node itself with the object key. Each node
may independently decide to replicate the object further. Therefore, the popularity has been
disseminated to each replica holders. The replication algorithm can quickly react to changes
in the popularity of objects since it is completely distributed and each node can decide how to
replicate the object. There is no need for any kind of agreement. Should the replication degree
of an object increase from i to i + 1 all nodes that have a prefix match of less then i + 1 must
delete the replica.
Beehive was implemented on top of FreePastry 1.3 and evaluated by comparing it to passive
caching in FreePastry. One-week DNS traces have been used as a workload. Beehive aggrega-
tion and replication was done every 48 minutes. The average lookup performance of Beehive
converges to one hop after two replication phases.
After 8 hours Beehive reaches a better performance than passive caching. The main problem
for passive caching is that the TTLs of the DNS records are chosen very conservatively, i.e.,
too short. It’s possible that a passive cache, which subscribes for update messages at the home
node of an object, could reach better performance. The reason therefore is, that objects would
be cached only there, where they are actually used locally, while Beehive uses constraints on the
ID prefix, which might lead to replicas being stored on nodes where nobody uses them.
Summary In DNSPastry we try to overcome delay problems by improving the DHT design.
We do not try to fight delays by excessive replication for efficiency reasons as mentioned before.
Furthermore, we do not intent to use an peer-to-peer overlay to improve the client-side perfor-
mance since we have shown in [PFS06] that DNS is able to improve this point on its own. The
DNSPastry design and evaluation is shown in Chapter 5.
4.3 Administrative Control and Autonomy in Structured Peer-to-Peer Overlays
Firewalls emerged in the late 1980s when Internet users and providers discovered that unwanted
communication between Internet hosts can be a problem. In recent years more and more com-
panies started depending on Internet communication as basis for their own distributed software,
business processes and internal communication. The motivation is often just cutting cost since
they do not have to engineer their own communication networks. It is enough to know the IP
addresses of the companies hosts and assume full connectivity provided by some ISP. Unfortu-
nately security threats in the Internet have now a strong influence on the dependability of work
flows in these companies. Hence, there is a reasonable amount of money available for security
appliances. Many of them are named firewalls, but do actually contain more functionality.
There are different kinds of firewalls for different purposes and the term firewall seems to be
overloaded. Often a firewall also includes anti virus functionality and intrusion detection or
intrusion prevention. These functions in a firewall may introduce a significant delay penalty
when configured wrong. Since an application layer packet inspection for each packet does not
seem to be very reasonable, there are often very simple firewall rules that use network layer
and transport layer knowledge to decide which packets need further inspection. This prevents
unnecessary delays for well known services.
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Peer-to-peer overlay networks are a new way to design distributed applications in the Internet.
They have many advantages compared to client-server-architectures, e.g., lower management
effort and higher resilience to node and network failures. The flexible organization of peer-to-
peer networks makes it difficult to predict which way a packet will take through the network
and which hosts will try to establish connections through a firewall. Virtually each overlay host
could be contacted from each other overlay host. This makes it difficult to configure a firewall
for peer-to-peer traffic. The connectivity of overlay networks certainly might suffer from firewall
configuration issues. Therefore, tunneling has become a very common way to traverse firewalls.
Often port 80 is used. Note, that this is not just the case for peer-to-peer overlay networks, but
also for Java remote method invocation and SOAP-connected applications or services.
Tunneling improves the connectivity of distributed services since almost all firewalls allow traffic
to arbitrary destinations via certain ports. With tunneling, overlay connectivity does not longer
suffer from peers being behind firewalls or misconfigured firewalls.
Unfortunately, tunneling also allows intrusion with malicious intent. Administrators can use two
ways to deal with this situation, i.e., setting up a policy that no user is allowed to use applications
that tunnel through firewalls or to use an intrusion detection system (IDS) or intrusion prevention
system (IPS) to inspect each packet. The first one prevents users from using popular software
like Bit-Torrent, Gnutella, Skype, and even networking techniques like SOAP, which uses HTTP
to invoke web services. It also prevents developers from using these techniques in new products
since the user acceptance is not high enough. The latter alternative introduces an additional load
to the firewall and additional delay to the network traffic.
Summary It must be concluded that firewalls and security concerns block innovation in the
area of peer-to-peer systems. We try to overcome these problems by designing DNSPastry
(Section 5), an overlay network that preserves the flexibility of peer-to-peer systems but allows
simple firewall rules at the same time.
Although this is not in the scope of this thesis, it should be noted that firewall tunneling also
blocks innovation for other technologies apart from peer-to-peer networks. We also observed
that SOAP and XML-RPC based systems suffer from the same problem. They use HTTP as
transport protocol and encapsulate remote calls in it. Even if the URL is included in the HTTP
packet, like in REST 6 the firewall appliance would still have to do some URL (application layer)
filtering and cannot block communication based on transport layer knowledge.
6REpresentational State Transfer Architecture, introduced in Roy T. Fielding’s PhD Thesis: Architectural Styles
and the Design of Network-based Software Architectures, University of California, Irvine, 2000.
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Chapter 5
DNSPastry
DNSPastry has already been mentioned in several sections of this thesis. Some of the design
decisions have been explained, such as prefix-routing, firewall-awareness, proximity neighbor
selection with constrained gossiping. In this Section, the design is explained completely.
DNSPastry is inspired by the similarity of the prefix routing scheme and the iterative resolution
of DNS names. Names can be mapped to node identifiers and prefix routing can complete the
domain names hop per hop thereby routing to the node in the overlay. The implementation is
based on FreePastry 1.3 (see Section 4.1.2), which can reach a stretch of less then two using
proximity neighbor selection (PNS). PNS is able to optimize the first hops in the overlay routing
based on proximity between overlay nodes as explained in Section 4.1.3. Unfortunately, the last
few hops then dominate the routing delay.
DNSPastry tries to solve this problem, by reducing the average distance between nodes in the
leaf-set. Therefore, the assumption is used that often nodes with a very similar DNS name are
rather often close to each other in the network topology. Other peer-to-peer networks tried to use
similar information, e.g., Toplus [GERB+03] (Section 4.1.3), which tried to use IP addresses.
This led to a very good stretch, but unfortunately it is still difficult to find the optimal location
for objects that are stored in a DHT. The routing path can be optimized, but if an object that I
often want to use is stored on a far away location, the delay is still a problem.
DNSPastry tries to close the semantical gap between node identifiers, i.e., hostnames or overlay
IDs, and the hash keys of objects stored in the corresponding DHT buckets. Often objects in the
Internet have addresses that show some useful semantics. When an object is accessed using a
URL, the URL contains the name of the host, the path to the object, and some protocol showing
how the object can be queried. When URL-like identifiers or addresses would be used in a
peer-to-peer network, the structure of them could be used to find a good location for such an
object.
5.1 Main Objectives
In the Internet resources are accessed using names. Since the early days of the arpa-net there
was a need to use names for hosts instead of IP addresses. Nowadays, we use names to locate,
connect to, or access not only computers, but also services, and other users. If the naming
service is used for different kinds of applications, it must be scalable enough in order not to
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be a bottleneck for them and dependable enough to allow these applications to be dependable.
In general, one could say, a naming service can easily make a service unusable, e.g., with a
suboptimal architecture or configuration. So there is a special need to have a well engineered
universal naming service for the Internet.
For more then 20 years, DNS has been the naming service for the Internet. Unfortunately, it
turned out to be very fragile and difficult to use efficiently, as explained in earlier Sections of
this thesis. Non-optimal performance is often caused by configuration issues. They lead to per-
formance problems that are perceived as failures by stub resolvers. And since DNS resolvers are
using timeouts to detect communication failures, this leads to significant performance degrada-
tions in the presence of node failures or DNS configuration issues (see Section 2.3).
DNSPastry is another try to serv DNS data from a peer-to-peer infrastructure to overcome the
weaknesses of client-server infrastructures combined with DNS configuration issues.
5.1.1 Configuration Issues
In Section 3 we tried to show that certain configuration issues are very wide spread. A single
missing DNS entry can lead to a failure of a service that depends on it, e.g., ssh is checking
ACLs using reverse DNS mappings (PTR records), which are often forgotten by administrators.
The structure of the DNS server network also depends on DNS data itself. There are certain
infrastructure records, like NS records or clue records, that are needed to delegate authority
and requests from one server to another. SOA records are used to configure replication and
synchronization intervals between primary and secondary DNS servers. Misconfigurations in
these records result in higher DNS traffic and increased load on servers.
In a peer-to-peer network, which serves DNS records from a DHT, the structure of the network,
i. e., the routing data would be completely independent of the data in the DHT. A DNS configu-
ration issue could not harm the overlay’s connectivity. A DNS record would also be independent
of any other records, at least in the case that there are no dependencies due to the application
using it.
Therefore, it can be expected that a DHT based DNS solution is significantly less configuration-
error-prone than DNS. Furthermore, the configuration effort for administrators would be reduced
since there is no need for infrastructure records anymore1.
5.1.2 DoS Attacks
The 13 root servers of the DNS server network are often considered a disadvantage. They are
heavily used, sometimes due to resolvers or DNS zones that are configured poorly, which can
lead to performance problems. They are also often targets of DoS attacks.
Of course, there are not only 13 root servers. IP anycast is used for some of them, but still, the
number of root servers does not grow automatically with the size of the Internet. Unfortunately,
the chance to obtain a big bot network to attack these servers increases due to the growth of the
Internet, even if it is difficult to characterize the size of bot nets [RZMT07].
1Except: if they are needed for some legacy systems. At least they cannot make the DHT unusable due to poor
configuration
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When a DHT is used to serve DNS records, each single record could have its own set of root
servers. Of course this would require, that there are enough nodes in the underlying P2P network,
but it could be expected that the network grows with the number of hosts in the Internet. For DoS
attacks, that would mean that an attack on one of these sets could only affect the DNS records
in its buckets. If the set is too small, e. g. if there is no replication or caching, the records could
be made unavailable. However, this would still be a local problem.
In general one could say, in DNS an attacker can attack a small number of servers to make a
huge set of zones unavailable, while with a peer-to-peer solution an attacker has to attack a set
of servers to make a few or even a single record unavailable.
5.1.3 Data Integrity Problems
DNS does not protect the integrity or confidentiality of DNS records. Because DNS is nowadays
used for applications with high security demands the Internet engineering task force is working
on a secure DNS standard: DNSSEC (DNS security extentions).
DNSSEC solves some major security problems of DNS but it is not a silver bullet. Some of the
problems are even amplified by DNSSEC.
DNSSEC offers mechanisms to use asymmetric cryptography to protect the integrity of DNS
data. It even protects non-existing data: A DNSSEC server can send a signed answer containing
a NXT or NSEC record. This record shows that a certain record does not exist, as explained in
Section 2.5.
The use of public key cryptography increases the configuration effort. Administrators do not
just have to ensure that all delegations are correct. They also need to sign them and be aware
of the fact that an expired key turns them invalid. Some people belief that this makes DNSSEC
more fragile than DNS (Geoff Huston2 and [AA02]). Of course, one could reduce the problem
by using longer lifetimes for keys, but the security implications are obvious.
We cannot expect DNSSEC to replace DNS in the near future since too many problems are still
around, most of them having been explained in Section 2.5. Fortunately, general data integrity
can also be provided without DNSSEC. The need to counter different kinds of fraud in the
Internet is apparent. The use of DNS (without security extensions) allows attackers to block
traffic or to redirect traffic to other hosts, while the growing dependency on Internet services
demands a way to resolve a name securely.
There are two basic problems:
Wrong mappings can lead users to faked web sites to steel confidential information. Signed
DNS records could solve this problem as shown by DNSSEC. This can even be done
in a economically efficient way, e.g., by reuse of SSL certificates, which are used on
application layer anyway [PFJ05].
The denial of DNS records or unavailability is the second problem. DNSSEC solves the prob-
lem but the mechanism to do so is one of the central obstacles to its deployment. In a peer-
to-peer solution, a host could sign negative answers. However, a mechanism is required to
show that this host is allowed to answer this query. This can be reached by cryptograph-
ically ensuring the correctness of the routing algorithm and checking the host’s identity.
2The ISP Column: http://www.dnssec.net/ and http://ispcolumn.isoc.org/2006-10/dnssec3.html, April 2008
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Unfortunately, this still can not prevent a node from sending wrong information, but there
could be out of band ways to assign blame and the signature would show that the node
lied.
Example: After receiving the answer from a DHT bucket, there could be an application
layer mechanism to set up a secure connection, like SSL. If it is not possible to verify the
hostname via SSL, the mapping from the DHT might have been wrong3.
5.1.4 Advantages of Extending Pastry
To implement a DHT to serve DNS mappings we decided to extend FreePastry, which is an
implementation of Pastry (Section 4.1.2). Pastry features a routing algorithm which can be
optimized to exploit locality and which is more flexible than routing algorithms of other peer-
to-peer networks. It offers a property that is called routing convergence which can be used to
implement and use caches in a very efficient way.
We implemented DNSPastry which improves the locality of a DHT on FreePastry. That means,
similar names are stored together on hosts with similar host names. Our enhancements lead to
better data locality due to a revised hash function [PFS06]. The use of this hash function could
still be tuned by the applications, e.g. to reach a flat hash, respectively name space.
5.1.5 Security of Entries
As already discussed in Section 5.1.3, the integrity and confidentiality of items in a DHT can
be protected on the DHT-layer, i. e., above the KBR network (key-based routing, see Section
4.1.2).
When DNS mappings are stored in a DHT, these mappings can be signed by their owner and
shipped together with a signature. For non-existing entries the overlay node can sign the reply.
In the case of DoS attacks the replication factor of DHT entries may be used to counter them.
This could even be done in an adaptive way. After observing DoS attacks, one could analyze the
number of nodes affected and extend the replication factor to a value above this number4.
The correctness of the routing algorithm of DNSPastry must be enforced in the KBR layer.
DNSPastry uses signed nodehandles (certificates, see Figure 5.6) are used to verify a node’s
identity. These nodehandles are checked before they are used in the routing information (leaf-
set or prefix routing table) of another node. They are also used to authenticate direct neighbors
in the overlay ring.
When messages are sent, a peer-to-peer application might also use the key in a node certificate,
which is part of the nodehandle, for encryption to ensure that only the receiver can decrypt the
message.
3Of course, the reason might also be an SSL configuration issue or a temporary outage of the web server, etc.
Hence, this would be a best-effort method and the outcome has to be evaluated carefully.
4This has not been implemented so far.
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5.2 Design
For DNSPastry the prefix routing scheme of Pastry has been adapted to reach better locality in
[PFS06]. The central point is a new way to compute the keys for objects and node IDs.
In Pastry, the last routing step is determined in the leaf-set. Leaf-set neighbors are nodes with the
most similar smaller and greater IDs in the ring. When random IDs are used or secure hashes
like in Figure 5.1, the leaf-set neighbors cannot be expected to be close to each other in the
network topology. Figure 5.3 shows this idea. One can see that nodes with DNS names from
different country-code domains are grouped in continuous regions in DNSPastry while Pastry
spreads them all over the ID space. The reason therefore is a change in the hashing scheme.
Using DNS names in DNSPastry, each label of the DNS name is hashed and the label hashes
are concatenated to build the key or ID (Figure 5.2). We called this scheme hierarchical hashes.
Figure 5.2 shows that names with common domains, but different host names are still producing
similar hash values, thus being close to each other in the ID space of DNSPastry. In this case,
rather often the leaf-set neighbors can be expected to belong to the same organization or same
country5.
Figure 5.1: SHA-1 Hashes as node IDs
Figure 5.2: Hierarchical hashes of peer names
An advantage of the prefix routing scheme in combination with hierarchical hashes is routing
locality. If a message is routed between a sender and a receiver in the same domain, the prefix
match of all forwarding nodes is not shorter than the match between sender and receiver. This
means, that internal messages do never leave a domain, e.g., in Figure 5.4 a message from
the node with ID 38 to node 3d would only be routed inside the ring that represents their DNS
domain. The routing within a ring, i.e., the changes to the Pastry routing table to use hierarchical
hashes, is explained on page 100.
There is only one exception to this property: If a subdomain of a certain domain (like domain
39 and 3 in Figure 5.5) is coupled to the root ring and a message is sent from a sender inside
the domain to a receiver inside this subdomain, the message must be forwarded through the root
ring. The concept of several hierarchical rings will be explained in detail in Section 5.2.1. An
5The hashes for single labels must be long enough not to produce collisions






Figure 5.3: Leaf set structure for hierarchical hashes
example can be seen in Figure 5.5. If a message is sent from a node 3b with destination 39 it
goes through the root ring, which is the top layer ring. This is done, by introducing redirection
entries in the DHT, similar to the ones used in [MD04] as discussed in Section 4.3.
A redirection record shows, which ring is responsible for a certain record. The ring for domain
3 contains a redirection record at the node responsible for the ID 39. It is used, if the overlay
routing for a message to some node in 39 is done in this domain. This message is than be
forwarded to the proxy and routed in the external domain, where it would find a proxy for 39. A
proxy is a special overlay node. Each proxy is connected to two rings - each of them associated
with a certain DNS domain. For simplicity we refer to them as internal and external domains,
where the external domain is the one with the shorter DNS name.
The proxy concept simplifies firewall configurations, since it helps to relax the demand for global
connectivity between overlay nodes.
Note that the holder of the redirection record should not be used as a cache for contents of
domain 39, since this is an ordinary overlay node. If 39 contains very popular objects, it could be
overloaded. Replication records themselves are replicated in the DHT to achieve load balancing.
The proxy would be a better place for caching (Section 5.2.2).
The other alternative for connecting domains can also be seen in Figure 5.5. Domain 5 does not
need any redirections for domain 56. The wildcard of its proxy would match any keys in 56
automatically. In the other direction a node on 56 could determine that a key, e.g., 5a does not
belong to the current domain and forward it to the proxy.
5.2.1 Hierarchical Rings
As already mentioned, DNSPastry allows to partition the ID space into several rings. This
allows:
Reduced Visibility Nodes within a ring can be invisible from outside. This makes sure that
organizations can hide their internal representations and structure. Increased visibility
due to the NXT/NSEC mechanism is one of the main obstacles to the deployment of
DNSSEC.
Reduced Connectivity Usually peer-to-peer networks demand full connectivity. Each node
in the network must be able and allowed to send messages to every other node. This
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is a problem for firewall configurations. Hence, most overlay networks tunnel through
firewalls. Unfortunately, this makes firewalls useless for many new Internet services like
Skype, Kazaa, etc. Thus, most administrators just forbid such services since they might
contain malware, but they cannot use firewalls to block the traffic.
DNSPastry allows the use of proxies (grey nodes in Figures 5.5 and 5.4) as explained
above, which can be deployed in a DMZ. They can implement certain policies, like
whether or not to forward messages to a certain node behind the inner firewall. They
can also reply on behalf of such nodes. The concrete behavior depends on the overlay
application. The normal overlay nodes (black nodes in Figures 5.5) can only see nodes
inside their local ring.
Routing Locality As already mentioned, routing locality prevents local messages from leaking
out of a domain. This property also improves the resilience to network partitions. There
might be, e.g., a problem with the configuration of some firewall, which blocks all traffic.
Since external nodes are not visible through the firewall, all internal communication can
still proceed. External communication could, e.g., be buffered by the proxy until the con-
nection is available again, or just dropped. This behavior can completely be implemented
by the application using the interface explained in Section 4.1.2.
  











Figure 5.4: Proxies (grey nodes) connected to the root ring. One ID digit represents one DNS
label.
There are several prerequisites to exploit these properties:
Locality of Names If the structure of hostnames would not give locality information in the
majority of the cases, the leaf-set organization would not be better than a complete hash
as implemented in Pastry.
Similarity of Naming and Network Topology If it is not possible to use naming conventions
for nodes grouped behind a firewall, the proxy approach is not usable. However, since it
















Figure 5.5: Subdomains can be attached to their parent domain or the root ring. One ID digit
represents one DNS label.
is perfectly possible to assign several names to a host in the Internet, this should not be a
major obstacle.
Fault Tolerant Proxies Using several proxies for each domain is necessary. Otherwise, there
would be a single point of failure. In the external ring, proxies are using a wildcard
mechanism to become the responsible node for their internal domain. Again, proxies are
connecting two rings - the internal ring representing the more specific DNS domain. The
wildcard replaces the least significant label of their name, e.g., a proxy node with ID 345
would be addressed in domain 5 as ∗45, representing any node in domain 45 To have a
unique ID for each node, even if labels are truncated, a SHA hash of the complete name
is appended to the ID to prevent collisions. This allows to have arbitrarily many proxies.
5.2.2 Caching
Like local web caches or local DNS servers, DNSPastry proxies can be used as caches for DHT
content. The analogy is obvious: a group of users at a certain location invests some resources to
reduce wide area network traffic. Furthermore, the cache could also reply for arriving external
queries and so reduce the load on local nodes.
Groups can invest in their own proxies and protect their investments using group policies. There-
fore, a node certificate can contain a group name. A proxy can decide to serve requests for all
groups or just for its own group. The association between a node and a group is made within the
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Figure 5.6: Certification chain for a node
5.2.3 Composability with Legacy Products
If it is not feasible to install DNSPastry nodes on each computer in a network, it is straightfor-
ward to install frontends for the desired services. These applications could translate from the
legacy protocol to DHT lookups. There is a wide range of applications, where this would make
sense, e.g., local DNS servers, web servers, web caches, e-mail servers (SMTP), IMAP servers,
groupware servers, etc. A DNS proxy has been implemented for Pastry and DNSPastry. It con-
nects to a peer-to-peer DNS caching application for testing purposes. Thereby, we have shown
that we can leave most DNS users untouched. Using DNSPastry instead of DNS just requires to
replace local DNS servers with a DNS proxy to DNSPastry.
5.2.4 Registrars
Names of nodes in the Internet must be unique, i.e., no two nodes are allowed to have the same
name whereas one node can have several names. This was one of the reasons for the hierarchical
design of the DNS namespace. It relaxes the constraint of global uniqueness to uniqueness
within the domain.
Usually a registrar assigns names for certain domains or whole subdomains. It ensures that no
name is used twice within its domain.
In our design of DNSPastry this approach is used as well. A registrar, i. e., a certification
authority (CA) can issue a name certificate. Using this certificate, a customer can then create
node certificates and name certificates of subdomains. The scalability of the certification process
has almost no limitations since an arbitrary number of CAs can be used, as long as trust is
established among them. In Figure 5.6 the structure of node certificates is depicted. To allow
mobility of nodes, the network address is not part of the certificate. Each time, a node connects
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to the overlay, it signs its socket address. This signature can be checked by other nodes using
the public key from the node certificate.
5.3 Implementation
As mentioned in 5.1.4 we used FreePastry and implemented DNSPastry as an extention of it.
Altogether, the implementation contains 97 classes with 20,800 lines of code and took two man-
month to implement.
The implementation contains a benchmark application which sends pings to random hosts in the
overlay and uses ICMP ping to estimate the network distance. With these two time measure-
ments we calculate the stretch, i.e., the performance penalty of overlay routing.
5.4 Performance Problems
5.4.1 Performance of the Application in Planet-Lab
In Figure 5.7 one can see the disappointing results of the performance analysis of DNSPastry
on Planet-Lab. The graphs show the stretch on the y-axis (log scale). The x-axis contains the
communication partners of the local node sorted by the match of the domain name. Nodes with
most common labels are in the right hand box, nodes without DNS name postfix match are in
the left hand box. The box in the middle contains nodes within the same top level domain as
the sender node, in this case .jp. For better readability, some empty areas have been inserted to
seperate these boxes from each other. Therefore, the labels do not show the actual number of
nodes.
It can easily be seen that the stretch is too high for this overlay to be used in any interactive
application. Sometimes we measured a stretch of 8 or more, which is totally unacceptable. This
surprised us since we had simulated the performance of a DNS-based prefix routing before. The
main error in this simulation was the central assumption that the Internet topology is transit-stub-
like where the name would give a hint to locality in many cases. In Section 5.4.2 we show your
promising results of DNSPastry in comparison to other peer-to-peer overlays. Note, that the
simulations have been done before we decided to implement DNSPastry. There are several dif-
ferences between the simulated version of DNSPastry and our implementation: The concept of
proxies has not been implemented in the simulator, including redirection records. For simplicity,
it is assumed, that the first routing hop leads to the right top level domain and the next hop would
lead to a proxy. The implementation of firewall rules has been ignored accordingly. Therefore,
the explanation of the routing algorithm in Section 5.4.2 does not contain handling of redirec-
tions. The main focus of the simulation is on the performance of the prefix routing algorithm.
Later on, I improved the simulation with the help of TopDNS, as novel topology generator, as
explained in Sections 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. These improvements resulted in the same observations
as the experiments on Planet-Lab. Therefore, it can be assumed, that the simplifications of the
simulated protocol did not lead to wrong results.
5.4.2 Simulation with Transit-Stub-Topologies
In [PFH07] we presented results of a simulation of DNSPastry on PlanetSim [LPM+04].
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Figure 5.7: stretch measured from planetlab1.sfc.wide.ad.jp
The central goal of [PFH07] is to describe a design of a low-latency peer-to-peer lookup service
for global scale deployment.
Related Work
The time to locate objects in a DHT can be reduced in several ways, e.g.: (A) The access
locality is exploited: Each object is stored near the location where it is most likely to be used.
This includes replication and caching strategies. (B) Proximity Neighbor Selection (PNS): The
routing steps towards the desired object are optimized with respect to network delay. To do
this, one can (B.1) measure the round trip time to nodes that are candidates for entries in a
routing table, or (B.2) use existing knowledge about the underlying network structure to select
the closest candidate.
(A) Locality Some applications are able to provide locality hints for helping to place objects in
a peer-to-peer network. For example, consider that a peer-to-peer network is used to locate text
documents. One could use the language of a document as a hint for the most likely countries
in which the users of a document might be located. Other applications might use URLs that
can give us similar hints. Since the hash function of a DHT usually destroys these locality
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hints, caching and replication is needed to exploit access locality. Data caching and routing
information caching are often used in peer-to-peer networks to reduce response times.
Pastry [RD01] uses Leaf-Set-Replication6 to optimize the distribution of DHT data in the net-
work. Since the peer-IDs are randomly created, replicas are evenly distributed in the topology
of the underlying network. This means that each user should have a nearby replica that is found
by the prefix routing protocol. Applications based on Pastry can also exploit local route conver-
gence to find good locations for cached objects. This means that routing from different nodes to
a common target would converge at a common node before reaching the target node. From there
on, the routing path is shared. Therefore, there can be several good locations for caches on this
path.
Tapestry [ZHS+04] allows the selection of the replication level which defines how many copies
of an object are stored in the network. This level is implemented by defining a common prefix
length that a replication host and the object ID must share. The shorter the prefix length, the
higher is the number of replicas. If node IDs are generated randomly, the replicas are evenly
distributed in the network topology. This allows to adjust the replication level to the desired
mean time for fetching an object.
Beehive [RS04a] uses this technique to build a pro-active caching framework that adjusts the
replication level of an object based on the request rate for this object. Beehive is used in
CoDoNS [RS04b] to build a peer-to-peer-based domain name system. CoDoNS reaches O(1)
lookup performance. The number of hops that is allowed for a lookup can be adjusted. To
achieve a low number of hops, e.g., 0.5 hops average latency, the local cache hit rate must be
very high, i.e., 50% in this case.
(B) PNS In different peer-to-peer solutions the stretch is reduced by optimizing the routing
tables of peers. When a node has to forward a message, it should pick a nearby peer. This is
often reached by measuring the round trip time (RTT) to peers that are available for a certain
position in the routing table. Sometimes this generates a substantial amount of traffic due to
the high number of peers. Fortunately, the traffic can be reduced. Often it is sufficient to probe
a small number of peers [GGG+03]. To reduce the PNS effort even more, we plan to use
Vivaldi [DCKM04] in the future.
Another solution to the same problem is landmark routing or clustering [ZDH+02, RHKS02]:
Peers cluster around distinguished peers called landmarks. The proximity to and between land-
marks is assumed to be known by the use of network coordinates or RTT measurement data.
This information can be used as an approximation of the proximity of nodes that have similar
distance vectors to the landmark nodes.
Intrinsic problems of DHTs Despite the availability of technologies to optimize routing table
information, peer-to-peer routing is still not widely accepted and used for low latency services.
The reason is that usually the stretch is still too high. Objects are stored too far away from their
users and replication schemes like Beehive cannot exploit the access patterns of local users or
6The leaf set contains the direct successors and predecessors of the node in the ID space. Details can be found in
[RD01].
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user groups in a global system. Instead, such solutions replicate a high number of the most
popular objects on hosts without a guaranteed benefit for the local user.
DNS has good locality properties, which should be used. Computers in a LAN are often served
by the same DNS server and have a long common suffix in their DNS names. Also Internet users
usually visit web sites that have a cultural proximity, i.e., they are written in the same language
or located in the same country. This proximity can be exploited by DNS and improves, together
with caching, the performance. DHTs often destroy such proximity information, contributing to
a rather slow lookup and poor proximity between the target object itself and the user.
While other approaches try to exploit common keywords to express cultural proximity like Lu
et al. [LHL05] to speed up peer-to-peer lookups, we exploit the hierarchical structure of DNS
names. If some user looks up harrypotter.warnerbros.co.uk, it is more probable that user will
also lookup www.amazon.co.uk instead of harrypotter.warnerbros.fr. In general, a country code
of a URL may tell us where the object may be used frequently. Also, typically it is more likely
to lookup the IP addresses of hosts within its own domain than of hosts in other domains. The
postfixes of host names indicate their location in the DNS name space and in this way provide
some locality information: (A) not only is it more likely to resolve names in a node’s own
proximity of the DNS hierarchy but (B) there is also a correlation between the geographical
proximity of hosts and their proximity in the DNS hierarchy. To preserve these two correlations,
our hash scheme preserves the DNS hierarchy in the generated host IDs. For locating objects,
we are using a prefix routing scheme like the one of Pastry [RD01] or Tapestry [ZHS+04]. Our
evaluation shows that even for random access patterns (i.e., without using locality factor (A)),
our scheme harnesses (B) provides a better stretch than Pastry (from which our system is derived)
on DNS-based transit-stub-topologies, which implement the assumption of proximity reflected
by DNS names. Note that this assumption proved wrong as discussed Section 5.4.4. Our goals
are also similar to those of SkipNet [HJS+03]. However, optimizing routing tables using PNS is
much easier in our system than in SkipNet, where it is necessary to maintain additional routing
state for this purpose.
DNS-Based Clustering
In prefix-based peer-to-peer schemes, peers cluster around common prefixes. In DNS, names
are contained in zones. A zone is an organizational unit. Starting from the root zone, authority
can be delegated to sub-zones. A zone manifests itself in a name as a suffix.
The King approach [GSG02] assumes that Internet hosts often cluster around their authoritative
DNS servers. These hosts share a common suffix, i.e., the name of their DNS zone. Since the
King tool achieved good results, we exploit this knowledge in the design of our hash scheme. In
contrast to that, DNS gives us a poor indication for the inter-domain proximities. Country code
domains give us some benefit which we exploit, but generic top level domains (.org, .com and
.net) do not. However, we assume that most communication is done within a domain 7.
When calculating an ID for a name, we compute for each label of the node’s DNS name a
hash value. These values are then concatenated to build the ID. This construction itself does not
7For connections to web sites this is not true but usually, there are many applications that satisfy this assump-
tion, like e-mail clients that fetch new e-mails from the local mail servers in short intervals, connections to domain
controllers for user authentication, group communication, connections to the local NTP server, etc.
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cause collisions because names in the hierarchical DNS name space are unique. A novelty in this
approach is that IDs can have different length. This makes the comparison of IDs slightly more
difficult: the identifier space is not a ring with a modulo operation and it is infinitely large. At the
same time it gains direct support for domains with different granularity in their organizational
structure.
Our performance evaluations are based on transit-stub topologies. These topologies are usually
interpreted as router-level models because they explicitly group vertices into domains and reflect
that grouping in the connectivity between vertices. In our case, they reflect the DNS hierarchy.
We assume that links within the same DNS domain have a lower delay than inter-domain links.
As mentioned before, this assumption is based on the observations of Gummadi et al. [GSG02].
In DNSPastry, nodes within the same DNS domain are neighbors in the ID space. Hence, the
distances between leaf set nodes are in average much smaller than in a Pastry or Chord overlay.
Comparing IDs To make routing decisions, IDs have to be comparable. For computing the
ID of a peer, a hash function πlname is used: π
l
name returns a hash value for the l-th label of the
peer name, where l = 0 selects the highest label, i.e., the top level domain. The ID of a peer
which name consists of k + 1 labels is defined as:
π0name · π1name · ... · πkname,
where “·” is the concatenation operator.
The order we use on IDs is lexicographical order, i.e., we interpret the digits as letters of an
alphabet (and not numbers) and use the alphabetical order to compare two IDs.
Routing
The routing algorithm is very similar to Pastry, but it provides path locality, as defined by Harvey
et al. in [HJS+03]. Path locality, which is an additional security feature, prevents packets from
being routed through external hosts in the case that source and destination of the packet are in
the same domain. This property is actually provided by the combination of the original routing
algorithm of Pastry and our approach to generate IDs: The routing ensures that the common
prefix never gets shorter and our hash algorithm ensures that a common domain is represented
by a common ID-prefix. The routing information consists of a prefix-routing table and a leaf
set. The leaf set covers a certain part of the ID space. It contains up to N node handles: The
(N −1)/2 nodes with the closest smaller IDs, the current (local) node, and the (N −1)/2 nodes
with the closest greater IDs. If there are not sufficiently many nodes with smaller (larger) IDs,
the leaf set is padded with nodes that have the largest (smallest) IDs in the system. The worst
case routing complexity depends on the number of digits in the destination’s ID since the routing
algorithm assures to add at least one digit with each hop to the possibly non-empty prefix match
that source ID and destination ID already have. During our measurements we have seen an
average routing complexity of O(log N) with N nodes in the overlay.
Say, we want to locate an object with ID idd. To do so, the routing algorithm sends a message
m to locate idd. A peer L that receives (or sends) m performs the following steps:
1. IF there are peers in the routing table or the leaf set of L with a longer prefix match with
idd than the local node L, pick the one with the longest prefix match. If there exists
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multiple nodes with a longest prefix, forward to the closest one of them in terms of the
round trip time. Select one at random if there is more than one node with the longest
prefix and the shortest round trip time.
2. ELSE IF there is a node N in the leaf set or the routing table of L that has the same
prefix match with idd as L but is lexicographically closer to idd than the local node L
(i.e., L < N < idd), then L forwards the message to N .
3. ELSE deliver it to the application on the local node, i.e., m has reached its destination.
Routing Table The routing table is very similar to the one used by Pastry. The number of
columns is set to the base 2b which is used to encode IDs, e.g., for base 16 (i.e., b = 4) there are
16 columns. We use the function shPfD(id1, id2) to denote the number of digits in the shared
prefix of IDs id1 and id2, i.e., they match in the first shPfD(id1, id2) digits. The term id1[i]
refers to the ith digit in the ID id1.
Consider that we want to store ID t in the routing table of the current node c. The column of t is
determined by t[shPfD(c, t) + 1] which is the first digit after the common prefix shPfD(c, t)
if the length of t is at least shPfD(c, t)+1. Otherwise, t is a prefix of c as discussed in the next
paragraph. The line is determined by the length of the common prefix. The first line contains
node handles whose IDs do not have a prefix match, except for the the entry in column c[1].
In the second line shPfD(id1, id2) equals one, except for the column c[2] and so on. These
exceptions apply for the fields, where the local node’s ID would be the best match. This is
similar to Pastry. The number of lines is equal to the length of the ID of the current node plus 1
because we have to gain one prefix digit in each routing step to get logarithmic complexity.
Figure 5.8 shows a routing table for the node 02312 and b = 2. The table has six lines for
the reasons mentioned before. The number of columns is four since b = 2, which means that
possible digits are ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. The leaf set size is eight, which means that at most four nodes
nodes are stored in each direction. For simplicity, Figure 5.8 shows only one entry for each field
in the prefix routing table. We can store more than one for better fault tolerance. One of them
will be chosen as next hop depending on its distance, i.e., round trip time.
The variable length of IDs leads to a little more complex indexing in the routing table (see
below) but at the same time our approach offers a novel ability to the overlay: like in DNS,
an optimization of the communication between hosts within the same organizational unit is
possible. The organizational structure can be as fine grained as desired. The structure is, like in
DNS, reflected by the names of the nodes. Since these names are directly mapped to node IDs,
the hierarchical structure of the overlay is represented by the prefix-routing table.
Routing Table Indexing If peer IDs with a fixed length are used, the indexing of the routing
table is very straightforward. A message with destination id2 is forwarded by peer id1 to the
entry
(column, line) = (id2[m+ 1],m)
where m = shPfD(id1, id2) and m < length(id1) and m < length(id2)
in its prefix-routing table.
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Figure 5.8: Routing information for node 02312
Because we are using a variable ID length, we need to extend this rule. As noted, we only use
the above rule if the prefix match of id1 and id2 is smaller than the length of any of the two IDs.
If id2 is a strict prefix of id1, we use position
(column, line) = (id1[m],m)
where m = shPfD(id1, id2) and m = length(id2) and m < length(id1)
In turn, if id1 is a strict prefix of id2, we use position
(column, line) = (id2[m+ 1],m+ 1)
where m = shPfD(id1, id2) and m = length(id1) and m < length(id2)
Note that the last line in the routing table is needed to ensure logarithmic routing performance.
Algorithm for Weighted Proximity-Neighbor-Routing Depending on the density of nodes
in the identifier space, there could be more than one node possible for a certain position in the
routing table. In this case, a routing decision is made based on physical proximity, i.e., the
measured round trip time, and logical proximity, i.e., the distance in the ID space. For this
purpose, a weighted ranking is needed, which is defined by the following function.
rank = α ∗ |destId[l]− nextHopId[l]|+ β ∗ |nextHopRTT |
where l = shPfD(destId, nextHopId) + 1 and length(destId) ≥ l and
length(nextHopId) ≥ l
Choosing a stronger β (i.e., β > α) would increase the work load on overlay nodes due to the
higher number of hops for the sakes of better response time. Choosing a stronger α (i.e., α > β)
would reduce the number of hops but increase response time.
Having multiple options for each routing decision does not just improve performance but node
failures can be tolerated much better too.
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Bootstrapping
To enter the overlay network, a new node must know at least one overlay peer. This peer is used
to send a message to the new node’s ID. The node, that is responsible for this ID is asked to
send its routing table and leaf set information. Before the new node incorporates the discovered
nodes into the routing information, it first sends PING messages to determine the round trip
times, which are needed for the ranking.
We extended the bootstrapping mechanism for Proximity Neighbor Selection. After retrieving
the routing information, the new node can iterate over all nodes it knows and ask them for
their routing information. Then candidate nodes for a certain position in the routing table are
compared with respect to proximity, i.e., round trip time.
Updating Routing Information To keep routing information up-to-date, each message that
is forwarded is analyzed. In the case that the sender of the message could fill a field in the
routing table, a PING message is sent to get RTT information. In the future, we want to use
Vivaldi [DCKM04] to reduce the number of ping messages. A periodic maintenance of the
routing table is not used, instead we check and correct the routing table on use. This is similar
to Pastry.
Performance Analysis
Our main requirements for selecting a simulator for performance evaluation were to evaluate the
scalability of our solution and to compare the routing performance with IP-routing to compute
the stretch. Furthermore, we wanted to compare it to other peer-to-peer solutions. Hence, we
looked for a simulator that already included several common peer-to-peer protocols and allowed
us to simulate at least 1000 nodes. To be able to use the algorithms applied in the simulation runs
also in a real application, we payed attention to the fact that the simulator sticks to the common
API for structured peer-to-peer overlays [DZD+03] (see Section 4.1.2). Another advantage of
maintaining this API is that application developers can easily use the simulator and the overlay
to simulate their application on it. We also preferred Open-Source-Software to be able to per-
form some extensions. Since our overlay is based on a mapping of the underlying hierarchical
structure into the ID space, the simulator had to be able to use topological network information.
We examined several simulators:
peer-to-peersim [GKL+06, NBLR06] is very well known and comes with implementations of
some peer-to-peer overlays, but it does not provide a good documentation and the Common API
is limited to the implementation of a join() and a lookup() method.
OverlayWeaver [ove06] also comes with implementation of some peer-to-peer networks and
supports distributed simulation with several computers but cannot use topological information
like link latency.
PlanetSim [pla06, LPM+04] is very well documented and comes with implementations of
Chord and Symphony. It is a implemented as single threaded application and does not sup-
port topological information. However, it was able to simulate a Chord-overlay with 100,000
peers on a Pentium 4 with 1GB RAM. The stabilization of the ring took 46 hours. PlanetSim
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provides a very clear separation of the network layer, overlay layer, and application layer. Hence,
it is easy to simulate new applications on top of existing overlay networks or vice versa.
PeerSim [NBLR06] is a simulator framework which comes with a good documentation and
some peer-to-peer implementations. Unfortunately, it does not support network topology in-
formation and there is no separation between application and overlay, which makes it virtually
impossible to test one application on several overlay networks.
GPS [YAG05] was developed to examine the network throughput of BitTorrent. So it supports
network topologies, bandwidth, and delay statistics. It does not support the common API and so
it would be very difficult to simulate Chord, Pastry, or DNSPastry.
3LS [TD03] is a very comprehensive framework. It supports a three-layer-architecture for net-
work, overlay, and application. Unfortunately, the very detailed simulation leads to limited
scalability.
We decided to use PlanetSim and added three extensions: (1) a topology front-end that parses
and imports topology files, (2) a statistics back-end that collects statistics like delay times and
hop counts during simulation, and (3) a graphics backend that is able to display the network
topology and the overlay topology on top of it. Of course, the latter only makes sense for small
networks. The output format is GML. The network layer had to be extended to use the given
topology and report delays to the statistics component.
Evaluation The main focus of the simulation is to figure out, how efficient the overlay routing
of our clustering-based overlay (DNSPastry) behaves in comparison to other overlays and to
IP-routing. The important characteristics are (1) the average number of hops, (2) the round trip
time (RTT), and (3) the stretch.
We created transit-stub-topologies with a three-level hierarchy, which are very common in DNS
names, e.g., www.tu-dresden.de. For the link latencies we use a Gaussian distribution8 with
a mean of 1009 for intra-transit domain links, 10 for stub-transit links, and 1 for intra-stub
links and a deviation of one fifth of the mean. These values are derived from the CAN simula-
tion [RFH+01] for better comparison.
Since our implementation is very similar to Pastry, we also added a Pastry implementation to
the PlanetSim project. Additionally, we tried to use the existing Chord implementation, which
was however quite buggy, so that we had to revise it. The comparison to Chord might be slightly
unfair because it does not use PNS.
We were not able to simulate 100,000 nodes like in [LPM+04] since our enhanced simulator
needs much more memory for statistics and topology management. So we created overlay net-
works from 500 to 4000 peers, in steps of 500. The nodes of the peer-to-peer overlay were
chosen randomly for each size from a topology of 4420 nodes. The simulation was done on a
Intel Pentium D 820 with 2048 MB RAM running Ubuntu Linux and Sun Java-VM 1.5.
We compared Pastry, Chord and our DNSPastry with respect to the average number of hops, the
round trip time and the stretch. Our benchmark application generates 100,000 ping messages
between randomly chosen peers. Obviously, this kind of application has no locality properties.
Hence, the results of the benchmark are interesting for a wide range of applications. However,
8For simplicity: all timings of topologies mentioned in the following parts of this Section refer to the mean.
9We use abstract time units instead of ms, just to show the ratio of delays between different parts of the network.
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we think that the benefits of our overlay are even higher for applications which can exploit
data and request locality. Of course, all of the measured values depend on size and structure
of the underlying network topology and the parameters of the overlay networks, so they can be
compared to each other but not to other benchmarks. Pastry and DNSPastry use PNS to optimize
routing information. In our case, up to three entries are contained in one field in the routing table
to be able to choose the best proximity and allow some resilience to node failures. The leaf set
contains 32 entries, 16 in each direction. The Chord implementation does not use PNS. The
successor list contains 16 entries.
Results Figure 5.9a depicts the average number of hops for 100,000 ping messages in four dif-
ferent simulations. The number of hops is often a good performance indicator when configuring
an overlay network. All overlays we used reach O(log N) complexity where N is the number of
overlay nodes. Nevertheless, some fine-tuning is always possible. The trade-off is the size of
the routing information. If, e.g., the base b of a digit in Pastry’s prefix routing is increased, the
number of columns in the routing table increases to 2b. This would help to reduce the average
number of hops because Pastry needs O(log2bN) hops to reach a destination. In the case of
Chord we use a successor list of 16 nodes, i.e., 24. For a network size of, e.g., 4000 (≈ 212)
nodes, we can reach a destination within 8 hops.
Another measure that reduces the number of hops is to increase the leaf set size. We ran DNSPas-
try with 4, 8, and 16 nodes in the leaf set, reducing the average hop count by 0.2 to 0.3 for each
doubling of the leaf set size.
In Figure 5.9a we can see that Pastry needs less overlay hops than Chord and our DNSPastry. We
also simulated an application that only sends ping messages within Top Level Domains (TLD) to
show the performance gain for local communication. We found that DNSPastry is, as expected,
much better in this case since the domain structure is reflected by the routing information. The
graph DNSPastry TLD in Figure 5.9a shows this result.
To find out, whether a low hop count guarantees a good response time, we also measured the
round trip time for this experiment. Figure 5.9b shows the results. We observed that DNSPastry
has a much better RTT for random ping messages. The reason is that it efficiently accelerates
the last steps of the routing that go through the leaf set. The PNS of Pastry ensures that the first
few hops are done to nearby nodes. The reason is that there are many options as long as the
common prefix is short, but the number of choices drops exponentially with a growing prefix.
The last hops of the Pastry routing are usually very long in terms of network distance. This is
where DNSPastry does much better and gains the RTT advantage.
Of course, the RTT of the intra-TLD simulation of DNSPastry has much lower values. We can
see that DNSPastry needs less RTT than Pastry but more hops (Figure 5.9b). This phenomenon
has already been observed by Xu et al. [XMH03] when constructing a hierarchical peer-to-peer
routing algorithm. The number of routing hops is getting larger as the hierarchy depth increases.
However, the user perceived performance depends more on delay and not on the number of hops.
Therefore, we measured the stretch of DNSPastry. Figure 5.9c shows the comparison of stretch
for the different overlay networks. Stretch is defined as the ratio overlay distanceIP distance .
We can see that DNSPastry does not incur as much delay penalty as Pastry or Chord. The
difference between DNSPastry with arbitrary ping destinations and intra-TLD destinations is
















































































Figure 5.9: Comparison of Pastry, DNSPastry, Chord
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almost negligible. This indicates that DNSPastry routing is quite efficient even for applications
without good locality properties.
Since the good stretch of DNSPastry is due to the fact that long distance hops are efficiently
avoided, we also examined the influence of different timings in the transit-stub topology.
Therefore, we created two more topologies. For better comparison, we used timings that were
also used in other simulations, like done by Ratnasamy et al. [RFH+01]. Our first topology
had link latencies of 100 for intra-transit domain links, 10 for stub-transit links, and 1 for intra-
stub links. Now we add a 20-5-2 and a 10-10-10 topology. These timings can help to examine
the case that a domain does not cluster advantageous. The 10-10-10 timing would also be a
case where the King tool [GSG02] would not work properly since it depends on the assumption
of clustering around DNS names. According to the authors of [GSG02] this does not seem
to be a common case. Our overlay (Figure 5.10a) can deal with this situation but loses some
performance. These timings might apply for communication between different domains within
generic TLDs. However, if we compare it to the results of Pastry and Chord in Figure 5.9c we
still see better performance.
Our transit stub topology does still not reflect the real characteristics of DNS zones in the Inter-
net. There are two enhancements that we apply therefor: (1) slow intra-stub links and (2) fast
intra-transit links.
Some zones are not as tightly coupled as we assume in our H(100,10,1) and H(20,5,2) topolo-
gies. Examples could be bbc.co.uk and amazon.co.uk. We introduce a slowdown factor for the
intra-stub links and a probability that a zone is slowed down. In Figure 5.10b you can see, how
DNSPastry behaves in this cases for a H(100,10,1) topology. We used 100,000 random ping
messages and a probability of 0.2 for a factor of 10 for intra-transit speedup, which we are going
to explain later on. A slowdown factor of 10 or 100 is not a problem, while factor 1000 increases
the stretch significantly. However, factor 1000 is rather unrealistic since it would mean that an
intra-stub link is 10 times slower than intra-transit links. The probability that a zone is slowed
down seems not to have an important influence.
Sometimes the delay between hosts in different TLDs is quite short, like between .de and .nl or
between .mil and .gov, which are both used in the US. Therefore, we created topologies with a
speedup factor for intra-transit links and a probability that a speedup is applied for a certain link.
The results are depicted in Figure 5.10c. For this simulation a probability of 0.2 for a slowdown
factor 10 for the intra-stub slowdown has been used. We expect, that there might be many such
links in the Internet, like between country code domains of countries that are geographically
close to each other. However, the share of such short links among the intra-stub links has almost
no influence on the stretch.
Conclusion
We simulated a new design for a peer-to-peer overlay network. It can support and exploit locality
correlated with the position of nodes in a hierarchical name space. Due to the novel design of its
ID space, it also supports hierarchical names within organizations to speed up communication
within large organizations. The deeper name space of these organizations will be reflected by
longer IDs in the overlay. At the same time, prefixes in the application name space are used as
locality oracle. This locality information is also reflected by overlay IDs.




















































































probability of speeding up a TLD connection, 20 TLD zones total with 220 nodes each, timings 100-10-1
speedup 10x
speedup 100x
(c) Short intra-transit links
Figure 5.10: DNSPastry average stretch
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We have shown that our design provides good performance for random ping messages on transit-
stub-topologies. This proves that it is usable as multi purpose overlay – even for applications
that do not provide locality in its access patterns. The only prerequisite is that nodes have DNS
names.
For our performance evaluation we used a simulator with a layered architecture. We maintain
the common API for peer-to-peer networks [DZD+03] thus it can easily be used to simulate any
application on top of our peer-to-peer network.
5.4.3 Building Realistic Topologies with TopDNS
After implementing DNSPastry and running it on the Planet-lab, it was obvious that the simula-
tion results of [PFH07] where too promising. For [PF09] we developed a topology generator to
help us running more realistic benchmarks with DNSPastry.
Introduction
Designing overlay solutions which can compete with IP-based routing is difficult [CMM02,
GERB+03]. Our motivation is to show that our overlay network DNSPastry [PFH07] can exploit
the DNS name structure of hostnames to connect nodes in an overlay in a way that improves the
efficiency of overlay routing. So far we have been using transit-stub-topologies [ZCB96] and
random ping benchmarks. However, we would like to evaluate if our overlay can provide a DNS
service with increased dependability based on the fault tolerance and flexibility of peer-to-peer
networks as proposed in [CMM02] and [PPPW04].
As a workload for such benchmarks we used traces of DNS requests recorded at the servers of
our department. The main problem is that the realistic characteristics of the traces, i.e., which
host name is used how frequently, must be mapped to the abstract instances of nodes and net-
works in the topology that we are using for the simulation (See Section 5.4.4). The easiest way
to do that is to have real node names in the topology. A request in the DNS trace would then be
routed to a node representing this name. This might be the DNS server for this zone, or even the
node itself if the name is used for routing instead of resolving it to an IP in the first place.
To evaluate the performance of DNSPastry, we used the stretch, i.e., overlay routing delay over
IP routing delay [GERB+03, PFH07], as a representation of the penalty that comes with overlay
routing. Prerequisite for the computation of stretch is knowledge about the IP-routing delay
between any pair of nodes in the topology. Hence, we do not require our topology to represent
the actual route a packet takes between two nodes. Instead, the distance between real identifiable
hosts in the Internet is sufficient. A host is identifiable iff it is known by name and IP address.
We developed TopDNS, which is a topology generator that fullfills these requirements. In this
Section, we describe the experiences we made while building and using it. It is able to provide
very precise topologies, where precision is defined as similarity to the Internet at the point in
time when the landmarks made their measurements.
Related Work
Many topologies are created using characteristics of the Internet that are statistically analyzed
and used to represent the Internet’s intrinsic properties. Examples of such characteristics are
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the AS structure and routes represented in the BGP routing tables, in-degree and out-degree of
routers, churn in routing tables, etc. A very common way to represent the AS based hierar-
chical structure of the Internet are transit-stub-topologies [CDZ97, ZCB96]. We have used such
topologies in our previous performance analysis of DNSPastry [PFH07] (see Section 5.4.2). The
main problem with such topologies is, that it is nearly impossible to run benchmarks which use
real Internet addresses on them since there is no way to map existing Internet nodes to nodes in
such a topology. A workload for such topologies would also have to be abstract but still needs
to represent the statistical properties of a typical workload.
Vivaldi [DCKM04] is a very efficient distributed network coordinate system. Each participating
node can compute it’s coordinates using just a small number of latency measurements. Each
node in Vivaldi computes its coordinates by simulating its position in a network of physical
springs. Such a network behaves in a way that all springs are stretched to a point that reduces
the overall energy in the network. Therefore, springs with a very high energy, i.e. a high distance
between neighbors in an overlay, might exist contributing to the overall low energy of springs,
i.e. low distance between neighbors. This system is used, e.g., in Bittorrent clients. The dis-
advantage of such an algorithm is that each node must participate to do measurements, which
is in our case not possible. Vivaldi is usable with different metrics. The authors of [DCKM04]
reached best results using 2d coordinates together with a height.
Several schemes to estimate Internet latencies use landmarks. Landmarks are often nodes to
which a remote login is possible, hence they actively participate in the distance computations by
contributing measurements of round trip times.
Internet Distance Maps (IDMaps) [FJJ+01] places landmark nodes at well distributed locations
in the Internet. It estimates the latency between two nodes A and B as the latency from A to its
closest landmark added to the latency from B to its closest landmark plus the latency between
the two landmarks. With an increasing number of landmarks, the error of distance estimation
can be reduced. One problem with IDMaps is that a client node has to measure distances to all
landmarks to identify the closest among them and a rather high number of landmarks is needed
to achieve good precision.
Dynamic Distance Maps (DDM) [TR00] is comparable to IDMaps but it is utilizing a more
sophisticated way to find appropriate landmarks. DDM organizes them hierarchically, and a
client node traverses the hierarchy top-down to locate a near-by candidate.
M-coop [SZ03] utilizes a network of nodes linked in a way that mimics the autonomous system
(AS) graph extracted from BGP routing information. In contrast to IDMaps, each node measures
distances only to a small number of other nodes. When an distance between two nodes is to be
estimated, a path containing several measurements is created to provide it. The performance and
quality is comparable to IDMaps.
Global Network Positioning (GNP) [NZ02] represents the topology as a Euclidian space. Each
node is positioned using a set of coordinates. The authors measured that, using a 7-dimensional
Euclidean space, in 90% of the cases GNP can predict the Internet distances among a globally
distributed set of hosts with less than 50% error. GNP also uses a set of landmarks. The number
of available landmarks limits the number of dimensions in the Euclidian space. Measurements
of [NZ02] show that GNP reaches a better precision than IDMaps.
King [GSG02] is similar to IDMaps and M-coop, but uses DNS servers as landmarks. For each
pair of nodes that is measured, the distance between the nameservers that are authoritative for
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their names is measured. Say we want to estimate the distance between nodes A and B. The
measurement is done from our own node C. Therefore, we measure the distance from C to A’s
name server and send a request for a non-existing name to this server. The name must be chosen
in a way that it does not produce a cache hit and that it is served by B’s name server. The answer
time is measured. It contains a round trip between C and A’s name server, which we can measure
directly and a round trip between C and B’s name server. Hence, we can calculate the distance
between A’s and B’s name servers. The assumption is that this distance is very similar to the
distance between A and B. However, the mushrooming of content distribution networks and the
world-wide replication of name servers reduces the probability that this assumption holds. The
second problem is that we cannot expect name servers to be recursion enabled to everyone as
we experienced in you studies for [PMF08].
System Design
TopDNS is using DNS traces to collect node names. To assign coordinates to these nodes, it
uses GNP. We are using Planet-Lab [Ros05] nodes as landmarks. A python script is exercised
on each of them which first determines the distances to all other landmarks and then measures
the distance to each of the hosts found in the DNS trace. To collect the data we use a MySQL
database. It provides the names of the landmarks, as well as all names found in the DNS trace.
All landmark nodes ping all nodes in the trace and store the distances, i.e., round trip times, in
the data base. The complexity of the topology generation is O(N) for N unique nodes in the
traces. A significant part of the work, i.e. measuring the round trip times, is done in parallel.
Using DNS traces allows us to find hosts that are actually in use. This gives us the advantage
that our topology has a strong emphasis on machines that are important for Internet users.
To select landmarks we used CoMon [PP06] to find alive lightly loaded Planet-Lab nodes. How-
ever, it turned out that some of them nevertheless had more or less permanent problems. The
overall poor dependability of Planet-Lab nodes as observed by Warns et al. in [WSH08] is a gen-
eral problem that limits the number of available landmarks significantly. Some of the problems
we encountered are:
• a firewalls blocked MySQL traffic
• a gateway blocked traffic between the commercial Internet and Internet2
• package manager (YUM) problems caused iptables not to be started (Planet-Lab nodes are
running Fedora Linux)
• slow or overloaded nodes produced measurements with a high deviation
• nodes which are not up and running during the complete measurement process
To improve the quality of our topologies, we took several measures to get rid of poor measure-
ments:
• Landmarks with too few measurements were excluded.
• Landmarks with a too high standard deviation in the round trip times to nodes in our own
network were excluded.
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• We used a genetic algorithm to find a good selection of landmark nodes. Starting with a
random selection we mutated 1/8 of the selection of landmarks a dozen times. Then we
evaluated the fitness of the generation. At the end we used the best generation found so
far. Of course, this algorithm does not guarantee an optimal solution, but it is easy to run
in parallel and it can be seen, that after a rather small number of generations (5-10) hardly
any further improvement can be reached.
From the remaining landmarks, we took the measurements and used GNP to calculate node
coordinates. We tried to find the best number of dimensions and landmarks to get a precise, i.e.,
realistic, topology (see Section 3.3.3). However, these measures are limited by the number of
landmarks available.
Results
When running TopDNS, there are two things to optimize: (1) to maximize the number of nodes
in the topology, and (2) to minimize the error on the delay or distance estimation.
The number of nodes is in our case limited by the number of names we can extract from the
DNS traces and the reachability of these names. In Figure 5.11 it can be seen that DNS only
resolved 85.54% of the names. Of course, without having an IP address, we cannot use them
in the topology since we cannot estimate their position. Such non-resolvable names stem from
users providing non-existing names in address fields of browsers or outdated links in the Internet.
Another source is the standard behavior of many browsers to append the local domain to relative
names that could not be resolved. Hence, if a name cannot be resolved, it often apprears twice
in the DNS trace. Sometimes browsers also try to resolve IPv6 addresses if the local system
supports this protocol stack. However, as we explored in [PMF08], this has hardly any chance
to succeed.
Another thing that can be seen in Figure 5.11 is that DNS problems cannot be the only reason of
nodes been excluded from the topology since altogether only 65.89% of the nodes are resolved
and responding to ICMP pings (34.11% did not respond to ICMP ping and 19.65% did not
resolve to an IP address). However, even out of this fraction not all nodes are usable since the
nodes would have to respond to all landmarks, which is often not the case.
Please note that we exclude any names of e-mail blacklists and search engines that are provided
in the case of DNS failures. We have seen many samples in our DNS traces, where spam filters
query DNS to search a black list for an e-mail sender’s host name. Therefore, we exclude all
names that resolved to local IP addresses, which are usually answers from spam black lists
or otherwise not usable anyway. Furthermore, we had to exclude the OpenDNS search page,
which was often returned when otherwise an NXDOMAIN error would have been returned by a
standard DNS server. These cases are included in the failures in Figure 5.11.
In Figure 5.12 one can see, how many pings were sent by each landmark and how many of them
returned a result. We have used a trace with about 368,000 names. Even the best Planet-Lab
nodes were only able to resolve about 250,000. Some hosts were so overloaded or unavailable
that they were not even able to try all names. Note that we used CoMon to select Planet-Lab
nodes without any problems at the beginning. An interesting observation is that some of the
nodes had hardly any success even when trying all names. We mentioned the reasons for this
phenomenon in Section 5.4.3.







          34.11%
Figure 5.11: success rate of node name resolution and measurement
Besides the number of successful pings, we also used the standard deviation of ping measure-
ments as a fitness function to exclude certain landmarks, even if they measured many distances
successfully. In Figure 5.13 one can see the measured distribution of the standard deviation. One
can see that the deviation grows continuously until about 15 and then grows significantly. We
used this threshold and excluded all nodes with a standard deviation of more than 15, which is a
very defensive value given the fluctuation of round trip times in the Internet and an extraordinary
defensive value given the load variations on Planet-Lab nodes [WSH08].
Trying to minimize the error of the pairwise latency estimation also influences the number of
nodes available for the topology. Note that we use a specific notation of landmarks and dimen-
sions to name our experiments, e.g., 3d4l means that an Euclidian space with 3 dimensions is
used and 4 landmarks to estimate the coordinates.
In Figure 5.14 one can see how many nodes were usable for a topology with different numbers
of dimensions and landmarks. Some nodes, that we called outliers have shown a deviation
between calculated and measured distance to the landmarks of more then 10%. These nodes are
not used later on. We are convinced that this threshold is selected very conservatively, given the
deviations we have seen in our distance measurements.
The overall trend is that the number of usable nodes decreases with growing number of land-
marks. The reason is, that the probability of a node being measured from all selected landmarks
decreases with each additional landmark (see Figure 5.12). This has an even stronger influence
when the number of landmarks is very small.
Nevertheless, sometimes it can be found, that with a higher number of landmarks even more
nodes are usable, e.g. with 11 and 15 dimensions. The reason is, that with more landmarks the
coordinate calculation can be improved. Hence, the number of outliers decreases. The relative
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Figure 5.12: Number of pings send by each landmark vs. successful pings
amount of outliers among the nodes can be seen in Figure 5.15.
To achieve a good quality of the topology, as mentioned before, we have to keep the error in the
calculated distances low. We compared the pairwise error in the distances between landmarks
for different configurations of dimensions and landmark numbers to find out what is a reasonable
choice. The trade-off here is that a higher number of dimensions reduces the performance of the
distance calculations while it offers more precision. Even if the additional cost for more dimen-
sions was not important for us, it turns out that more then 15 dimensions are not contributing
any improvement anymore as can be seen in Figure 5.16. It shows the CDF of the pair-wise link
delay estimation error. It can clearly be seen that 2 or 3 dimensions are not providing a good
latency estimation.
We also tried to decide, whether it would be good to have more landmarks than d + 1 for
d dimensions. In Figure 5.17 it can be seen that a better precision can be reached, if more
landmarks are used. However, this benefit is not as significant as could be expected since the
availability of high quality landmarks is limited. We sorted the landmarks to be used by number
of measurements and standard deviation. With every additional landmark the overall quality of
landmarks decreases and so the overall increase of the topology’s precision is rather limited.
In Figure 5.16 one can see a comparison between different numbers of dimensions d where we
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Figure 5.13: standard deviation of landmark measurements
always selected d + 1 landmarks. It is obvious that for two and three dimensions there is a
significant error. Approximately 10% of the distances have an error of at least 100%, while for
more than 15 dimensions the amount of computed distances with such a deviation is negligible.
With seven dimensions, we reached much better results. 72.91% of the computed distances had
less then 10% error and only 4.1% had more than 100% error.
One can also see that we reached very similar results with 15, 17, and 19 dimensions. Between
71.86% and 84.42% of the distances had an error of less than 10%. With 15 dimensions and
20 landmarks we even had no computed distances which had more than 92.5% error. Note that
we never created any topology with more than 21 landmarks due to the restricted availability of
good landmarks.
In Figure 5.18 one can see that for an equal number of dimensions, more landmarks are an ad-
vantage. However, having more dimensions is not an advantage in general. With 15 dimensions
and 20 landmarks, we see the best result, while if we would only have 16 landmarks, it would
be better to reduce the number of dimensions. One can see that with 11 dimensions we reached
better results than with 16 landmarks for 15 dimensions.
We also tried to find hints to be able to create better DNS name-space-based transit-stub-topologies
as proposed in [PFH07]. Therefore, we selected three times 500,000 links and classified them
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Figure 5.14: Nodes measured with sufficient precision vs. outliers in total numbers
based on the names of the two peers to be intra-stub (IS) for names within the same 2nd-level
domain, stub-transit (ST) for names in the same top level domain, or intra-transit (IT) otherwise.
Statistics Intra Stub Stub-Transit Intra Transit
mean 50.76 ms 86.90 ms 110.82 ms
standard deviation 74.65 62.57 72.54
median 10.40 ms 75.72 ms 112.29 ms
Table 5.1: measured statistics for DNS name-based transit-stub-topologies
As one can see in Table 5.1, there is always a significant standard deviation. However, the
median suggests that similar names have most of the time a shorter distance to each other. The
mean however indicates that there are outliers with high link delay in the IS and TS statistics.
For the IT links the mean is even smaller then the median, which indicates that there are some
very small link delays decreasing it. It is however difficult to represent in a transit-stub-topology
that some nodes in different stubs are tightly connected.
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Figure 5.15: Nodes measured with sufficient precision vs. outliers
Conclusions
We use DNS traces and Planet-Lab nodes to generate realistic Internet topologies using TopDNS.
There are several critical points where wrong assumptions can lead to poor precision in the
generated topology.
When using DNS traces as sources to learn node names used in the Internet, it is not possible
to include all nodes found in the trace. The reasons are manyfold, but sometimes only 50% of
them are included in a topology.
When using Planet-Lab landmarks, it is important to know that their workload sometimes is
unstable and therefore, the precision of round trip time measurements is decreased. Also uptime
is a critical point here. Planet-Lab nodes cannot be expected to take measurements over a long
period of time. Hence, landmarks have to be sorted out using different criteria before using there
measurements for coordinate calculation.
The number of dimensions is also a critical choice. TopDNS works best with 15 dimensions.
We cannot exclude that it would work even better with more dimensions if more high precision
landmarks would be available.
Creating good transit-stub-topologies is still challenging and needs further research. However,



















Figure 5.16: Pairwise relative error for d+1 landmarks
realistic Internet topologies, as TopDNS is creating them, have many advantages in comparison
to transit-stub-topologies. They represent a part of the real Internet. Results of simulations on
such topologies offer a much more direct insight in the behavior of a system in the Internet.
Furthermore, network information, like host names and real IP addresses, are already available
in the simulation.
5.4.4 Stretch of P2P Systems on TopDNS-Based Realistic Topologies
To understand the performance results of our DNSPastry implementation on Planet-Lab, we
repeated our simulation on top of a realistic Internet topology, created by TopDNS, containing
187,414 nodes. The results are shown in Figure 5.21. The stretch for random pings in DNSPastry
turned out to be approximately five times worse than in our transit-stub simulation.
These simulation results explain why our deployment of DNSPastry on Planet-Lab has not been
successful. Of course, there are some options to improve the performance, e.g., selecting host
names based on geographic positions but this is not the purpose of a naming system.
















Figure 5.17: Pairwise relative error for different numbers of landmarks
Introduction
In recent years, peer-to-peer overlay networks have been used to implement applications, that
before have been implemented using client-server architecture. Such applications, like group
communication [RKCD01], web caching [IRD02, FM03], block storage [DKK+01], and e-mail
[MPHD06] should benefit from the increased reliability and connectivity of overlay networks.
One significant problem has been a correct evaluation of such systems using large scale sim-
ulation. Apart from the scalability of the simulator, a network topology must be chosen. For
Internet scale systems, this is difficult, because the Internet is a large dynamic network with
an unknown, continuously changing topology. Often a selection of known networks and nodes
is used to extract certain characteristics, like connectivity, distance distribution, bandwidth dis-
tribution, etc. These properties are then scaled up to match the estimated Internet size or the
targeted deployment size of the overlay application.
During simulations, there are three gaps that limit the validity of the results: (1) the gap between
Internet addresses and addresses in abstract topologies, (2) the gap between real workloads and
abstract workloads, and (3) the gap between Internet characteristics and community characteris-
tics.
The first and second are caused by the common procedure of simulating the application’s behav-
ior on the overlay using workloads from earlier client-server implementations. This procedure

















Figure 5.18: Pairwise relative error of the most precise solutions
does not work properly, if the workload contains references to the network topology, e.g., IP
addresses, host names, network masks, etc. Hence, an abstraction of these workloads must be
produced.
The third problem is, that for certain applications, only a very limited group of Internet hosts
is important. The statistical network characteristics of this group might be different from the
characteristics of the overall Internet. E.g., if an illegal file sharing application for movies shall
be simulated, the community of participating nodes might consist of nodes with DSL dial-up
connections having good bandwidth but poor responsiveness (high delay, high jitter). None
of them would be well connected to the Internet. If one would use an overlay that depends
on using nodes with a high outdegree as supernodes (e.g. [TnM06]), this might work well in
simulations on a general Internet topology, but in our example, the reality is that no such node
would participate in the overlay application. Therefore the simulation results might be very
promising, but the implementation would not meet it’s performance goals.
We present an approach, in which, we use TopDNS [PF09] to use a workload, i.e., DNS traces,
to discover nodes that belong to the community of participating nodes. This is reasonably since
almost all distributed applications would look up names of their participants using DNS. Then,
we use Planet-Lab nodes as landmarks, to determine their network coordinates, i.e., to determine
the topology. The topology generated consists of real Internet nodes, that are identifiable by
network addresses, which actually participate in the application, i.e., DNS. It condenses network
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TLDs, sorted by number of names per TLD
Figure 5.19: Ratio of names per TLD over second level subdomains in this TLD
information, like IP routing paths, to pairwise delay between nodes in the topology.
We then simulate several overlay networks within a latency-aware simulator. We found that
overlay performance in simulation is lower than published results. We theorize that this is be-
cause previous simulations were conducted with unrealistic topologies.
Topology Characteristics
The characteristics of a realistic topology must reflect the characteristics of the community of
participating nodes. In our case, we used a DNS trace, which mainly contains data produced by
web and e-mail services.
Since DNS traces usually are biased with respect to the location of the resolvers, we show our
bias in Figures 5.22 and 5.19. This is very useful to claim generality of our approach. If the
DNS trace would only reflect a very small community of interest, it would not be possible to
generalize the results. One can see that the DNS zones are represented in our trace according to
the expected size according to the ISC domain survey. However, the ranking is not exactly the
same, since the semantic of the ISC domain survey is a bit different. The ISC domain survey’s
methodology is slightly different from ours – it counts host names only while we count any
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names. Nevertheless, the ranking is similar.
Figure 5.22 shows the distribution of node names per top level domain (TLD). It is very heavy
tailed and we only present the largest TLDs. It can be seen, that the country code domain of
the place where the trace was recorded is ranked as second (de). However, according to the
ISC domain survey, the de domain is ranked 4th, after com, net, and jp, where the number of
subdomains is significantly higher in the de TLD than in jp.
Figure 5.19 shows the number of sub domains in the given TLDs over the total number of names
in this TLD. It can be seen, that TLDs differ a lot in this measurement. Some TLDs like uk and
au have many registered names, but few second level domains. The reason is that some registries
provide generic second level domains within a country code TLD, like co.uk [RS05].
Altogether, the DNS traces used to create a topology for our simulation are reasonably represen-
tative – even if the German TLD might be emphasized a bit too much.
Overlay Simulation
To examine the performance of existing overlays, we examined several existing overlays within
a modified PlanetSim framework. We ran simulations of Pastry, and DNSPastry within our
modified PlanetSim using topologies obtained with TopDNS. We measured the number of hops
and the stretch values for a simple benchmark application, which sends pings between random
pairs of nodes as well as for a DNS simulation of a real-world trace. The ping benchmark does
not exploit the additional locality properties of a name-space-based DHT on top of DNSPastry as
discussed in [PFH07]. Thus, this benchmark serves as an overhead measurement for DNSPastry.
In contrast to the ping benchmark, the DNS trace benchmark exploits this locality. The simulated
performance of DNSPastry, while an improvement over the ping benchmark is not a significant
improvement over Pastry.
The average round trip time, number of hops and stretch of overlays simulated on our network
are shown in Figures 5.20 and 5.21. Stretch of peer-to-peer networks, is the ratio between peer-
to-peer transmission delay and IP transmission delay; a lower stretch value typically results in
better query times and a reduction of unnecessary bandwidth consumption.
We observed a stretch for Pastry which is higher then other papers suggest: 1.4 is claimed in
[RD01]. 1.8 to 2.1 was found for Zipf-like distributed clusters in [HJS+03]. 1.2 to 2 was found
by [CDHR03].
The experiments were performed on a topology with randomly assigned coordinates. The au-
thors of [RD01] expected that a change to a more realistic topology would not drastically alter
Pastry’s performance.
The simulation results are worse than our original results for DNSPastry [PFH07], originally
simulated using transit-stub topologies (shown in Fig. 5.9c). Instead, they show DNSPastry to
be slightly worse than Pastry in stretch and number of hops for random pings, but better for the
DNS trace replay benchmark.
The stretch and latency for DNSPastry was surprising. The design was based on the phenomena
noted by Xu et. al. [XMH03] that hop count and hop latency are inversely related to one another
(shown in Fig. 5.20). DNSPastry was designed with the expectation that DNS names with
common substrings are local to one another and therefore there would be most hops would be
within a TLD, which we theorized would be of low latency.







































Figure 5.20: Average Number of Hops and round trip time
This phenomena is questionable within generic TLDs and ”Repurposed” Country Codes (rCC),
such as to, fm, and tv. As discussed in Section 5.4.4, generic TLDs have poor locality. We
theorize that prefix routing schemes, whose routing delay is dominated by the last hops, do not
efficiently prevent significant detours. In the case of DNSPastry, we believe this is because the
DNS based hash scheme quickly reduces the number of choices in routing, leading to more hops
to resolve a key, higher total latency and higher stretch.
Influence of the topology As described in Section 5.4.4 we simulated a simple ping applica-
tion within PlanetSim using a TopDNS topology. It contained of 187414 nodes and was created
using 15 dimensions and 20 Landmarks. We found different results than presented in [PFH07]
and [RD01]. Why is this the case? The straight answer is that the assumptions about the transit-
stub topology were wrong. Now we tried to find out, whether still some of the DNSPastry ideas
can be used to optimize routing decisions.
Is intra-TLD routing cheaper then inter-TLD routing, i.e., are nodes within a TLD likely to be
tightly coupled? Figure 5.23 shows the CDFs for RTT within TLDs. The RTTs are gener-
ally smaller for country code TLDs then for generic domains. A reason might be that content
providers try to minimize delays to offer a better user-perceived QoS and at the same time select
country code domains to match the local user’s habits, which is to memorize their local country
code. Note that there are exceptions, like in the US whose country code is rather unpopular/un-
populated according to the ISC domain survey.
























Figure 5.21: Stretch on a TopDNS topology
As already shown in Figure 5.22, the majority of names belongs to generic TLDs and therefore
the graph of the overall results in Figure 5.23 is dominated by generic TLD results.
Figure 5.24 shows the CDFs for pairwise distances of nodes in the same second-level domain
(with at least 200 nodes). The surprising result is that nodes in a within a second-level domain
in a generic TLD are more tightly coupled then nodes within a country code TLD. One reason
is that some second level country code domains use a deeper hierarchy, e.g., the jp,au, and uk
domains with subdomains like co.uk (see Figure 5.22). Therefore, some second level country
code domains do not show tight coupling. Another reason might be small businesses that use
shared hosting for their small dot-com homepages. However, the overall result shows that nodes
within a second level domain are usually close together, which should be a benefit for name-
space-aware overlays like DNSPastry. The fact, that the simulation did not show any benefits
out of this might be that there are not enough nodes within a second level domain to have a strong
influence on the leaf-set-routing of DNSPastry. At the same time, a low number of node within
a domain leads to sparsely filled routing tables. Therefore, Pastry, which has less constraints
there, can use the nodes’ routing state more efficiently.
In Figures 5.23 and 5.24, we additionally plotted TLD and subdomain distribution for the repur-
posed or seldom used country code domains to,us,tv,fm,am. These domains have a distribution
notably different from other country code domains.
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Figure 5.22: Number of third level subdomains per top level domain in our trace
We theorize that the main performance problem for DNSPastry is the fact that routing inside
the second level domain is much cheaper than outside of it. In [PFH07] we used a factor 10 to
express this phenomenon, which was probably much too small for many cases.
Using Locality in Overlays
Locality information is key to offering high performance overlay routing. A variety of ap-
proaches have been investigated to incorporate some form of locality information into these
networks. These approaches can be classified by the type of locality information they use:
(1) Global Topology Information: systems such as Toplus [GERB+03] and CAN [RFH+01]
explicitly use global topology information in routing or bootstrapping.
(2) Point Topology Information: systems such as Coral [FM03] and Pastry [RD01] attempt to
optimize for local topology based on a series of point measurements of the network, typically in
the form of round trip time measurements.
The goal of using both types of information is to optimize the overlay configuration to reduce
routing latency. The design challenges are different for these two types of information. With
















Figure 5.23: Pairwise distances of nodes within the same TLD
global topology information the challenge is forming a tractable view of global topology infor-
mation. With point topology information the challenge is choosing useful point measurements.
Based on our experimental results. We argue that point topology information is insufficient to
reduce stretch and increase overlay performance. Some form of global topology information is
necessary to achieve this goal.
We have shown that coordinates derived from large sets of point measurements offer a good
compromise between global and local information. They realistically encapsulate a view of
global network topology, in a tractable form.
Conclusion
We found that round trip times within generic TLDs are higher then within country code TLDs.
We also found that latency is higher within subdomains of country code TLDs than within sub-
domains of generic TLDs.
We simulated Pastry and DNSPastry overlays on a TopDNS generated topology using different
workloads. The results, in some cases, indicate poor latency and stretch for both our DNSPastry,
as well as for regular Pastry. Based on this result, we recommend that overlay networks attempt
to directly integrate global locality information through coordinates, rather than infer it through
















Figure 5.24: Pairwise distances of nodes within the same second Level Domains
point analysis such as pinging.
According to our topology analysis, routing is better done in a two stage process: (1) cooperative
use of routing state within one tighly coupled domain, which is often the second level domain,
but sometimes the third level domain, e.g., in the uk TLD, and (2) proximity or network coor-
dinate based routing outside of second level domains. The advantages are that the total routing
state of nodes in a second level domain can be exploited within a few very short hops, also in
generic TLDs, and that the network coordinates prevent inefficient long distance hops.
In the various simulation results we found that overlay simulation must be done on realistic
topologies, that reflect the community of hosts expected to participate in the overlay applica-
tion. Simulations run on synthetic transit-stub-topologies might lead to false assumptions and
disappointing application performance.
5.4.5 Summary
We implemented DNSPastry as application as well as in a simulation environment. We overes-
timated the performance of DNSPastry due to simulations on top of unrealistic topologies and
therefore, were surprised by the poor performance of the application. The development of a new
topology generator, TopDNS, helped us to understand the performance better and to improve
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the simulation. It now matches our experiences with the DNSPastry implementation and will
hopefully be very usefull in the future.
All results of this Section have been published, except the experiences with the implementation
and the simulation results on top of the TopDNS topology. However, the latter is submitted to a
conference (IEEE NCA 2009).
The performance of DNSPastry is, altogether, not better than Pastry’s performance. The im-
provements of better locality of leaf-set neighbors of DNSPastry is outweighted by the decreased
performance of the routing table. Pastry is able to fill the routing table more efficiently since
node IDs are stronger randomized by the hash algorithm.
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned, that DNSPastry offers some extentions compared to Pastry
and also compared to hierarchical Pastry rings as used in ePost: reduced connectivity for sim-
plified firewalling, and reduced visibility as well as routing locality for better privacy protection,
as explained in Section 5.2.1.
Chapter 6
A Cluster-Based Internet Naming
System
6.1 Motivation
Due to the high number of servers involved in resolving a name, DNS is not reaching a high
dependability. The reasons are manyfold as discussed in Section 2. Replacing the inflexible
DNS server structure with a peer-to-peer system is possible, but does not reach a comparable
performance as discussed in Section 4 and 5.
Using cloud computing concepts is another promising idea to be more flexible than client-server-
architecture and reach better performance than peer-to-peer systems since IP routing can directly
be used. Cloud computing is getting very popular nowadays with applications like Google apps,
storage solutions like Microsoft Sky drive, and computing resource solutions like Amazon’s
Elastic Compute Cloud. These examples show that cloud-architectures are already used to offer
application logic, storage, and CPU time to run the user’s custom applications.
Note that we do not want to do cloud computing. This would mean that we implement a DNS
service on some cloud, like Google App Engine or others. However, the following concepts of
cloud computing are interesting for improving DNS:
Location awareness Clients can connect to a nearby cluster. Direct communication between
clients and the cluster provides visibility of network addresses, which helps to estimate
network distances.
Scale out and scale up capabilities An increased demand can be served by scaling up a clus-
ter, creating a new one, or rebalancing user traffic. A peer-to-peer system only offers
scale up capabilities since setting up a second system would partition the bootstrapping
processes between these system and therefore, inter-overlay communication would need
dedicated proxies and therefore be very complicated and inefficient. However, e.g., for
privacy issues, one might want to create another system. With cloud computing, this is
not complicated since can be done on IP layer and therefore the bootstrapping process is
simplified.
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Together with an open protocol there could even be a competition between cluster operators in
the cloud.
The data mining approach that was presented in Chapter 3 could easily be transferred into a cloud
application. Several instances of such a service can exist – with or without cooperating. In the
following Sections, an architecture of such a system will be drafted. In comparison to the system
presented in Chapter 3, the goal is, to be able to deliver DNS data to clients in a timely man-
ner The main problems are, how to distribute data efficiently within a cluster, how to organize
client access, and which data processing and transformation to perform. The following Sections
contain ideas and proposals that have not been implemented yet. I do not claim completeness,
e.g., for the proposed data mining jobs. To implement such a system has unfortunately not been
possible as part of this thesis, but it will hopefully be a part of the Streammine EU project1. The
main contribution of this Chapter to a future implementation is to look at DNS data and analyze
access patterns, which could make load balancing inside a cluster difficult. Furthermore, some
pseudo code examples for data filtering are provided, to give an intuition about the programming
model of a Map/Reduce paradigm that does not consist of sequential processing steps.
6.1.1 Data Mining
A central advantage of our approach in comparison to the distributed DNS server infrastructure
is, that all or a significant amount of DNS data can be kept at one place. Therefore, it is much
easier to do data mining. An example to illustrate such capabilities could be Steven Bellovin’s
case [Bel95] against the missing connection between a address mapping in DNS and the back-
wards mapping from the address to the name. The example is a bit anachronistic since his
motivation was to show issues with host-based authentication, which is nowadays hardly used
anymore. Nevertheless, it illustrates our idea quite well.
Say there is a name, like host-x.tu-dresden.de and I run an Apache web server, with a confi-
dential web site2. I want to grant access to all hosts in the tu-dresden.de network. I could use
htaccess to do so.
Now if some attacker wants to get access from attacker.evil.ru she needs to pretend that she
belongs to the tu-dresden.de network. Let’s assume she has her own DNS zone where at-
tacker.evil.ru points to 12.21.31.14, which is the attacker’s host’s IP address. When she con-
nects to the Apache, the server can see the IP in the IP header and looks for a hostname in
14.31.21.12.in-addr.arpa. Unfortunately this address is in a zone which is also operated by the
attacker. It could easily be set up to point to host-x.tu-dresden.de and access would be granted.
It is very trivial to find this kind of fraud using a little data mining. In this case it is enough to
find out that there is no address mapping from host-x.tu-dresden.de to 12.21.31.14.
However, in the DNS architecture there is no way for the name server of tu-dresden.de to prevent
another name server to emit mappings. But if the resolver asks a cluster, which prefetches,
checks, and caches DNS mappings, the cluster could easily find the fraud and stop emitting the
problematic mapping.
There are two central ideas here:
1FP7-216181, http://www.streamproject.eu
2The same example would work for many other services. This is not a particular Apache issue.
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Problem Workaround
wrong e-mail address in SOA entry provide address of the operator’s mailing list, if there
is actually mail coming in, process it manually or
create automatic answers
wrong primary name server select a random name server from this zone
serial not increased with update set up a time-based serial
local IP address in A record do not propagate this record, except e.g. for local-
host
records with very small TTLs determine purpose. If it is a CDN, determine lo-
cation of client and deliver the right entry. If it is
for load balancing, deliver the set of records to each
client.
TTL too long set to maximum TTL, optional: send e-mail to oper-
ator
lame records (NS, MX, ...) try to find alternatives, e.g., if there are three NS
records, and one has no address, do deliver the re-
maining two only
CNAME chain collapse the chain and deliver a mapping from the
requested name to the end of the chain
CNAME cycle do not deliver (send NXDOMAIN, no SERVFAIL -
otherwise clients will retry)
Table 6.1: Some examples for improving correctness issues automatically
Local access The cluster can do very efficient data mining because the data is locally available.
On top of a peer-to-peer infrastructure this would be more difficult. Lookups could be
done efficiently in a distributed and parallel manner, but matching of entries would be less
efficient, due to the high amounts of data that would have to be transferred.
Centralized access The clients are connected to the cluster directly. Hence, no attacker can
bypass information that has not been checked. In contrast to this, peer-to-peer systems
still suffer from Sybil and eclipse attacks [Dou02, SCRD04]. This would allow a powerful
insider to disconnect a victim completely from any honest node.
Using these two very simple ideas, the cluster can provide vital functionality to the naming
system:
Enforcing correctness Whenever a record is requested by a client, it can be checked for cor-
rectness. There is a set of rules in the DNS RFCs3 that define the syntax of DNS resource
records. These rules can be checked and if they are violated, the cluster software can implement
workarounds as shown in Table 6.1.
3There is a very handy collection available on http://www.dns.net/dnsrd/rfc/.
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Detecting fraud There are several kinds of fraud using DNS. For our cluster-based approach
we need to deal with two kinds of fraud:
(1) Faked Records that are handcrafted for certain clients and not delivered to the general public,
e.g., a DNS server is lying to certain clients. (2) Bogus Records that are globally visible.
In the first case, we just need to connect all users/customers to DNS via our cluster. The cluster
is than an indirection between a malicious name server and a client. If the malicious name server
is lying to certain spiders, this must be detected by comparing the data. It is important to tell
such a fraud from content distribution networks, where different spiders would also see different
data for the same query. It might also be the case, that this particular server has missed an update
through a network failure and therefore delivers an old mapping. In this case a comparison with
older data in the cluster and the serial of the SOA record might help.
In the second case, manipulated records are visible for everybody. Hence, the cluster would
see them too – no matter which spider is used – and could use data mining for detection and to
raise an alert, if there is some fraud going on. Suspicious cases could be that a name server is
announced which is not similar to the previously known name servers or that IP addresses are
used which are in different networks than before. Of course, this could also be the case if the
provider/owner of the record changes the ISP. There are several additional checks that can be
performed – like trying to set up an SSL connection or comparing the geographic region of the
new IP addresses to the old ones.
Typical examples for DNS-based fraud are inserted bogus record and typo squatting. While typo
squatting can be done registering legal names, inserting bogus records with malicious intent
often involves penetrating a DNS server, intercepting and rewriting DNS messages, or using
cache poisoning techniques.
Verifying signatures The cluster can verify record signatures once for all clients. This reduces
the workload on clients and local servers. Between the cluster and the client, only one message
has to be authorized per request. Hence, the client needs to trust the cluster and the message must
be protected by a signature. This shortens the authentication chain. It also allows the cluster to
reuse records, that have already been checked.
Delivering authenticated data The cluster itself must be able to sign data for two reasons.
(1) DNS data might not always be signed, e.g., by a DNSSEC implementation. To transfer it
securely to a client and to allow a reuse of signatures, it must be signed.
(2) DNS data that is already signed can be signed again by the cluster to reduce the number of
signatures that a client needs to check. This also reduces the amount of data that is sent to the
client. Hence, a client would check the cluster’s certificate with the help of a certification author-
ity (CA) and the message signature instead of additionally checking the whole DNS delegation
chain.
6.2 Main Problems
To build a cluster appliance with high availability it is important to accept node failures as
part of normal operations. The cluster software should therefore be built in a way that allows
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hash map nodes min max mean std dev median
SHM, SHA-1 64 15388.0 15992.0 15625.0 141.07962403359429 15603.5
DHT, SHA-1 64 3732.0 54530.0 15625.0 11860.415644902218 11863.5
Table 6.2: Number of items per bucket: DHT versus stable hash map, 256 buckets
quick recovery. The concept of decoupled crash-only software should help here. To support a
continuous operation in the presence of node failures, nodes have to be replicated. It is important
to prevent diminished redundancy, i.e., a replica should not depend on the same switch or the
same power supply as other replicas of the same data.
Apart from availability, the central problem is to find an efficient way to do load shedding.
6.2.1 Scalability
We plan to have a constant number of hash buckets in our cluster. These buckets are not identical
with physical nodes. In contrast to DHTs, we use a stable hash map (SHM), where items are
not handed over from one bucket into another one. This is not necessary since we have a central
control over the cluster and there is much less churn in comparison to peer-to-peer systems. The
SHM is used to balance storage and processing load among cluster nodes.
Load balancing must be done during operation. The reason is, that even a very good hash
function such as SHA-1 cannot distribute DNS entries perfectly balanced in a hash table, as it
is shown in Figure 6.2.1. For this experiment I took 106 lines from a DNS trace, extracted the
unique names that have been looked up, and computed the hash of these owner names. It can be
seen that the number of items in a hash bucket varies roughly between 350 and 470.
In Table 6.2 I compare distributed hash tables, where host IDs were generated randomly, as often
done in DHT-based overlays (or by hashing IP addresses), to the same experiment for a stable
hash map (SHM). To create this data, I took 106 names from a DNS trace and computed the
number of items per host for 256 buckets on 64 nodes. The comparison shows that the stable
hash map is much more balanced than the DHT. The balance depends on the hash algorithm and
on the distribution of the 256 buckets on the available nodes.
Table 6.3 shows the experiment where there is one bucket per node. The balance now only
depends on the hash algorithm as it did in Figure 6.2.1. It can be seen that MD5 cannot keep up
with the competition here.
Table 6.4 takes popularity of names into account, i.e., it does not count items per bucket but
rather requests per bucket. We ran 106 requests from a DNS trace with 256 buckets, which is
one bucket per node, to focus on the properties of the hash function. The table also contains the
time it took to calculate the hashes for this experiment to get an idea about a trade-off between
CPU time and load balancing results, which seem not to exist. In this case, MD5 is not as bad
as before but still not among the best.
Now it can be seen that taking the requests into account, instead of the pure number of items
in a bucket, load balancing gets more difficult. This is due to the fact that popularity of web
objects follows a Power-law distribution [BCF+99] and many DNS resolvers often have addi-
tional highly-frequent names to resolve, like SPAM black-lists. The comparison between Table






















































































































































































Figure 6.1: Balancing problems with a SHA-1 on DNS names with 256 buckets, graph ignores
popularity of names
hash map nodes min max mean std dev median
SHA 256 3661.0 4110.0 3906.25 69.6396326194542 3911.0
SHA-1 256 3661.0 4110.0 3906.25 69.6396326194542 3911.0
SHA-256 256 3739.0 4068.0 3906.25 62.8420366365337 3904.0
SHA-512 256 3739.0 4082.0 3906.25 62.0640402974155 3901.5
MD 2 256 3727.0 4079.0 3906.25 61.9258886595461 3904.5
MD 5 256 3652.0 6501.0 3906.25 244.570852639443 3846.0
Table 6.3: Number of items per bucket: Hash Algorithm comparison, 256 buckets
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hash algorithm n min max mean std dev time
SHA 256 1387.0 33881.0 3906.25 3131.525286439157 1682 ms
SHA1 256 1387.0 33881.0 3906.25 3131.525286439157 1296 ms
SHA-256 256 1433.0 35671.0 3906.25 3220.225237524878 1654 ms
SHA-384 256 1703.0 41410.0 3906.25 3759.167393213034 2049 ms
SHA-512 256 1655.0 34824.0 3906.25 3107.165413975239 1906 ms
MD2 256 1841.0 33894.0 3906.25 3220.941434656984 6967 ms
MD5 256 1496.0 33982.0 3906.25 3428.640398232535 979 ms
Table 6.4: Number of items per bucket, taking popularity of DNS names into account
6.3 and Table 6.4 shows that this leads to a 50 times increased standard deviation. It can also be
seen that MD5 can be a good choice in terms of CPU time. Although it has shown a very high
standard deviation Table 6.3, it is quite competitive when popularity, i.e., query characteristics
are taken into account.
The conclusion of these experiments is that the hash algorithm alone cannot balance the load.
Additionally it must be possible to ship buckets from one cluster node to another. Therefore,
our research group plans to uses virtual nodes (VNodes) in the SHM to host the hash buckets: If
the load on a cluster node gets too high, VNodes can be relocated to other physical nodes in the
cluster.
6.2.2 Bootstrapping
In DNS, bootstrapping is done with a list of root servers that is contained in the installation
package of each name server. From any server that is alive, a more up-to-date list can be fetched.
This is, e.g., similar to the bootstrapping and the super peer selection in the Kazaa network4.
There, each client comes with a list of super peers. If at least one of them can be reached, a new
list can be fetched from this server.
Since name service clusters would be much more stable than file sharing peers, such a list would
have only very little churn in our case. After finding clusters that can be used, it must be decided
which cluster should be used under which conditions as discussed in Section 6.3.1.
6.3 Architecture
Each cluster consists of core nodes, which are responsible for hosting VNodes and proxies,
which are responsible for translating queries and responses for any desired legacy protocols, as
shown in Figure 6.3. An example for their use is, of course, DNS. The proxies can also be
pushed further towards the client. Therefore, an access network must be created, which allows
caching, exploiting locality of user groups, and which reduces the load on the cluster.
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Figure 6.2: Top-Level architecture of a cluster solution
6.3.1 Access Network
For performance and dependability reasons, there must be several clusters as depicted in Figure
6.3.1. This architecture also allows a competition between various ISPs who offer such a service
for the cloud. The client itself has to decide, which cluster is chosen for a certain request. This
can be done based on proximity and content:
Proximity A client can select a cluster based on its geographic location. Therefore, a list with
addresses would be needed for comparison. This list is the result of the bootstrapping
process.
If a cluster is selected based on proximity, WAN network traffic and update delays would
be reduced and cluster providers could provision their clusters based on the number of
local users.
Content If DNS registrars use an interface to update data in a cluster, it would be sensible that
they do it only for one cluster – as you update your DNS entries only in one DNS zone.
Clients would need a way to find the mapping from names or DNS zones to clusters. The
naive way to implement this is, to give each client a private map or a directory. They
would have to memorize the location of DNS names based on previous encounters. The
size of such a data structure would be limited by the number of resolved names or the











Figure 6.3: Cluster selection, two routing tables: content-based vs. proximity-based
If the DNS name is used as a key, there might be up to 700 million mappings according
to the ISC domain survey. According to our own experience with DNS traces it would
rather be a stable set of 350,000 names. The reason is, that not each computer, which has
a name is ever used by another used resolving it with DNS. If each entry takes 80 Bytes
for storage, this would sum up to roughly 54 GByte for the ISC numbers and 26 MByte
for our numbers, the latter of which would easily fit into the RAM of modern desktop
computers.
If the cluster address is used as a key, one can use a bloom filter for each cluster. The size
of the bloom filter must be adapted to the number of items that is going to be stored in
it. For 350,000 names, a bloom filter of 224 bits per cluster would be sufficient, assuming
an optimal number of hash function of k = m/nln2, as it is shown in Figure 6.3.1. If
700 million names are expected, 236 bits might be required, which is too much for a
off-the-shelf workstation’s RAM.
The trade-off here is between memory consumption and lookup time. If the name is the
key, it can be looked up in O(log N) steps (in a hash map or with sorted keys). If the
cluster is used as a key, all bloom filters must be searched for a name in the worst case.
However, the number of clusters would probably be in the order of magnitude of a few
dozen. Therefore, the latter alternative would probably be more feasible.
A cluster selection based on names would allow to reduce the storage requirements per
cluster since names would not have to be stored redundantly. On the other hand, data
mining would then be much more difficult.


















Figure 6.4: False positive probability for bloom filters, Figure made by Zbigniew Jerzak
If the cluster providers cooperate and allow each other to be notified about updates, the proximity-
based cluster selection would be a good choice, even though there would be much redundancy.
On the other hand, content-based partitioning would allow cluster operators to be more egoistic
and still provides reasonable access times of a caching network.
6.3.2 Data Mining
As already mentioned in Section 6.1.1, an important advantage of the cluster architecture is the
centralized view on the DNS data. Therefore, it should not be partitioned among clusters. It can
be used to protect clients from fraud and wrong configurations. Examples can be found in Table
6.1 on page 131.
In Figure 6.3.2 one can see a DNS spider at the left, as already introduced in Figure 6.3. The
spider finds DNS data in the Internet using methods explained in Section 3.3.1. It sends results
to the edge routers of a cluster. These routers use a SHM to find the VNodes that are responsible
for the given names.
Inside VNodes there are data mining jobs, i.e., incoming data is volatile in this system and
queries, i.e., data mining jobs, are persistent – in contrast to data bases, where the situation is
















Figure 6.5: Data mining in VNodes
hard disks) of a VNode provides historic data for comparison. This is important for continuous
map/reduce jobs to decide, whether data has been seen before or indeed was updated. In the case
of an update, the different map/reduce jobs take measures to serve data to clients. Therefore,
client caches are notified about updates and new jobs are sent to spiders in the case that new data
has to be looked up.
In comparison to the Hadoop-based implementation presented in Section 3.3.1, the continuous
map/reduce paradigm would allow updates to be visible instantly to client caches whenever new
data arrives at the cluster. With a batch-mode map/reduce, there is always a significant delay
between newly arrived data and the results of data mining jobs. To allow such a continuous
processing, the runtime environment cannot deliver all input splits continuously to all mappers.
Instead, there must be a mechanism, which allows to find old data for matching keys and provide
it to map/reduce jobs.
6.3.3 Continuous Map/Reduce Examples
To illustrate the idea of continuous map/reduce in the domain of naming systems, we want to
discuss some examples here. The function output.write(DNSRecord record, boolean visibility)
illustrates that there is a way to store DNS records in the cluster without making them visible
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Listing 6.1: TTL overflow checker
void map(KeyType key, DNSRecord record, DNSRecord oldRecord, StreamType
output){
if(record.ttl > MAXTTL && oldRecord.ttl <= MAXTTL )
out.write(key, record)
if(oldRecord.ttl > MAXTTL && record.ttl <= MAXTTL )
out.write(key, record)
}
void reduce(KeyType key, Collection<DNSRecord> records, StreamType output){










to clients. This is very useful, because often historic data is needed for comparison, even if its
quality might not be sufficient to show it to clients.
TTL overflow checking As discussed in Section 3 from page 47 on, there exist DNS records
with invalid TTLs. These are values that are not representable as a positive signed 32-bit integer.
The map reduce code for a TTL overflow checker would look like the pseudo code in Listing
6.1 It does:
Map: Map all incoming DNS records with TTLs higher then MAXTTL, i.e. 231− 1, and those
which had such a TTL before.
Reduce: Reduce invalid TTLs to 231 − 1. Store invalid records for later analysis and emit
corrected and valid records for clients.
Lame delegation checking When a DNS server delegates authority over a sub zone to another
server, it sends an NS record for the subzone together with an A record for the name server. If
this A record does not exist, it is a lame delegation because the resolver is not able to send a
request to the name server indicated by the NS record. Listing 6.2 shows the pseudocode for the
map and reduce functions:
Map: Emit all A records with the owner as key and all NS records with the rdata field as key.
Reduce: For all reduce groups that contain an NS record, but no A record, do not emit the NS
record to clients.
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Listing 6.2: Lame delegation checker







void reduce(KeyType key, Collection<DNSRecord> records, StreamType output){
Collection<DNSRecord> nsRecords
boolean havingAddress = false









if(nsRecords.length > 0 && havingAddress == true){





The purpose is to prevent clients from sending additional requests asking for the A record of the
name server since these queries could not be answered anyway. The hope for the resolvers it,
that at least one of the delegations works fine. In this case the map/reduce job helps to select
a valid delegation at the first try. An extention to this algorithm would be not to emit local or
private IP addresses in A records in the mapper since resolvers usually can not follow them.
Filter non-routable IP addresses Often local or private IP addresses are found in DNS zones.
This happens when a DHCP server updates a zone file and the zone file is not separated from the
external view of the zone. Reasons can be configuration issues or just laziness of administrators.
Of course, it is not very usable to show these entries to remote resolvers.
Map: Emit all A records and all AAAA records, if IPv6 support is needed, (Listing 6.3) that are
currently pointing to non-routable networks or that have pointed to non-routable networks
before.
Reduce: Listing 6.3 shows the pseudocode of the reduce function: Do not emit non-routable
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Listing 6.3: non-routable IP addresses
void map(KeyType key, DNSRecord record, DNSRecord oldRecord, StreamType
output){








void reduce(KeyType key, Collection<DNSRecord> records, StreamType output){








addresses to clients but emit records to clients that contain routable addresses.
6.4 Summary
A cluster-based name server solution based on cloud concepts has been presented here. Its
advantages in comparison to DNS are:
centralized architecture All data can be stored in one place. Therefore, the iterative of recur-
sive resolving strategies of DNS are not needed. A request is just sent to the cluster and is
there answered with local information. This contributes to better performance and higher
resilience to configuration errors.
data mining capabilities In contrast to DNS, all data is gathered in one cluster – there might
be many of them. The high bandwidth connections within each cluster provide improved
data mining capabilities. Huge amounts of data can be searched, sorted, and joined or
correlated locally.
Its advantages in comparison to peer-to-peer solutions are:
optimal routing The communication between clients and the cluster can be done using IP ad-
dressing and routing. Therefore, it is more efficient than overlay routing.
scale out capabilities For reasons of scalability and the laws of a free market, it is an advantage
to be able to set up several clusters. Due to the IP addressing and routing, this is much
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easier than connecting to several overlay networks. E.g., for being connected to two peer-
to-peer networks, one has to maintain the routing information for both networks. Of
course, this has to be kept up-to-date. Hence, the overlay maintenance traffic is doubled.
In a cluster-based solution, there is only one routing state, which is already contained in
the network layer. On the application layer, only a very simple routing state has to be kept,
as discussed in Section 6.3.1.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The main theses that are presented in this work are:
• Peer-to-peer overlays are not usable to replace DNS completely without performance
degradations.
• Peer-to-peer overlays do not provide advantages that make them useful to complement
DNS to reduce average response times.
• DNS contains many configuration errors. Therefore, as little data as possible should be
used to configure it. This is contrary to what the new DNSSEC standard will produce.
• A cloud computing concept can combine data mining capabilities with flexible cluster
selection. Precisely, a peer-to-peer overlay could be used for a backup service discovery,
but not for DNS lookups, due to the poor performance.
In this thesis, a thourough investigation about the usability of peer-to-peer systems to replace
or complement DNS was given. Overlay routing and bootstrapping strategies to reach better
responsiveness and shorter round trip times were presented. A new DHT-based peer-to-peer sys-
tem, i.e., DNSPastry was implemented and evaluated by simulation. The evaluation techniques
have been improved considerably be implementing a novel multi-purpose topology generator,
TopDNS, for network simulations.
Simulation results show that there is no considerable improvement over already known tech-
niques, even for workloads that are biased with respect to locality. Therefore, it is concluded,
that peer-to-peer networks, at the current state of development, are not usable to implement
services like DNS.
Peer-to-peer networks have also been used to complement the functionality of DNS to reach
a better availability. However, in this thesis it is shown, that DNS can also be used in a way
that reaches the same quality of service without any out-of-band communication via overlay
networks.
Often the poor dependability of DNS is connected to erroneous configurations. In this thesis, a
system is presented, which can analyse huge amounts of DNS data. Many typical configuration
issues can be found easily. Sometimes, even very surprising issues are found, e.g., TTL values,
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which are higher than the allowed 231 − 1. Proposals are presented, how DNS can be used in a
more robust way, preventing the most obvious shortcomings.
For a continuous data mining and a delivery of refined, checked, and robust DNS data to clients,
a concept is discussed, which is able to exploit the findings of this thesis to establish a better
Internet naming service.
7.1 Scientific publications
Scientific publications (full papers) that presented parts of the results of this thesis are:
• [FPJ05]: Christof Fetzer, Gert Pfeifer, and Trevor Jim: Enhancing DNS Security using
the SSL Trust Infrastructure Proceeding of the IEEE International Workshop on Object-
oriented Real-time Dependable Systems (WORDS 2005) , 2005
• [PFJ05]: Gert Pfeifer, Christof Fetzer, and Trevor Jim: Using SSL for Secure Domain
Name System (DNS) Transactions Transactions of the VSB - Technical University of
Ostrava, 2005
• [PFS06]: Gert Pfeifer, Christof Fetzer, and Martin Steuer: Rearchitecting DNS Proceed-
ings of I2CS’2006, 2006
• [PFH07]: Gert Pfeifer, Christof Fetzer, and Thomas Hohnstein: Exploiting Host Name
Locality for Reduced Stretch P2P Routing 6th IEEE International Symposium on Network
Computing and Architectures (IEEE NCA07) , 2007
• [PMF08]: Gert Pfeifer, André Martin, and Christof Fetzer: Reducible Complexity in DNS
Proceedings of the IADIS International Conference WWW/Internet 2008, 2008
• [PF09] Gert Pfeifer and Christof Fetzer: Experiences Building Internet-based Topologies
with GNP Proceedings of the IEEE International Workshop on Quantitative Evaluation of
large-scale Systems and Technologies , 2009
• submitted to the 8th IEEE International Symposium on Network Computing and Archi-
tectures (IEEE NCA09), 2009: Gert Pfeifer, Ryan Spring and Christof Fetzer, Towards
Improved Overlay Simulation Using Realistic Topologies
7.1.1 Awards
For the presentation of [PFJ05] I received a Laureate Award for the best contribution of PhD.
students.
7.2 Future Work
7.2.1 Evaluation of DNS Server Behavior
As we have shown in [PFS06], reduced timeouts can help to decrease average response times
of DNS requests. However, this might produce other problems on a macroscopic level. As
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already discussed by [DOK92], [BCN01], [JSBM01], and [PHA+04] the Internet shows huge
amounts of DNS queries. The main reasons are the very persistent retry strategies of DNS
servers and bogus queries, caused by typos or configuration errors, but in some cases also DNS
server configuration issues leading to cycles in a resolution.
If many DNS resolvers in a LAN use a rather short timeout, the DNS traffic in the LAN would
increase. Since LAN traffic is cheap and the number of users usually quite limited, this should
not be a problem. The question is, whether or not this would increase the WAN traffic caused by
the local DNS server.
Well implemented servers should not create more external traffic, since they queue active exter-
nal queries after cache misses. However, since usually two local name servers are provided, the
WAN DNS traffic can be expected to double in the worst case.
Since 2007 Ellacoya’s data shows, that web traffic (46%) overtakes peer-to-peer traffic (37%)
as largest percentage of bandwidth on the Internet. The most significant share of this traffic are
video and audio streams (41%) that do not require intermittent DNS queries. Together with the
peer-to-peer traffic it can therefore be assumed that most of the Internet bandwidth is consumed
by rather large data objects. These facts may lead to the assumption that doubling DNS traffic is
not a problem.
Since DNSSEC also increases the amount of DNS bandwith consumption, there are some studies
of this phenomenon. For example, the studies of Olaf Kolkman [Kol05] show an increase of 10%
in the number of messages and 100 to 200% in the bandwidth consumption. This seems not to be
considered an obstacle for the deployment of DNSSEC and still is within boundaries of currently
deployed systems. Therefore, it can be assumed that lower resolver timeouts could easily be
traded-off for message overhead. However, the effect on WAN traffic should be measured.
7.2.2 Hierarchical Pull-Caches for the Cloud
In DNS usually each client provides a cache, except for stub resolvers. Since the semantics of
TTLs in DNS resource records are more and more deprecated and often very short TTLs are
used, there is a high number of unnecessary DNS cache misses. The reason is that the TTL does
not really provide knowledge about the expiry date of the data. This has been indicated by the
results of [RS04b] and my own study, where I monitored roughly 2300 DNS zones over two
weeks. The results are shown in Figure 7.2.2. The y-axis shows the difference between default
TTL of the zone and actual TTL in seconds. The error bars indicate the difference between
shortest and longest observed lifetime of a version of the zone. It is easy to see that the true
value can easily be a week away from the given TTL, leading to unnecessary queries or lost
updates. The amount of time on the y-axis shows, how much too long some entries are cached
for all negative values, and how much too early some records are invalidated for all positive
values.
A cache infrastructure should provide a hierarchical network, forwarding updates in a publish/-
subscribe manner to overcome these TTL problems. However, this leads to some trade-offs that
have to be evaluated:
• How many caches should directly be notified by a cluster?
• How long should the notification path be at most in order to allow timely updates?
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Figure 7.1: Comparison of default TTLs and validity of one version of a zone in seconds
• Is it possible to apply existing protocols to organize such delegations, e.g. Gnutella version
0.6?
• How can caches be organized in a way that minimizes network stretch on the way to the
cluster? Could network coordinate systems help here?
7.2.3 Timeout Adaption for Local Resolvers
As we have shown in [PFS06], it can be useful to think about appropriate timeouts to contact
local DNS resolvers. This timeout could be learned from previous behavior of the local DNS
servers. The timeout adaption can have several objectives. It could help to detect omissions
earlier by estimating the highest useful timeout for a successful request. It can also be useful to
find out how many retries should be invested in a query. If it is indicated by the local history
that, e.g., there has never been a successful answer for a query after two retries, it can be con-
cluded, that not more than two retries should be tried. This would help to keep the number of
DNS packets low. In combination with the short timeouts discussed in Section 7.2.1, this could
balance out the higher number of packets due to short timeouts.
Now the question is, whether or not this would still lead to the same success rate as the standard
DNS while decreasing the average response time.
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7.2.4 Stable Hash Maps and Continuous Map/Reduce
To provide load shedding in a cluster, the stable hast map should provide better fairness and
performance than DHTs, as explained in Section 6.2.1. However, it has to be able to provide
load and store functionality for key-value pairs for continuous map/reduce programs to enrich
the map input and to store the reduce output. Therefore, it has to implement this functionality
in a way that does not influence the map/reduce operations in a negative way, e.g., by blocking
wait on the map input data.
Therefore, the requirements would be:
• non-blocking store operations with roll-back capabilities.
• parallel execution of non-conflicting loads and stores
• parallel execution of non-conflicting map/reduce operations
The traditional map/reduce implementation as it is used by Google Inc. and as it is implemented
by the Hadoop core consists of 6 consecutive phases.
1. reading an input
2. executing a Map function
3. partitioning the Map output
4. sorting the partitioned Map outputs
5. executing a Reduce function
6. writing the Reduce outputs
In this example the combiner has been left out for simplicity. Figure 3.1 on page 41 shows the
complete process.
In a continuous map/reduce implementation there must be phases that do not wait for each
other to finish. A phase will not finish, since the input is infinitly long. It is straightforward
to see that in the existing map/reduce implementations the map function is executed while the
input is read and also the final output writer does not have to wait for the reducers to finish
before it starts writing. The two main points that must be overcome by a continuous map/reduce
implementation are the dependability (1) between the sorter of the map outputs and the map
function itself and (2) between the sorter of the map outputs and the start of the reduce phase.
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